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Preface to ”Responsible Sourcing of Materials
Required for a Resource Efficient and Low-carbon
Society”
Our modern economy relies on the quality and availability of natural resources such as, e.g.,
biotic and abiotic raw materials, water, land and soils, clean air, and biodiversity. Driven by
population growth and economic development, future demand for natural resources is expected
to further increase in the coming decades. Raw materials including metals, non-metallic minerals,
and biomass will be an important part of society’s future material mix as countries increasingly
transition towards resource-efficient and greenhouse gas neutral economies. These materials are
also fundamental to meet ecological and socio-economic targets within the Sustainable Development
Agenda of the United Nations. For instance, they have a fundamental role in renewable
energy technologies, new building materials and infrastructure, modern communication systems,
and low-carbon transportation.
However, some materials are largely supplied from countries with poor governance and the
future availability of these materials could be threatened by various factors including, e.g., social
and environmental impacts during materials provisioning and production. The raw materials
criticality studies developed in recent years have explored amongst others economic, geo-political,
and technological factors that could affect the raw materials’ security of supply. Environmental
and social pressures also play an important role in the materials security of supply and can present
obstacles to a future transition to low-carbon societies required for achieving the climate targets under
the Paris Agreement. For instance, conflicts can prevent access to mineral deposits; accidents and
environmental damages compromise public acceptance and can hinder future extraction operations.
From the industry perspective, companies increasingly evaluate and report environmental and
social performance. Responsible sourcing of minerals and supply chain due diligence are sometimes
integrated in companies’ risk management strategies.
This book presents research papers with a focus on future outlooks of materials supply and use,
the consideration of associated environmental and social implications, and issues of raw materials
criticality and a circular economy. It highlights the importance of proper data and knowledge with
regards to materials availability, materials flows, social and environmental impacts along the supply
chain, and how materials supply and demand might evolve in the coming decades.
We are grateful for the well-drafted manuscripts that we have received from leading researchers
in the field for our special issue and hope that the compilation of all papers in this book format
provides for a concise and interesting overview of currently ongoing research in support of the
envisaged transition towards increasingly greenhouse gas neutral societies by 2050.
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Abstract: Our societies rely on the quality and availability of natural resources. Driven by population
growth, economic development, and innovation, future demand for natural resources is expected
to further increase in coming decades. Raw materials will be an important part of society’s future
material mix as countries increasingly transition towards resource-efficient and greenhouse-gas
neutral economies. Raw materials are also fundamental to meet ecological and socio-economic targets
within the UN Sustainable Development Agenda. For instance, they have a fundamental role in
renewable energy technologies, new building materials and infrastructure, communication systems,
and low-carbon transportation. However, some materials are largely supplied from countries with
poor governance. The future availability of these materials and associated impacts are of increasing
concern going forward. Recent raw material criticality studies have explored economic, geo-political,
and technological factors that affect materials’ supply. However, environmental and social pressures
also play a role in their security of supply. For instance, conflicts can prevent access to mineral deposits;
accidents and environmental damage compromise public acceptance and can hinder future extraction
operations. This article will introduce this Special Issue with a focus on material requirements
and responsible sourcing of materials for a low-carbon society, and provides an overview of the
subsequent research papers.
Keywords: raw materials; environmental and social sustainability; responsible sourcing and resource
governance; due diligence; future scenarios; security of supply
1. Introduction
1.1. Raw Material Trends
Raw materials are essential to fulfill many human needs, from the basic ones like shelter, to more
specific needs like communication and mobility. The amount [1] and variety [2] of materials used in
modern economies drastically increased in the last century to around 90 Gt (billion metric tons) in 2017,
causing concerns about the associated environmental impacts [3], social implications [4,5], and security
of their supply [6]. The extraction and processing of raw materials itself results in over half of global
greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions and more than 90% of global water stress and biodiversity loss [3,7].
Current scenario work by the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) estimates that raw material extraction could further double to approximately
160 to 180 Gt by around mid-century [7–9].
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Raw materials are important to reach many environmental and socio-economic goals as proposed
by the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development [10,11]. They are also required for
the transformation towards achieving the climate targets under the Paris Agreement [12–14]. However,
the provisioning of materials can also entail impacts which might hinder achieving such goals [11].
The material criticality studies developed in recent years have explored economic, geo-political,
and technological factors that could affect the raw materials’ security of supply [6,15]. It is argued
that governance is a proxy for also social and environmental considerations in related screening-level
assessments [16]. Other work has focused on developing more explicit environmental risk-related
indicators that could be used in criticality assessments [17]. Environmental and social pressures can
also play a role in the materials’ security of supply and present obstacles to a future transition to
a low-carbon society. Indeed, sudden supply chain disruptions, such as, e.g., during the current
Coronavirus pandemic or due to natural disasters or geo-political tensions, can suddenly alter material
availability. Conflicts can also prevent access to mineral deposits; accidents and environmental damage
compromise public acceptance and can hinder future extraction operations.
As highlighted by Ali and colleagues [18], social and environmental factors, as well as a lack
of legislative, economic, and governance stability in the host countries, might increasingly threaten
the capacity of the extractive industry to cope with a growing global demand for raw materials.
Hence, social conflicts, human rights issues (like, for instance, child labor), governance problems, and
environmental impacts are among the factors that should be monitored for preventing price peaks or
supply disruptions in the future. From the industry perspective, companies increasingly evaluate and
report environmental and social performance [19]. Responsible sourcing of minerals and supply chain
due diligence are sometimes integrated in companies’ risk management strategies [20].
Adverse environmental impacts and risks of primary materials provisioning can be reduced
through a number of approaches. One of them is the use of recycled materials for meeting demands
due to the potentially lower environmental impacts of secondary materials provisioning when
compared to primary raw material production. However, current recycling rates for many materials
are rather low globally [21] and also in regions where waste management practices are well developed,
like, e.g., in Europe [22]. Increasing product complexities, in terms of the number of materials
often used only in small amounts in single products [2], proves challenging from a technical
and economic standpoint for materials recovery from end-of-life products [22]. Furthermore, a
continued growth of anthropogenic material stocks coupled with increasing overall demands limits
the potential of secondary materials to displace large fractions of primary material input in the near to
medium-term future [22,23]. Other approaches towards a more sustainable materials system include,
e.g., lifetime extensions, dematerialization and efficiency strategies, substitution, and component reuse
and repair [24]. Furthermore, policy measures to promote life-style changes (sufficiency) also represent
an important component of a sustainable materials system, but life-style changes are less frequently
discussed in the literature and by policy making (see, e.g., the GreenLife scenario in [13] and other
literature [25,26]).
In addition to the above mentioned trends (growth in absolute material demands, associated
environmental and social implications, and increasing product complexities (i.e., the number of
materials used in single products)), also supply chains themselves are becoming increasingly complex
as many countries and economic sectors are involved in the provisioning of final products. This makes
it more challenging to track and manage material flows and associated impacts. An example is shown
in Figure 1 for the material flows of aluminum including the associated trade networks.
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Figure 1. Schematic figure showing selected material flows (Sankey diagram) and the associated
physical trade network of aluminum by life-cycle stage (physical trade flows are colored by source
country, arrows are proportional to flow size, and node size is based on the sum of imports and
exports) (Source: combination of the EU Material System Analysis [27] and trade network visualizations
from the EU Raw Materials Scoreboard [28] based on data provided in [29,30]. Details of the Sankey
visualization of aluminum are provided in [27], visualized using eSankey (www.ifu.com/en/e-sankey/).
Physical trade networks by life-cycle stage were created using data from UN Comtrade [29] together
with metal contents provided by Liu and Mueller [30] (see the methodological notes in the EU Raw
Materials Scoreboard [28]) and visualized using Gephi [31].) Gg: Gigagrams.
Aluminum finds widespread use in applications such as vehicles, industrial equipment,
construction, and metal products. Recycling (shown with purple arrows in Figure 1) is fairly high [27].
Physical trade intensifies, moving from the mining stage to metals production and subsequent
manufacturing stages as quantified by the trade network densities [28]. This shows the materials’
pervasive use in modern economies. The EU role in the global physical trade networks of aluminum
is most prominent at later supply chain stages (i.e., during the manufacturing of semi-finished and
final products), and in the trade of aluminum waste and scrap. Supply chain monitoring is required
to track the origin of materials and manage material stocks and flows more wisely [32]. At the
EU-level, the material system analysis (MSA) tracks the material flows and stocks for a wide range
of materials [27,33] and has been incorporated, e.g., into the EU Raw Materials Information System
(https://rmis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/?page=msa). The EU MSAs also provide the basis for a number of
indicators of the EU criticality assessment [16] and EU circular economy monitoring framework [34].
1.2. Aim of This Special Issue
Against this background, the aim of this Special Issue is to provide a collection of recent research
contributions on the topic of (future) raw materials needs and responsible sourcing. This includes the
consideration of environmental and social aspects in the management of raw material supply chains
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and an outlook to anticipated raw material demands in the coming decades. A particular emphasis is
given to the requirements for materials in environmental and low-carbon technologies.
In this editorial paper we, firstly, provide a brief overview of the anticipated role of raw materials
for achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [35] and implementing
the Paris climate targets for reducing greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions and the associated rise in
global average temperature to well below 2 ◦C [14]. Secondly, we briefly summarize some of the
relevant actors and policies both at the global and EU-level that aim at grappling with the challenges
of future raw material supply and demand. Finally, an overview of the papers in this Special Issue is
then provided.
2. The Role of Raw Materials for Future Societies
2.1. Raw Materials and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Modern societies rely on a wide range of materials that compose the physical basis of economic
systems. The variety of materials used has been limited to a few materials for most of the history of
civilization. Yet, over the past century, the amount and variety of materials used has been increasing
and has experienced a drastic surge in the last decades [28].
In a recent study [11], we mapped the role of raw materials to each of the SDGs proposed in the
UN 2030 Agenda [10]. The SDGs represent the vision for future sustainable societies and a guide for
policy making at all levels. The analysis takes into account the whole life-cycle of materials, including
their production (i.e., the role of economic sectors producing raw materials towards each goal), their
consumption (i.e., their function in the use phase), and their end-of-life. The review gathers evidence
of impacts occurring in the phase of material extraction and manufacturing, and those affecting the
environment and societies.
Regarding the manufacturing phase, pollution and safety at work can be pointed out as the
main concerns. Biodiversity impacts, conflicts with indigenous populations, and exacerbation of
competition for land and water are instead more typically occurring in the extractive industry (here
referring to forestry and mining and quarrying). The role of responsible business conduct and corporate
responsibility appears to be crucial in order to determine or prevent these impacts. For instance,
sustainable forest management can drive positive contributions to various goals including, for
instance, creation of jobs, maintenance of ecosystem services, climate change mitigation, etc. Similarly,
governance and institutions have a very relevant role in translating natural resource endowment into
national wealth [36,37]. The mining industry can contribute to economic development through the
payment of royalties, employment creation, and the provision of infrastructure and services to local
populations, especially in developing countries, if good governance of natural resources is in place.
The study also highlighted the contribution of materials in achieving several goals related to
society well-being and prosperity. This includes their direct contribution to some goals like the creation
of employment and economic growth (Goal 8: Decent work and economic growth) and the provision of
materials for infrastructure (Goal 9: Industry, innovation and infrastructure). In addition, the function
of materials in specific applications indirectly contributes to other economic, social, and environmental
goals. This is the case of non-replaceable materials used in medical devices (that contributes to Goal
3 on Good health and well-being), in low-carbon energy technologies (contributing to Goal 7 on
Affordable and clean energy and Goal 13 on Climate action), or in environmental technologies like
water treatments (contributing to Goal 6 on Clean water and sanitation), just to cite some examples.
The societal role of materials is partially captured by the concept of Critical Raw Materials [6].
The current assessment methodologies for criticality, however, are often based on factors related to
supply risks and, e.g., the materials’ economic importance. Other factors beyond economic importance
are not explicitly assessed in relation to the functions of materials in/for societies. As argued by the
contribution of Schellens et al. [38] in this Special Issue, a holistic definition of “critical materials”
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could allow for the consideration of, e.g., the socio-cultural and ecosystem support functions of natural
resources that could bring a different prioritization of materials.
Finally, proper materials management is pivotal for Goal 12 on “Responsible consumption
and production”. This goal includes the targets on sustainable management and efficient use of
natural resources (Target 12.2, measured through the material footprint and the domestic material
consumption) and on reduction of waste generation through prevention, reduction, recycling, and
reuse (Target 12.5, measured through national recycling rates and the amount of materials recycled).
Resource efficiency [39], a circular economy [40], and decoupling of material use from economic
growth [41] are pointed out as instrumental strategies to avoid overextraction and degradation of
environmental resources.
2.2. The Role of Raw Materials in a Low-Carbon and Resource Efficient Society
Low-carbon energy and transport technologies rely heavily on the use of critical materials. By 2050,
e.g., more than 1 billion electric vehicles, and the increased use of electricity for heat and renewable
hydrogen are expected as the main drivers for increased electricity demands from renewables [42].
For this, annual solar photovoltaics additions might need to increase from currently about 109 GW/yr
to 360 GW/yr in 2050 and annual wind additions from about 54 GW/yr today to 240 GW/yr in
2050 [42]. As, e.g., renewable energy systems are substantially more metal-intensive than existing
power generation [12], a transition to a low-carbon society requires an upscaling of current mining of
several metals and metalloids [43,44].
Authors have emphasized that this could hinder the transition to a low-carbon economy [45].
For example, using dynamic material flow analysis, Elshkaki and Graedel [46] found that for renewable
electricity generation technologies the global supply of base metals (aluminum, copper, chromium,
nickel, lead, and iron) could be met in the GEO3 Market First and Policy First scenarios, while
constraints in the supply of silver, tellurium, indium, and germanium could limit the introduction
of certain photovoltaic (PV) technologies. For seven major metals (i.e., iron, manganese, aluminum,
copper, nickel, zinc, and lead), demands are expected to double or triple relative to 2010 levels by
midcentury [47]. Using wind, solar, and energy storage batteries as proxies, the World Bank has
examined metal demands into the future [48].
Similarly, one recent assessment concluded that projected demand for 14 metals, such as cobalt,
lithium, rare earths, nickel, and copper, which are crucial for renewable energy, storage, and electric
vehicles could rise dramatically in the next few decades [49]. Another study analyzed demand for
12 metals in solar power, wind power, and electric motors, and batteries in global climate change
mitigation scenarios up to 2060 [50]. With regard to low-carbon energy and transport technologies at
the EU-level, moderate supply issues are expected for indium, silver, and silicon in PV technologies,
and for cobalt and lithium in electric vehicles until 2030 [51]. In addition, bottlenecks for carbon fiber
composites were found [51].
A recent study by de Koning and colleagues highlights that annual metal demand for electricity
and road transportation systems may increase significantly for indium, neodymium, dysprosium, and
lithium [43]. In Germany, the demand for metals due to new technologies (e.g., batteries, renewable
energy, superalloys, diodes, medicine, etc.) is expected to lead to significant demand surges for
germanium, cobalt, scandium, tantalum, neodymium, praseodymium, and a range of other metals
until 2035 [52]. For lithium, dysprosium, terbium, and rhenium, the demand of the German economy
might be more than twice the primary production in 2013 [52].
However, most studies to date focus on the transformation of the energy system or a subset of
“emerging technologies” and do not consider potential material demands across all economic sectors
and the necessary build-up of infrastructure required to reach GHG neutrality until 2050. Exceptions
include a recent report by the German Environment Agency which provides a systematic assessment
of material requirements for a GHG-neutral and material-efficient Germany in 2050 using scenarios
analysis [13]. A recent report of the European Commission forecasts raw material needs for various
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technologies (e.g., batteries, wind turbines, PV) and sectors (e-mobility, renewable energies, defense,
and space) in 2030 and 2050, and briefly discusses competitions between those [53].
Recent research also shows that sustainable materials management (i.e., implementing measures
related to material efficiency, reuse and recycling, product lifetime extensions, light-weight designs,
substitution, and others) has the potential to positively contribute towards the mitigation of GHG
emissions and needs to be considered in climate change mitigation approaches [54–58]. This has, until
recently, been overlooked in policy discussions on climate change mitigation [59]. Another recent
paper demonstrates that re-use of batteries arising from electric vehicles in stationary applications
has the capacity to increase resource efficiency of raw materials but can postpone significantly the
availability of secondary raw materials [60]. Future policy developments should consider the synergies
between sustainable materials management with other policy areas (e.g., climate change, biodiversity,
energy, agriculture, etc.) and design them in an increasingly integrated fashion.
3. Global and EU Policies for Sustainable Materials Management
Global level. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris
Agreement was adopted in 2015 with the goal to keep the increase in global average temperature well
below 2 ◦C [14]. However, policies currently in place seem insufficient for achieving this goal [61].
Recognizing that the successful delivery of the UN SDGs and implementation of the Paris climate
targets requires technologies that depend on a wide range of minerals in vast quantities [18], an
increasing number of institutions and activities are forming at the global level looking into possibilities
for more sustainable resource management.
These activities include, e.g., the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) International
Resource Panel (IRP), which was formed in 2007 with the mission to consolidate and evaluate scientific
data in order to provide global guidance for the sustainable management of natural resources [41].
The Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development aims at
supporting mining for sustainable development to limit negative impacts and ensure that financial
benefits are shared [62].
Several high-profile multilateral initiatives emphasize the importance of resource productivity.
The G7 (an alliance of seven major industrialized countries) has established an “alliance on resource
efficiency” at Schloss Elmau in 2015, which formed the basis for the adoption of the Toyama Framework
on Material Cycles in 2016, and the Bologna Roadmap in 2017 [63]. Similarly, the G20 decided
to establish a “G20 Resource Efficiency Dialogue” at their summit in Hamburg (Germany) in July
2017 [64]. The dialogue aims at making the efficient and sustainable use of natural resources a core
element of the G20 talks. In the fourth Session of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA4),
the international community adopted a number of resolutions with relevance to resource efficiency
(e.g., resolution UNEP/EA.4/RES.1 on innovation pathways to achieve sustainable consumption and
production, or resolutions UNEP/EA.4/RES.7 and UNEP/EA.4/RES.9 on environmentally sound waste
management and addressing single use plastic products pollution [65]). The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) promotes the sustainable use of materials and reduction of
their negative environmental impacts by encouraging resource productivity and waste management,
e.g., through the development of material flow and waste databases, related indicators, and the
publication of working papers and reports (http://www.oecd.org/environment/waste/). Moreover,
the OECD issued the “Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct” [66], which are
non-binding recommendations for enterprises willing to understand and implement due diligence on
a wide range of risk areas: human rights; employment and industrial relations; environment; bribery,
bribe solicitation, and extortion; consumer interests; and disclosure. Sector-specific guidance has
also been released for a number of sectors, including mining. The OECD “Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas” [67] is often considered the
international standard for due diligence in the mineral supply chains and underpins the EU Regulation
on Conflict Minerals (Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
6
Resources 2020, 9, 68
17 May 2017, laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum,
and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas).
The World Bank has enacted the Climate Smart Mining Facility, which supports the sustainable
extraction and processing of minerals and metals by scaling up technical assistance and investments in
resource-rich developing countries [68]. The World Resources Forum and Future Earth are bringing
together academics, policy makers, and industrial representatives to grapple with the science of
sustainable resource use. A responsible and sustainable sourcing of raw materials is also called for
by the Council Conclusions on Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) of October 2018, in order
to reconcile the extractive sector with the protection of ecosystems and biodiversity in producing
countries (Council conclusion 12948/18).
With the active support of the EU, the United Nation Environmental Assembly adopted in March
2019 in Nairobi a resolution on mineral resource governance [69]. The resolution acknowledges the role
of sustainable management of metal and mineral resources for the development of clean technologies
and therefore to the climate change action and the decoupling of economic growth from environmental
degradation. Moreover, it encourages governments, businesses, non-governmental organizations,
academia, etc. to promote “due diligence best practices along the supply chain, addressing broader
environmental, human rights, labor, and conflict-related risks in mining, including the continuous
increase of transparency and the fight against corruption”.
EU-level. The 2008 EU Raw Materials Initiative aims at ensuring: (i) a fair and sustainable
supply of raw materials from global markets; (ii) sustainable supply of raw materials within the EU;
(iii) resource efficiency and supply of ’secondary raw materials’ through recycling [70]. This approach
recognizes the role of raw materials for the functioning of the industrial system and its competitiveness.
At the same time, it stresses that sustainable production and a circular economy are needed in order to
achieve security of supply.
The “Europe 2020 strategy” and its related flagship initiatives outline the vision of promoting
resource-efficiency in Europe and shifting to a greenhouse-gas (GHG) neutral economy [71]. The EU
Circular Economy Strategy (e.g., encompassing an action plan, monitoring framework, and plastics
strategy) followed as the basis for overall materials management at the EU level [72]. The energy
roadmap outlines possible routes towards decarbonizing the energy system by 2050 [73]. Recently,
a long-term vision for a climate-neutral Europe was published [74] and a strategic action plan on
batteries was adopted [75]. This “EU strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive
and climate neutral economy” (COM(2018) 773 final) stresses the role of raw materials for climate
action. While it acknowledges that primary raw materials will continue to provide a large part of the
demand, resource efficiency and a more circular economy are expected to improve competitiveness,
create business opportunities and jobs, reduce energy requirements, and in turn, reducing pollution
and GHG emissions.
Currently, the EU Green Deal (COM(2019) 640 final) provides a roadmap with actions towards a
competitive economy in which GHG neutrality is reached by 2050, economic growth is increasingly
decoupled from resource use, and no person/no place is left behind [76]. Within the Green Deal, the EU
sets actions to promote a sustainable and inclusive growth. Among them is a new circular economy
action plan [77], a new industrial strategy for Europe [78], and a proposal for a climate law [79].
Examples of instruments for the promotion of responsible sourcing at the EU level include the
Conflict Minerals Regulation (EU 2017/821), which tackles the specific issues of 3TGs (Tungsten,
Tantalum, Tin and Gold) and will be effective from 2021; the Strategic Battery Action Plan (COM(2018)
293 final, Annex 2), which promotes ethical sourcing of raw materials for the batteries industry
and the related European Battery Alliance (EBA), launched in 2017 to create a competitive battery
manufacturing value chain in Europe; and the research program Horizon, including the research
project RE-SOURCING (Global Stakeholder Platform for Responsible Sourcing). Moreover, in 2019, the
European Commission launched “Due Diligence Ready!”, an online portal that provides businesses
with guidance on how to check the sources of the metals and minerals entering their supply chains.
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Various additional EU and national policies in member states related to material use and resource
efficiency exist, and an overview is provided elsewhere [80–83].
4. Towards Low-Carbon and Material-Efficient Societies
Recent policy developments in the EU, such as covered in the EU Green Deal [76–79] as well as
climate and energy policies of individual member states, have set out the ambitious goal of achieving
climate neutrality by 2050. This will only be possible through a rapid transformation of all economic
sectors towards low carbon technologies, by increasing material efficiency across a wide range of
materials, technologies, and sectors, and by changes in life-styles. While research in the design of 100%
renewable energy systems has gained increasing attention since 2004 [84–87], an integrated view of the
associated materials and other resources demand (water, land area, biodiversity, etc.) [88], associated
social and economic implications [19], as well as the potential of material efficiency to contribute to
climate mitigation [89], have only recently been considered. Some scenarios and modeling approaches
exist to highlight the impact of future development paths towards multiple SDGs, highlighting potential
trade-offs that might not be visible when focusing only on a subset of impact categories [90,91].
Determining options for reducing GHG emissions and resource use within an economy requires,
firstly, a screening across all economic sectors (i.e., energy, mining, manufacturing, transportation,
agriculture, buildings and infrastructure, waste management, etc.) to determine possibilities for
implementing material efficient and renewable (low-carbon) systems. Substitution roadmaps are
central to complement efficiency and recycling approaches [92]. Given the long lifetimes of large-scale
systems, such as power plants or steel production, an implementation of alternative solutions has to
take place within the next years if climate goals under the Paris Agreement until 2050 are taken seriously.
This includes, e.g., the switch to renewable energy and towards the use of power to gas/liquid (for gas,
fuels, and chemical feedstocks provisioning from renewable power) in the energy sector and across
industrial applications, e-mobility and better public transport, and life-style changes (e.g., reduced
meat consumption, increased on-ground public transport for shorter distances instead of aviation,
traffic avoidance, sufficiency, etc.). Research shows that an economy-wide transformation across all
sectors is technically feasible (at least for single countries and regions) but that it requires rapid and
ambitious implementation on the policy side [13,84].
Providing scenarios and roadmaps that describe the technical, life-style, and policy changes
required to achieve GHG neutrality by 2050, while at the same time closely monitoring potential
pressures through other natural resource demands, is an important step in laying out technically
feasible visions for individual countries and regions. Stakeholder engagement is essential to have
broad societal support for such a vision.
Furthermore, sound data and indicators are crucial to understand possible trade-offs between
different material and technology choices with regard to environmental and social implications.
By capturing the flows and stocks of individual materials [32] or broad material categories [93], material
flow analysis (MFA) provides a good starting point for better managing (raw) materials, avoiding losses
to the environment, and for assessing social considerations. Efforts by governments are underway at
various spatial (globally, regionally, and for individual countries or sectors/industries) and temporal
scales to capture material flows in the economy (e.g., [27,32,33,94–97]). Frameworks for the description
and monitoring of the physical economy are emerging [98].
In the life cycle assessment (LCA) methodology, physical accounts of materials and energy inputs
and outputs in a system can be combined with unitary factors of impact (i.e., characterization factors
(characterization factors express how much a single unit of mass of the intervention contributes to an
impact category)) in order to help assess impacts over the life-cycle [99]. At the level of products or
companies, product and organizational environmental footprints provide both a concept and data
for estimating environmental impacts supporting, e.g., corporate reporting and investment [100,101].
Looking at socio-economic aspects, the social life cycle assessment (S-LCA) methodology similarly
combines site-specific and generic data on social aspects affecting different types of stakeholders in
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order to help identify impacts in the supply chain [102]. Both techniques are based on the design
of a system from a physical point of view, the definition of its burdens, and the consideration of all
the life-cycle stages, which facilitates detection of burden shifting and comparison of alternatives.
Moreover, a wide spectrum of impact categories is addressed by both environmental and social
LCA. Availability and quality of data remains, however, one of the main constraints, as both LCA
and S-LCA require extensive gathering of primary data in order to get to robust results. Indeed, in
the case of social assessment, contextual information is essential and generic data from commercial
databases can support a first screening of hotspots but are not sufficiently accurate to perform an
impact assessment [103].
5. Overview of Papers in This Special Issue
The contributions gathered in this Special Issue address the following aspects: (i) assessment of
material requirements for future energy systems; (ii) reflection on the concepts of resource depletion
and criticality; (iii) analysis of social and environmental pressures of mining; (iv) analysis of conflict
minerals management from a company perspective; and (v) analysis of a circular economy through
material flow cycles.
Concerning the first group, these papers quantify material requirements to support efficient
transport systems [104] (Teubler et al.), renewable energy technologies [105] (Moreau et al.), or
low-carbon electricity generation [106] (Boubault and Maïzi). Different time frames are considered
(respectively, 2030, 2050, and 2100). Teubler et al. [104] quantify the annual final energy and
GHG-emission reductions from low-carbon transport in Europe in 2030. Moreover, they compare
these reductions to the savings and additional requirements for materials and metals using indicators
like material footprints, carbon footprints, etc. Boubault and Maïzi [106] use life-cycle inventories
of technologies for energy generation and the TIME Integrated Assessment Model to project the
global raw material requirements in two scenarios (a second shared socio-economic pathway (SSP2)
baseline and a 2 ◦C target scenario). Moreau et al. analyze the material requirement of a transition to a
renewable energy system, taking into account five energy scenarios. The storage capacity needed to
support renewables is also modeled. The material requirement is then compared with the availability
of metal reserves and resources, reflecting on the implications on resource depletion.
Resource depletion is also at the core of the Rötzer and Schmidt paper [107]. Using historical data
on ore grades, prices, mining technologies, etc., they argue that decreasing metal ore grades should not
be considered as indicators of resource depletion, as they are often addressed through technological
advancement in mining techniques. However, the increasing environmental impacts, and resource
requirements related to the exploitation of lower concentrated deposits (which can imply competition
for water and land, and lead to social tensions and/or impacts) should be looked at as the main concern.
Schellens and Gisladottir [38] discuss another feature of raw materials that has been gaining
growing importance in the last decade, especially from a policy perspective, i.e., raw materials criticality.
Their investigation focuses on the current definitions, and suggests that the current discourse on
criticality overemphasizes some aspects, like the economic importance of materials (instead of their
social and ecological function), the role abiotic materials (instead of biotic), etc. A holistic definition
of natural resource criticality is proposed to provide decision-makers with neutral and balanced
information and recommendations on natural resource management.
Social and environmental pressures linked to mining are investigated in the paper by Di Noi and
Ciroth [108]. This paper presents a sustainability hotspot screening for the EU Horizon 2020 “Integrated
Mineral Technologies for More Sustainable Raw Material Supply” (ITERAMS) project, which targets
more efficient water recycling, tailings valorization, and the minimization of environmental footprints.
Looking at the downstream part of the metals supply chain, Young et al. [109] gather data from
smelters and manufacturing industries to explore how these industries manage conflict minerals and
perform due diligence programs. This investigation sheds light on the implementation of responsible
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sourcing from a company perspective, providing insights on supply chain transparency and risk
management for what concerns human rights violations, conflicts, poor governance, etc.
Finally, in Graedel et al. [110], the Australian anthropogenic cycles of five materials (four metals
and one alloy) were analyzed and utilized to provide novel insights into the circular economy potential
for each of the cycles and carbon neutral prospects in Australia. The study demonstrates that the
circular economy must be conceived at the global level, and must be cognizant of the losses that are
inevitable at every life stage.
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Abstract: The long-term transition towards a low-carbon transport sector is a key strategy in Europe.
This includes the replacement of fossil fuels, modal shifts towards public transport as well as higher
energy efficiency in the transport sector overall. While these energy savings are likely to reduce the
direct greenhouse gas emissions of transport, they also require the production of new and different
vehicles. This study analyses in detail whether final energy savings in the transport sector also
induce savings for material resources from nature if the production of future vehicles is considered.
The results for 28 member states in 2030 indicate that energy efficiency in the transport sector leads to
lower carbon emissions as well as resource use savings. However, energy-efficient transport sectors
can have a significant impact on the demand for metals in Europe. An additional annual demand for
28.4 Mt of metal ores was calculated from the personal transport sector in 2030 alone. The additional
metal ores from semiprecious metals (e.g., copper) amount to 12.0 Mt, from precious metals (e.g.,
gold) to 9.1 Mt and from other metals (e.g., lithium) to 11.7 Mt, with small savings for ferrous metal
ores (−4.6 Mt).
Keywords: energy-efficient transport; greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; material resources
1. Introduction
The transport sector in Europe is responsible for one quarter of the region’s greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. A transition towards low-carbon transport alone would enable a 60% reduction
until 2050 compared to 1990 [1]. Existing policies work towards this goal. They promote, for example,
low- and zero-emission vehicles or a switch to alternative energy for transport.
From a technical point of view, this translates into fewer and other vehicles (modal shift).
These vehicles are either more fuel efficient or powered by alternative sources of mechanical energy.
While these steps help to reduce the direct GHG emissions in Europe, there are some indications
for additional indirect emissions (e.g., from electricity supply and battery production) as well as
unintended side or rebound effects from this transition strategy. The study at hand intends to shed
light on some of these effects and to assess their criticality in regard to future material use in Europe
and abroad.
One major concern of researchers is the additional indirect GHG emissions from non-operational
infrastructures, fuel provision and vehicle manufacture. Chester and Horvath (2009), for example,
found that GHG emissions and energy use are influenced by non-operational aspects. The overall
GHG emissions are 1.4–1.6 times higher for road transport and 1.8 to 2.5 times higher for rail transport
in the US [2]. Renewable electricity and lower material intensities of transport infrastructure and
manufacturing could reduce GHG emissions and emissions from air pollutants such as SO2 and
NOX. Other authors (Williams et al., 2012) emphasize that low carbon transitions require a logical
deployment sequence in order to be successful. Energy efficiency is followed by decarbonization of
energy supply and the electrification of fossil energy use [3].
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These findings go hand in hand with research on effects from the production of electrified vehicles
and their infrastructure. A recent study on behalf of the European Environment Agency [4] analyzed
the interactions of electric vehicles and the power sector in Europe. The authors quantified the net
emissions from an increased number of electric vehicles. They conclude that with an increased share
of electric vehicles, the electricity demand of these cars becomes a relevant factor in the energy system.
The positive GHG effects are partially offset by the additional demand.
The affected systems and impacts of low-carbon mobility are widely discussed in the literature.
Bohnes et al. (2017), for example, found that environmental burden shifting can take place if electric
vehicles are deployed to a large degree. The electrification of passenger transport can also have
unintended side effects in cold countries. Additional energy for car heating might be required,
as vehicles with an internal combustion engine are more energy-efficient in this regard [5]. It is
also possible that direct and indirect price effects lead to a rebound effect from a microeconomic
point of view. Vivanco et al. (2014) analyzed the price elasticity of transport demand and marginal
consumption models. They showed that some technologies for electric vehicles can lead to partial or
over-compensation for some environmental impacts [6].
In regard to natural resources, raw materials and the economic effects of low-carbon transport,
several studies focus on metals (e.g., lithium). Tagliaferri et al. (2016) analyzed the environmental
impacts of conventional and electric vehicles in a cradle-to-grave life-cycle assessment (LCA) [7].
They found that higher toxicology impacts for electric vehicles are linked to the use of precious
metals and chemicals in the battery-manufacturing phase (GHG emissions and abiotic depletion are
reduced with the help of battery electric vehicles, but are more influential during the production
phase). Olivetti et al. (2017) put their research focus on the future material requirement for lithium-ion
batteries. They conclude that manganese and nickel supply is sufficient to meet these requirements [8].
For lithium itself, it is not the quantity of reserves that poses a challenge, but the slow increase in
production compared to the high increase in demand. The authors are confident that this is only
a bottleneck in the short term. Another potential bottleneck is the material requirement for cobalt.
The mining and refining of cobalt is currently highly concentrated in certain regions (Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and China).
The metal availability for future low-carbon transport also depends on similar transitions
in other sectors. In this context, several studies analyzed the future demand of metals such as
lithium or neodymium [9–13]. It is assumed that these issues can be overcome with an upscaling
in metal production. However, there is a need for further analysis of the trade-off between
reducing GHG emissions on the one hand and the additional material demand from technologies
towards electrification.
The authors of this study follow up on this question by analyzing the results of a multiple-impact
analysis of future energy efficiency improvement actions in Europe in 2030 (Calculating and
Operationalizing the Multiple Benefits of Energy Efficiency in Europe (COMBI)). With respect to
the transport sector, it is investigated whether future transport systems require additional metal ores
to be produced and which metals might be needed in particular. Are we required to trade metals
for fuels?
The consequences of such a trade could affect different aspects of more sustainable economies.
Further increasing the extraction rates of metals would increase the associated environmental burden
itself and the burden shift towards developing countries (which often provide the metal ores).
Bottlenecks in particular could amplify these effects, as metal costs increase and less favorable reserves
(lower ore grades) are tapped in order to meet the demand. This could, in turn, lessen the positive
effect of many sustainable policies on a global scale. However, it could also be an additional incentive
for countries to promote higher material efficiency and material recovery rates in their economies
(including the development of cost-effective recycling technologies).
The study is subdivided into 6 sections. The introduction in Section 1 is followed by a description
of the scope of the study in Section 2. Section 3 covers impact-indicators, methods, data, models
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and limitations. Section 4 describes the results and Section 5 discusses the implications for metal
demand and supply. Section 6 concludes the study with an aggregation of the findings and the need
for future research.
2. Scope
The core results in this paper are part of the Horizon 2020-project COMBI. COMBI aims at
calculating the energy and non-energy impacts 21 energy efficiency improvement (EEIs) in the
28 European Union members (EU-28) in 2030. The analyzed impacts cover the areas of air pollution,
social welfare, macro economy, energy systems/security and resources (further information such as
reports and a tool to visualize the effects, can be found at https://combi-project.eu or [14–16]). They are
calculated from a snapshot view. The final energy use in 2030 after implementing EEIs is compared to
its equivalent without these measures. The base-case scenario includes activities that are already in
motion (extrapolated towards 2030).
For resources, the authors created several bottom-up models to quantify the annual net impacts
in terms of raw material extraction and greenhouse gas emissions. These models cover the so-called
use-phase of all 21 actions in five sectors. The use-phase represents the difference in resource impacts
from two different scenarios: base-case and energy-efficiency. They are based on final energy savings,
but also the necessary material and energy flows to provide the energy services. This includes, for
example, the construction of power plants and grids for electricity in the member states (see pp. 37–54
in [17]). The calculation method uses the input data (final energy per energy carrier and EEI) and
relates this energy consumption to the material and energy flows necessary to provide the energy
service. The differences in the flows of both scenarios are then used to calculate the resource impacts
(see also section on methods).
In addition to the net effects during the use-phase, several actions were also considered in the
context of their production-phase. The production-phase represents the material and energy flows that
stem from differences in the product stocks and product types. For passenger and freight transport,
production-phase models consider the production of cars, busses, duty trucks and trains (see pp. 55–63
in [17]).
This study focuses on EEIs in the transport sector, which were modeled by the University of
Antwerp (see [18,19] for further details). For passenger transport, a modal shift (action 9), future car
(action 11) and bus stocks (action 12) were considered. The freight transport activities cover a modal
shift (action 13), light duty trucks (action 14) and heavy-duty trucks (action 15). Table 1 shows the list
of actions considered, as well as the resulting differences in the final energy use between base-case and
EEI scenarios in 2030.
Table 1. List of energy efficiency improvements (EEIs) in the transport sector considered for the study
at hand.
Actions a (EEIs)
Final Energy Saving in EU-28 in 2030
(Baseline vs. EEI)
9—Transport (passenger) modal shift 40 TWh
11—Transport (passenger) cars 284 TWh
12—Transport (passenger) public road/bus transport 3 TWh
13—Transport (freight) modal shift 90 TWh
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Table 1. Cont.
Actions a (EEIs)
Final Energy Saving in EU-28 in 2030
(Baseline vs. EEI)
14—Transport (freight) light duty truck 13 TWh
15—Transport (freight) heavy duty trucks b 32 TWh
Total c (Actions 9,11,12,13,14,15) 460 TWh (rounded value)
Source: Calculating and Operationalizing the Multiple Benefits of Energy Efficiency in Europe (COMBI) input
data [18,19] based on the models: PRIMES [20]; JRC TIMES [21]; TREMOVE [22]; iTREN [23]; ASTRA-EC [24];
SULTAN [25]. a The numbering of actions might deviate from other COMBI sources, because it has been changed
over the course of the project; all numberings in this paper refer to this table. b There are no differences in the
product stocks for action 15 in the COMBI input data (the same types of heavy duty trucks are produced in both
scenarios). However, changes in the overall amount of heavy duty trucks are also reflected in the data on modal shift.
c The “missing” action 10 considers energy savings from passenger transport with two-wheelers. As the production
of two-wheelers could not be incorporated into a production phase model, it is omitted from the selection of actions
for impact quantification (use phase and production phase).
The actions themselves can be differentiated into measures towards structural changes in the
mode of transport (modal shift in actions 9 and 13) and changes in the transport systems (road transport
in actions 11,12,14,15) [18,19]. Modal shifts in the personal transport sector include a shift towards
public transport and to non-motorized transport (cycling, walking). For freight transport, a shift
towards rail and waterborne transport is assumed. The actions for road transport address changes in
drive train technologies (fewer conventional vehicles with an internal combustion engine). They also
cover higher fuel efficiency (eco-driving, increased occupancy levels/load factors, higher fuel efficiency
for vehicles) and the use of “green” fuels (more environmentally friendly). Avoiding or reducing the
number of trips or trip lengths is not considered.
The two modal-shift EEIs represent growth rates for the different modes of transport (all
vehicles including walking and cycling). They are based on PRIMES data. While activity levels
(e.g., passenger-km) change between 2015 (base year) and 2030 (both scenarios), they are not different
between both scenarios. The same holds true for occupancy levels and loading factors. All of these
parameters would affect energy consumption and thus distort the direct impacts of EEIs.
The vehicle-specific EEIs rely on fuel-efficiency improvements and changes in drive-train
technologies. Fuel efficiency and fuel share values are based on EU scenarios and models (TIMES
by the Joint Research Centre), TREMOVE, iTREN, ASTRA-EC and SULTAN). Changes in the vehicle
stocks are based on country-specific shares for all different technologies. They are modeled according
to annual new sales for each drive-train technology and transportation mode. Basis for the stock-model
are JRC TIMES, TREMOVE, iTREN, ASTRA-EC and SULTAN as well.
The quantified net impacts (see methodology) originate in the EU (see Figure 1). Measures within
European countries are the source for a reduction of the country-specific energy consumption.
The impacts of providing the energy services and producing necessary technologies are not restricted
to the European borders (with exception of direct GHG emissions). Because many energy services
require materials from outside of the EU, final energy savings also affect material extraction and
emissions on a global scale.
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Figure 1. System boundaries for resource impacts material footprint, global greenhouse gases (GHG)
and direct GHG (own compilation).
3. Methodology
The quantification required the definition of resource impacts, the selection of methods and
the generation of models. A thorough description can be found on the COMBI website (see scope).
It contains a literature review [26] as well as a report on methodology (see pp. 14–36 in [17]) and results
(see pp. 64–91 in [17]).
3.1. Impact Indicators for Natural Resources
There are several definitions of natural resources and their sustainable use. Most definitions
revolve around the usefulness of resources to humans. It is also commonly agreed upon that their
depletion affects the environment as well as the needs of future generations. According to the Flagship
Initiative under the Europe 2020 Strategy, natural “resources underpin the functioning of the European
and global economy and our quality of life. These resources include raw materials such as fuels,
minerals and metals but also food, soil, water, air, biomass and ecosystems” [27].
The study at hand restricts natural resource use to raw materials (in tons) and GHG emissions
(in tons of CO2 equivalents or CO2e). The wide variety of environmental and economic effects of
resource use cannot be merged into a single indicator [28]. However, the extraction of raw materials
on the input side of the techno sphere allow for a rough estimation of resource use effects. Less use of
material resources is likely to be accompanied by less pressure on soil, water and ecosystems. A lower
global warming potential also indicates a lower environmental footprint in most cases. Functioning as
a proxy for a much more complex issue, both impact categories are strongly linked to the EEIs. A more
detailed description of advantages and limitations of material flow accounting (MFA) and similar
methods (e.g., primary energy demand) can be found in the literature [29–32].
Other potential impact-indicators have been omitted for various reasons. First, any resource
indicator for COMBI needed to be applicable to single EEIs within countries and the sum of all EEIs in
a country. Second, any resource indicator should have no direct relation to other impacts in the study
on multiple benefits of energy efficiency in order to avoid double counting. Third, resource indicators
should be able to cover mining aspects as well as biotic raw materials.
Methods based on multi-criteria analysis were ruled out, because they are either non-quantitative
assessments or rely on weighting by experts. Energy-related resource indicators were not used for
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risk of double counting. Methods based on input-output tables on the other hand (e.g., economy-wide
material flow accounting) were ruled out due to their high level of aggregation. Many suitable LCA
impact categories for resource depletion (such as abiotic depletion potential) are restricted to a selected
group of materials and do not cover the mining process or raw materials without economic use.
However, future assessments of multiple impacts might benefit from the current work of the task force
on natural resources. This expert group is expected to classify and evaluate several resource indicators
and relate them to their area of protection (see [33] for present findings).
Table 2 lists the impact indicators. The indicator dGHG refers to the GHG emissions from both
scenarios, caused by the combustion of fossil fuels in the transport sector. It is restricted to the use
phase of EEIs and the direct consumption of energy carriers. The carbon footprint also includes the
life-cycle wide, but annual GHG emissions from energy services and the production of vehicles (use
and production phase). It refers to globally induced GHG emissions.
Table 2. Impact indicators for EEIs in the European transport sector.
Impact Indicators [Unit] Description
Material Footprint [tons]
Biotic and abiotic raw materials from used extraction in use- and
production-phases
unused extraction of biotic and abiotic materials without economic use in use-
and production-phases
Biotic Raw Materials [tons] Biotic raw material demand from used extraction in use- andproduction-phases
Abiotic Raw Materials [tons]
Fossil fuel demand from used extraction in use- and production-phases
Metal ore demand from used extraction in use- and production-phases
Mineral demand from used extraction in use- and production-phases
Carbon Footprint [tons] Global Warming Potential (GWP 100a) within and outside of Europe in use-and production-phases
dGHG [tons] Global Warming Potential (GWP 100a) from fossil fuel combustion in Europein use-phase
Source: [17].
The material footprint (in kg or tons) includes the life-cycle wide amount of extracted raw
materials. These materials are either put to an economic use (used extraction) or not (unused extraction
from e.g., excavation). It can be further divided into abiotic raw material demands for fossil fuels,
minerals and metal ores. This includes for example ore waste after processing as well as the biotic raw
material demand. The material footprint is a sum-indicator of material accounting. It adds up the
life-cycle wide inputs of specific materials and connects them to their natural occurrence (e.g., in form
of a ore) as well as any additional material needed for their provision:
Material Footprint (MF) = Fossil Fuel Demand + Metal Ore Demand
+ Mineral Demand + Biotic Raw Material Demand + Unused Extraction
(1)
The final results or net effects are quantified as the difference between both scenarios (see
3.4 models) with help of characterization factors (e.g., the fossil fuel demand of electricity from
soft coal in a certain country). This means that sub-impacts can partially compensate each other,
such as trading fossil fuels for metal ores.
3.2. Methods
Impact indicators refer to different base-lines throughout EU member states or European markets.
Energy-efficiency improvements take place in the same spatial and temporal boundaries. The methods
for calculation are based on the material flow accounting and life-cycle assessment methodology.
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A additional advantage of these two methods lies in their compatibility. All impacts can be calculated
by using characterization factors in the same models from the same input and generic data.
For material footprint the material-input-per-service (MIPS) is chosen (see also [29,34–36]).
The necessary impact factors (raw material extraction and unused extraction from nature) are mostly
based on Wiesen et al. (2014) [37]. Additional factors are found in an expertise on behalf of the German
Environment Agency [38].
The carbon footprint represents the Global Warming Potential for 100 years (GWP 100a) by the
International Panel on Climate Change [39]. Direct GHG emissions are calculated by multiplying the
direct fossil fuel use in both scenarios with their characterization for GWP 100a. Emission factors stem
from a guideline for GHG monitoring by the European Commission [40]. Renewable energy carriers
have no direct emissions (dGHG), but can have global GHG emissions for provision and utilization.
Apart from these direct emissions, all impact indicators cover the life cycle phase from extraction
to production or cradle-to-gate over the lifetime. They represent a current set of technologies for energy
supply and, in case of EE’s during the production-phase, for average vehicles and lighting systems in
Europe. The functional unit is 1 MWh of net energy or 1000 products.
The phase of decomposition or end-of-life (EoL) is excluded from the analysis. Including the EoL
stage would have required data or assumptions for at least the state-of-art, costs and capacities of
utilization technologies. It would also require reliable information on secondary material prices and
regulatory requirements.
The use-phase, on the other hand, is directly represented by the final energy use in the input data.
3.3. Data
The following data is included in the COMBI input data (not all of which were used to model
EEI’s in the transport sector):
Final energy use per energy carrier, EEI and country
• Gross energy production in 2030 per country (aggregated data based on PRIMES);
• Stocks of cars, busses, duty trucks, lighting systems per EEI (if relevant) and country;
• Share of ambient heat sources per country;
• V-% of blend for biofuels in 2030;
• loading factors for freight transport vehicles;
• number of lighting points per building in residential and non-residential buildings;
• lighting efficiency of lighting types.
The upstream material and energy flows, including parameters for energy conversion, stem from
the Life Cycle Inventory (LCI) database ecoinvent in version 3.1 (The first models were generated as
early as 2015. At this point, only ecoinvent 3.1. data was available for the calculation of impact factors
for resource use.). Additional data was drawn from EUROSTAT and literature (see section on models).
3.4. Models
The researcher chose a static bottom-up model approach in light of the project’s restrictions.
Those restrictions required the compilation of input data during impact quantification. The input data
itself focused on the effects of energy-efficiency improvements alone. Many surrounding systems were
assumed to be the same between scenarios. Dynamic modelling (e.g., feedback loops between sectors)
was therefore not possible. The models also exclude the export and imports of energy or products.
Each model consists of a set of characterization factors for a country, a region, Europe or one type of
product. These factors are then multiplied with the final energy use per energy carrier in the input
data or the amount of product type stocks in both scenarios.
The basis for the electricity model is a top-down disaggregation of the gross electricity production
in Europe in 2030 (generated within the PRIMES model). The electricity supply by power plants and
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grids is then further disaggregated bottom-up. Each country is represented by one characterization
factor for each impact indicator. However, power plants are, in many cases, representatives of a
European region rather than a European country. The same holds true for electric grids, which represent
a European average. Additional data stems from ecoinvent 3.1. [41], Eurostat [42], the PRIS database
on nuclear reactors [43], wind energy statistics [44], solar power statistics [45] as well as a study on
hydropower in Europe [46].
The (transport) fuel model is somewhat simpler, as there are not many differences between
European countries in terms of fuel production. This led to the compilation of a European model
for fuel provision. Each of the 8 different fuel types in the input data is represented by one average
characterization factor for each impact indicator. Additional data for model generation was drawn
from ecoinvent 3.1, the JRC well-to-tank/well-to-wheel analysis [47] and the SULTAN model on
biofuel substitution of the future [48]. Feedstock data stems a study on biofuel sustainability [49] and
information on the natural gas supply in Europe [50].
Additional models were required to represent the production of vehicles in the European market.
The COMBI input data provides information on the stocks of 14 different car types (with 3 different
sizes each) in both scenarios. A recent study provided the LCIs of 8 different car types [51], which had
to be matched to that input data and scaled according to three different sizes (see Tables 3 and 4).
The LCI data in [51] is based on several LCAs of vehicles [52–55]. In light of these sources, data on the
car body and to lesser extent electrical engines might be outdated.
Additional characterization factors were generated for light-duty trucks (based on the car data),
busses (based on a MAN Lion’s City M in [56]) and heavy-duty trucks (based on the ecoinvent 3.1.
process “production of lorry, 28 tons”). Trains were modeled according to ecoinvent data as well
(“goods wagon production” and “locomotive production” for the Rest-of-Europe). All data on vehicles
for freight transport was scaled to the country-specific COMBI input data on average load factors (see
supplementary materials for detailed information).
Table 3. Matching of drivetrains in the COMBI input data with data from a project on “key technologies
for electro mobility” (STROM).
Passenger Car Type in COMBI Used Drive Train Based on STROM
Internal combustion engine (ICE) gasoline baseline ICE gasoline
ICE gasoline advanced ICE gasoline
ICE diesel baseline ICE diesel
ICE diesel advanced ICE diesel
ICE liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) retrofit ICE CNG
ICE compressed natural gas (CNG) retrofit ICE CNG
ICE ethanol ICE gasoline
ICE hydrogen ICE gasoline
Hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) gasoline Hybrid gasoline
HEV diesel Hybrid gasoline
Plug-in Hybrid (PHEV) gasoline Plug-In Hybrid gasoline
Plug-in Hybrid (PHEV) diesel Plug-in Hybrid gasoline
Battery electric vehicle (BEV) Battery electric
Fuel cell (FC) hydrogen Fuel cell electric
Source: [17] based on [51].
Table 4. Scaling of vehicle weight for personal transport.
Type Weight Class Weight Lifetime
Passenger Car
Small 1200 kg 12 years
Medium 1600 kg 12 years
Large 2000 kg 12 years
Bus Standard 11,000 kg 13 years
Source: own compilation.
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3.5. Limitations
The chosen approach as well as data availability and matching to the input data resulted in
numerous simplifications, assumptions and cut-offs for the models (see Table 5).
Table 5. Key assumptions and cut-offs of models in the study.
Model Key Assumptions Cut-Off
Electricity Supply-
Use Phase
• All countries use the same network specific (per unit
of energy) length and technology for their
electrical grid
• Power plan technologies of single countries may
represent countries within one market
• One European process was used to process natural
gas into heat and electricity
• Country-specific processes do not include upstreams
for waste provision, therefore an appropriate process
for Switzerland was used for all countries
• Imports and exports of
electricity in Europe or
between Europe
and Rest-of-World
• No SF6 for switching gear
Fuel Supply- Use
Phase
• EU-28 average for fuel provision
• Direct CO2 emission factors for each fuel are average
in Europe (assuming total combustion)
• Share of biofuel in biofuel blends is the same
throughout Europe
• No bioethanol from wheat,
barley, triticale, wine, cassava
• No biodiesel from
sunflower, tallow




• One product represents one vehicle type in EU-28
• Small, medium, large vehicles are scaled by mass
• Standard and advanced cars with internal
combustion engine share the same production recipes




• Light-duty trucks based on large car types in
passenger transport model
• Heavy duty trucks only represented by one type with
different loading capacities per country
• Trains represented by one type with different loading
capacities per country
• Different production mix for
heavy duty trucks in
efficiency and base-case
scenario (only stock
differences by modal shift
relate to impacts)
The researchers used current production recipes to generate models of a future use of resources.
They neglected potential higher rates of secondary materials in the European economies in the
future. This results in the following major limitations in regard to the study itself and their use
in another context:
• the generated characterization factors are not a robust basis for a comparison of impacts between
countries or technologies by themselves;
• the resulting impact indicators (e.g., net material footprint) depend on the size of final energy use
in both scenarios as well as product stocks and the assumption on the share of certain energy
carriers (e.g., electricity from soft coal in 2030);
• differences in the LCIs within one product type (e.g., for different battery electric vehicles) can be
larger than differences between average product types;
• static bottom-up models cannot account for the fact that changes in the product stocks and final
energy use are likely to have an impact on the systems (e.g., the electricity system) themselves
as well as extraction and recycling rates of material in a economy.
Other (minor) limitations are inherent to LCA and MFA methods in general (e.g., uncertainty
from actuality of data and the use of generic process data), but would also affect other models.
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4. Results
The energy efficiency improvements in the transport sector scenarios result in final energy savings
in the European Union of 460 TWh in 2030. This results in savings for the overall material demand
(material footprint) of 67 Mt (56 Mt for passenger transport alone); 52 Mt stem from a lower raw material
demand for fossil fuels; and 12 Mt from a lower demand for materials from unused extraction. There is
also the possibility for a small negative trade-off for the extraction of biotic materials. Changes in
the provision of final energy lead to an additional demand of 0.4 Mt of biotic raw materials in the
use phase. On the emission side, greenhouse gas emissions of 159 Mt CO2e could be saved globally.
135 Mt CO2e could be saved directly from a lower combustion of fossil fuels within the EU.
4.1. Use vs. Production in the European Union (EU)
The changes in the production systems for vehicles attributes to additional global Carbon
Footprint savings. 8 Mt CO2e are not emitted globally, resulting in a net carbon footprint of
168 Mt CO2e. However, additional 12 Mt of material have to be extracted during this production
phase, decreasing the net material footprint down to 54 Mt. While additional savings could be realized
for minerals (1.2 Mt of savings), fossil fuels (1.1 Mt of savings) and materials from unused extraction
(5 Mt of savings), the extra demand for 19.9 Mt of metal ores is largely responsible for this effect (see
Figure 2). There is also evidence that these transitions lead to an additional demand for biotic raw
materials: additional demands of 0.4 Mt are required during use with a net effect of 0.33 Mt.
 
Figure 2. Gross and net impacts of resource impacts in the transport sector (negative values indicate
savings). By calculating the differences between both scenarios, single sub-impacts (e.g., metal ores)
can be higher than the sum of all sub-impacts combined (see also Section 3.1).
4.2. Material Demand for Modal Shift and Differences in Vehicle Types
The modal shift improvements (action 9 and 13) have a rather small effect on the material
requirements of the use-phase. Additional 0.7 Mt are required in the personal transport sector, while
1.2 Mt are saved in the freight transport sector. The overall smaller product stocks from modal shift
24
Resources 2018, 7, 49
rather affect the production-phase. The study found additional savings of 53 Mt for personal transport
and 61 Mt for freight transport.
Changes from differences in the produced vehicle stocks (actions 11, 12, 14) are mainly responsible
for additional material requirements. For personal transport, 56 Mt are saved during use-phase
compared to an extra of 106 Mt during the production phase. Light-duty vehicles on the other hand
require an additional 18 Mt during the production-phase, but reduce the material demand during the
use-phase by 61 Mt.
Looking at the net effect of both sectors (savings of 54 Mt), personal transport only contributes 7%
of the savings.
4.3. Metal Ore and Metal Demand
Metal ores are the only material resources that are required additionally in relevant amounts.
While EEIs from freight transport induce metal ore savings of 9.8 Mt, an extra of 28.2 Mt of metal ores
are needed to provide energy savings in the passenger transport sector in 2030 (resulting in a net effect
of an extra 18.3 Mt).
The following sub-sections focus on the metal demand for cars in the passenger transport sector,
as this sector alone is responsible for an additional net metal ore demand of 28.4 Mt.
4.3.1. Differences in Car Types and Stocks
Two actions are responsible for metal ore savings and additional metal ore demand from passenger
transport in the scenario. Action 9 compares the car stocks in the reference scenario with reduced car
stocks from modal shift. Action 11 is compiled from changes in car stocks towards more fuel-efficient
vehicles. The total of both actions results in the total net effect. Large differences can only be found
for diesel cars (46 million advanced cars in exchange for 57 million baseline cars) and gasoline cars
(64 million advanced cars in exchange for 72 million baseline cars). Fewer than 10 million hybrid cars
have to be produced additionally. Stocks for full battery vehicles are even negative: 0.2 million cars
do not have to be produced as a net effect (although their share in the production mix is significantly
higher compared to a reference scenario).
4.3.2. Metal Ore Demand by Metal Type
Despite low differences in car stocks for non-conventional cars, additional metal ores are required
to provide energy savings during the use-phase. According to Table 6, additional 28.4 Mt of metal ores
are required with savings only for iron ores (4.6 Mt). The additional metal ores from semiprecious
metals amount to 12.0 Mt, from precious metals 9.1 Mt and from other metals 11.7 Mt. While the modal
shift effect itself saves up to 20.0 Mt of metal ores, an additional 48.6 Mt are required to produce the
cars for action 11.
Table 6. Material and metal ore demand (net effects of actions 9, 11 and 9 + 11; negative values
indicate savings).
Indicators for Metal Ores Modal Shift for Cars (A 9) Production of Cars (A 11) SUM of A 9 & A 11
Material Footprint −55.49 Mt 104.81 Mt 49.33 Mt
Unused Extraction −32.49 Mt 53.07 Mt 20.58 Mt
Metal Ores—TOTAL −20.17 Mt 48.56 Mt 28.39 Mt
Metal Ores—Iron −4.96 Mt 0.39 Mt −4.57 Mt
Metal Ores—semiprecious metals −5.30 Mt 17.29 Mt 11.99 Mt
Metal Ores—precious metals −1.90 Mt 11.04 Mt 9.14 Mt
Metal Ores—rare earth metals −0.01 Mt 0.10 Mt 0.08 Mt
Metal Ores—minor & other metals −8.00 Mt 19.73 Mt 11.74 Mt
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4.3.3. Direct Metal Input
The production of fuel-efficient cars is the cause of the additional metal ore demand in the scenario.
The main drivers for the additional requirement of 48.6 Mt in action 11 are hybrid cars (58.1%), fuel
cell cars (39.4%) and plug-in hybrids (38.2%), while the reduction in conventional car stocks saves
metal ores of up to 17.8 Mt.
The demand for semi-precious metals (12.0 Mt for both actions) is dominated by copper.
Copper ores alone contribute 80.3% of this demand. This corresponds to a direct input of 148,000 tons
of copper metal and equals 1.0% of the global copper production in 2012 (but 3.6% of Europe’s demand
in 2014 according to [57]).
For precious metals, an additional metal ore demand of 9.1 Mt would be required. The majority
(73.1%) stems from gold ores (coupled production). The corresponding annual direct input for gold
only amounts to 11.6 tons of gold, which is 0.5% of the global gold production in 2012 [58], and only
0.4% of the mined gold supply in 2015 [59].
The metal ore demand for minor and other metals (11.7 Mt) is driven by the demand for lithium
brines (13.0 Mt). Nickel derivate savings of 2.1 Mt only partially compensate for that. The direct input
for lithium amounts to 19,550 tons or 103,000 tons of lithium carbonate or LCE (it is assumed that 1 kg
of LCE is equal to 0.1895 kg of pure Li), which is roughly 51% of the worldwide lithium production in
2012. While it seems likely that lithium production will increase of the next decades, demand is likely
to increase as well, as more and more lithium-dependent applications evolving (see also [60]).
Cobalt and rare-earth elements are both popular research objects in related literature.
Unfortunately, the researchers of this study could not quantify robust results for these metals.
The uncertainties from data, methodology and the potential technological development were too high.
4.3.4. Metal Ore Demand for Drive Trains
Many factors in the scenario data were kept on the same level for both scenarios in order to focus
on EEIs (e.g., energy mix or activity levels). Additionally, modal shift improvements played a crucial
role in reducing the overall demand for cars in the personal transport sector. Only replacing current
car technologies with future car technologies would, therefore, have a larger impact on the overall
metal demand. Using data in this study on the production of medium-sized cars allows for a rough
estimation of these effects. Table 7 shows the comparison between the metal ore demand for a petrol
car and the additional demand of other drive trains. However, this risk can be mitigated, if metal
recovery and material efficiency are improved.
Table 7. Additional annual metal ore demand per car type compared to a medium-sized petrol car
(production of car).
Material Demand Hybrid, Medium Fuel Cell, Medium Battery, Medium
Metal ores (all) 3.1 tons 5.4 tons 6.1 tons
Semi-precious metal ores 1.1 tons 2.0 tons 2.5 tons
Precious metal ores 0.8 tons 0.9 tons 1.0 tons
5. Discussion of Metal Demand and Supply
Table 8 lists the direct metal input results in the study for copper, gold and lithium. It compares
them to maximum global production rates in Sverdrup et al. (2017) [58]. Even without considering
the uncertainty of the scenario and LCI data, possible technological development as well as higher
recycling and more efficient extraction rates, most additional demands for metals are not critical from
the perspective of supply.
Trading “metals for fuels” is clearly a possible consequence of low-carbon transport policies,
however; in particular, if electrical drive trains (hybrid and battery vehicles) are advocated and lithium
remains the most important raw materials for their production. Looking at the literature (e.g., [8,11,61]),
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it is likely that the future demand for lithium in electrical vehicles exceeds its current production.
These additional supply needs can likely be met by an increase in production (also in regard to a
comparable large availability). However, lithium is not only required for future vehicles, but also
electronic products, thus further tightening the supply in the future.




This Study in 2030
in [Tons/Year]
Current Production
in Sverdrup et al.










Copper 148,000 16,000,000 28,000,000 0.7%
Gold 11.6 2600 3200 0.3%
Lithium (LCE) 103,166 200,000 350,000 29.5%
Source: Own compilation based on [58].
Koning et al. (2018), for example, analyzed the demand, production and supply of various metals.
They looked at four different scenarios for a low-carbon economy in 2050 (not restricted to the transport
sector) [11]. The authors found that the high demand for most analyzed metals (such as aluminum)
can be met by the known economic reserves (not without further development of mines, however).
In opposition, the demand for lithium and copper (among other metals) cannot be met by current
reserves. It was calculated that the global annual demand for electricity production, construction
works and land vehicles in 2050 amounts to 18 million tons of copper and 414,000 tons of lithium
(supplementary material in [11]); 37 million tons of copper and 1.6 million tons of lithium are required,
if also other products such as electronics are considered (data stems from the Blue Map electricity
supply (BMES) scenario in the study, which not only considers technological development, but also
changes in the electricity supply systems with high shares for renewables and nuclear energy).
Another study by Olivetti et al. (2017) looked closely at the future supply chains of lithium-ion
batteries [8]. They emphasized that comparing the demand for lithium to its future supply is
not sufficient to determine its criticality. Potential bottlenecks are, rather, likely to stem from an
imbalance in production of lithium carbonates in comparison to the demand for battery-grade material.
Recycling batteries at the end of life might mitigate the challenges in the lithium supply in the long
run, but this is currently economically not feasible.
6. Conclusions
This study quantified the annual final energy and GHG emission reductions from low-carbon
transport in Europe in 2030. It compared these reductions to the savings and additional requirements
for materials and metals in particular. In regard to the research question (metals for fuels?), additional
metal ores are required to allow for energy and GHG savings in Europe and worldwide. The net
effect from energy-efficiency improvements in freight and personal transport, amount to an additional
demand of ca. 18 million tons for metal ores per year (compared to savings of 54 million tons of fossil
fuels). In turn, large global GHG savings of more than 168 million tons of CO2 equivalent and a lower
final energy use of 460 TWh are realized. However, the overall material bill is positive: despite negative
net effects for metals and biotic materials (0.3 Mt), more than 54 million tons of material would not
have to be extracted due to transport modal shift and low-carbon vehicle stocks. This amount is likely
to increase, if technological development and recycling lead to better material efficiency.
For metal ores, the negative impact is dominated by EEIs in the personal transport sector.
Considering both use and production of vehicles, an extra of 28 million tons of metal ores are required
to be extracted in 2030 alone. This demand mainly stems from car production, which is only partially
compensated for by their use and a modal shift. The resulting extra annual net demand for metal
ores (28.4 million tons) is divided into the following ore types: an extra of 12.0 Mt for semi-precious
metals, 9.1 Mt for precious metals, 11.7 Mt for other metals (mainly lithium) and savings of 4.6 Mt for
27
Resources 2018, 7, 49
ferrous metals. The direct input (metal) for copper amounts to 150,000 tons, for lithium carbonates to
103,000 tons, and for gold to 12 tons per annum. With the exception of lithium, none of this demand is
deemed crucial on its own or from a low-carbon transport sector alone. Nonetheless, the occurrence of
future supply bottlenecks for these metals in particular also depend on the metal ore demand in other
areas, as a short literature review showed.
The authors applied a bottom-up approach by calculating the effects of over 20 different energy
efficiency actions in different sectors all over Europe and summing these effects up. The models did
not account for the fact that recycling rates for metals might increase due to policies for recovery.
They also exclude assumptions on technological developments leading to higher material efficiency.
Positive synergies can also be created by developing different sectors together, reducing environmental
impacts as a consequence (e.g., by power-to-x technologies). Due to the focus on material resources,
many environmental effects could not be accounted for. Deep and large structural changes for an
energy-efficient Europe might harm water resources, induce land-use change, decrease biodiversity
as well as generate additional waste or emit additional harmful substances into water, air and land.
It is up to further research to determine whether all of these effects are going to be negative or whether
positive effects occur in Europe alone.
The perspective applied in this study is driven from a technological and economic point of view.
Societies invest in energy-efficiency products in Europe in order to meet the goals of a low-carbon
society. It is recommended to validate these and similar findings by applying a more transdisciplinary
approach which also takes into account the needs of future societies or the cultural drivers of
transformation (e.g., as shown by [62]).
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Abstract: The transition from a fossil fuel base to a renewable energy system relies on materials and,
in particular, metals to manufacture and maintain energy conversion technologies. Supply constraints
shift from fossil fuels to mineral resources. We assess the availability of metal reserves and resources
to build an energy system based exclusively on renewable energy technologies. A mass balance of
29 metals embodied in renewable energy technologies is compiled in order to satisfy global energy
demand, based on five authoritative energy scenarios for 2050. We expand upon these scenarios by
modeling the storage capacity needed to support high shares of intermittent renewables (wind and
solar). The metal requirements are then compared with the current demand and proven reserves and
ultimate mineable resources. This allows us to distinguish between constraints related to renewable
energy sources from those linked to technology mixes. The results show that proven reserves and,
in specific cases, resources of several metals are insufficient to build a renewable energy system
at the predicted level of global energy demand by 2050. The comparison between reserves and
resources shows that scarcity relates sometimes more to techno economic supply than to raw material
availability. Our results also highlight the importance of substitution among technologies and metals
as well as the limited impact of recycling on the depletion of scarce metals.
Keywords: global renewable energy system; metal reserves; supply side; storage; long-term scenarios
1. Introduction
The current energy system relies overwhelmingly on fossil fuels, with the associated combustion
technologies and storage facilities. A very different system, based on renewable energy sources,
must be built by 2050 to drastically reduce carbon emissions and avert catastrophic climate change [1].
Renewable energy (RE) sources, including solar, wind, hydropower, geothermal energy, and biomass,
must be converted by renewable energy technologies to cover the final energy demand for heating
and transportation fuels, as well as for electricity. These RE technologies have to be manufactured and
maintained, which requires a flow and stock of mineral resources and, in particular, metals. In other
words, attention is shifting away from oil, gas and coal reserves, which need to stay in the ground,
to the reserves of metals required in the transition to a low carbon energy system [2–4].
Reserves are what can be extracted economically with current technology and available energy.
Resources are the amount of ore known (proven, probable or potential) in the Earth’s crust which
become available as technology and prices evolve. This means that future reserves are found in today’s
resources, but changes in the energy cost of extraction for example, could also mean that current
reserves become future resources [5]. The number of elements utilized by human activities has grown
sharply, in particular for transition metals for manufacturing electronics and RE technologies [6].
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Thus, the transition towards a fully renewable energy system places additional pressure on the
main mineral resources, as well as on specialty metals [7–9]. However, unlike fossil fuels which are
chemically degraded by combustion in the current energy system, metals in RE technologies retain
their properties and can in principle be recycled. This offers greater potential for a circular economy,
provided sufficient metal resources are available to build this new energy system. A lot of research
already exists on the metal stocks and flows associated with new technologies including renewable
energy ones [7,10–18]. However, none address the issue of metal scarcity from a comprehensive
perspective, that is, by comparing jointly the global demand from industry to reserves and resources of
the main and specialty metals for multiple RE technologies. Among the key attempts, Kleijn et al. [19]
and Vidal et al. [20] assessed the material and mineral implications of switching from fossil fuels
to low carbon technologies. While their results show that low-carbon sources of electricity require
more metals and minerals, they did not compare this growing demand with current reserves and
resources. Similarly, Vesborg and Jaramillo [21] estimated the volume of metals required to generate
one TWh of final energy from a range of clean energy technologies without addressing scarcity or
future energy demand.
The supply of metals depends on specific geological, physical and industrial conditions, such that
one metric of supply does not fit all metals. Thus, supply constraints are often performed individually
and per application, such as cadmium (Cd), tellurium (Te), indium (In), gallium (Ga) or selenium
(Se) for thin film solar cells like cadmium–telluride (CdTe) or copper–indium–gallium–selenide
(CIGS) [22–25]. In addition, the supply of these metals depends to a large extent on the extraction of
parent metals such as copper, zinc, tin or aluminum and must be evaluated as such [26–28].
On the demand side, Kavlak et al. [29] quantified the metal requirements for large scale deployment
of photovoltaics (PVs) according to energy scenarios, as well as from historical production/consumption
of the different metals found in PV panels. They conclude that demand for indium, selenium and
tellurium might limit the thin film PV industry as early as 2030. Grandell and Thorenz [30] reached
a similar conclusion for silver (Ag). The availability of dysprosium (Dy) might also hinder the
manufacturing of permanent magnets for wind turbines [17]. More generally, Harmsen et al. [31]
evaluated the potential scarcity of copper (Cu) for long term global renewable energy scenarios (2050).
Similarly, Elshkaki [32] concluded through dynamic material flow analysis, that resources of platinum
(Pt) would be depleted before the end of this century. The supply of other metals such as cobalt (Co) [33]
and lead (Pb) [34] might be less affected because they are recoverable from multiple sources.
Among the most comprehensive evaluations of metal use for RE technologies, Elshkaki and
Graedel [11] quantified the availability of different metals used for wind turbines, PV panels,
concentrated solar power (CSP), hydropower, geothermal, biomass, coal, oil, gas, and nuclear power
under policy and market-based scenarios for 2050. They conclude that the manufacturing and
replacement of wind turbines may not face major resource constraints, whereas the production of
PV panels is potentially more problematic. Tellurium in particular might become critical in terms of
resource availability and production capacity for CdTe panels. Yet, this study falls short of accounting
for the metal constraint of a fully renewable energy system and excludes an important subset of metals,
the platinum group metals (PGMs), which might prove critical.
We build on the work of Vidal et al. [7,20] and Habib et al. [35] who estimated the demand for
main metals and rare earths respectively, in several renewable energy scenarios. We systematically
estimate the demand for a set of 29 metals necessary for manufacturing and replacing RE technologies.
Moreover, we use well established scenarios of energy supply and demand for 2050 which rely on 100%
renewable energy sources, or with a small share of non-renewables. We also estimate the short-term
storage requirements of intermittent sources, namely PV and wind, and account for the necessary
battery technologies. Finally, we simulate different combinations of renewable energy and battery
storage technologies to estimate the impact of the technology mix on metal scarcity. We then evaluate
the metal scarcity by comparing the requirements for these scenarios and technology mixes with
current extraction rates as well as current reserves and ultimate mineable resources. To evaluate the
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relative supply constraints of each metal, we compute their respective depletion horizon in terms
of reserves and resources by considering the demand from both energy and non-energy industries.
However, we focus exclusively on the energy supply side of energy-related activities, although the
evolution of energy demand side technologies, such as electric vehicles, necessarily influence the
demand for metals as well. We assume that the supply chains of metals are equally global as that of oil
and gas, with potentially new cartels and regional disparities in resource supply [4,36]. In this sense,
our results are based on a mass balance analysis, comparing supply and demand volumes, without
addressing economic issues.
This comprehensive evaluation of the availability of energy metals is organized as follows:
Section 2 details the methodological approach. In Section 3, we present our results and the impacts of
energy and technology scenarios. Section 4 discusses these results and we conclude in Section 5.
2. Materials and Methods
To evaluate the potential supply constraints of metals, we estimate depletion horizons, or the
year when reserves and resources would be depleted, should the deployment of a global and fully
renewable energy system take place. While reserves and resources of metals are regularly re-evaluated
alongside extraction, depletion horizon provides a common measure of scarcity. We consider the
main renewable energy technologies as well as the stationary batteries needed to balance electricity
generation from intermittent renewables (wind and solar). Although battery electric vehicles can
also store electricity temporarily, in their first or second life, we ignore this possibility for now [37].
In order to estimate the extent to which the demand from renewable energy industries will impact
the extraction of metals, we include the current demand from incumbent economic activities, such as
electronics and aerospace which compete for the same metals.
Metal scarcity can be defined as follows: A steady decrease in the global average grade of ores
extracted over time and an increase in prices of extracted metals which cannot be compensated by
improving and upgrading mining technologies [38]. Improvements in mining technologies compensate
for declining ore grades, but the energy cost of extraction keeps growing, with potential impacts
on renewables [39]. Thus, we model different technology mixes for photovoltaics, wind, biomass,
and storage technologies to assess substitution opportunities for the renewable energy industry.
Five different battery chemistries were taken into account for intraday electricity storage.
The methodological approach can be divided into four steps. First we select five scenarios of global
energy supply or demand in 2050, broken down by energy sources. These scenarios account for changes
in demand for energy as a result of population and economic growth as well as energy efficiency and
subject to the potential of renewable sources. Second, we integrate sub-scenarios of renewable energy
technologies including solar PV and battery chemistries for storage. Third, we quantify the amount of
each metal needed to manufacture and maintain renewable energy technologies in each of the five
scenarios by taking the life cycle inventory of each technology and metal (kg/kWh) and scaling the
metal requirements according to each scenario. We ignore potential resource productivity gains, as the
rate of changes required in the energy system to meet emissions targets by 2050 will likely outpace
productivity. In the fourth and last step, we compare the annual demand for metal with reserves and
resources, assuming a renewable energy system is deployed linearly by 2050. Although recycling has
little impact as demand grows and the energy system is implemented, we nonetheless included several
recycling scenarios. Indeed, PV technologies for example have already witnessed their first lifecycle.
2.1. Energy Scenarios
Two well-established scenarios attempt to estimate global energy demand based exclusively on
renewables: an IPCC scenario and one that results from the work of Ecofys and WWF [40,41]. We also
include three scenarios with a high share of renewables: the International Energy Agency’s “High RE”
and “2 degree” scenarios, as well as the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) “REMAP”
scenario [42,43]. All of them have the same time horizon of 2050 but different estimates of global
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energy demand. They also differ on the share of each renewable (and non-renewable) energy source,
such that they provide a measure of uncertainty in the energy supply and demand and the metals
required to manufacture and maintain renewable energy technologies (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Five scenarios of global energy supply/demand in 2050 with high shares of renewables.
2.2. Renewable Energy Technology Scenarios
The scenarios in Figure 1 estimate global energy demand in 2050 together with supply per
energy source. Forecasting the mix of technologies per energy source, such as that of PV technologies,
is challenging not only because technology improves continuously but more importantly because
a range of technologies normally co-exist, in particular for solar, wind, biomass or battery storage.
Given the metals needed to manufacture each technology, the mixes require different quantities and
often also qualities of metals. Thus, we used sub-scenarios of renewable energy technologies for solar
PV, biofuels and battery energy storage as explained below. All scenarios already accounted for the
potential of onshore and offshore wind power.
2.2.1. Solar PV Scenarios
The current market for photovoltaic (PV) panels is dominated by mono- and multi-crystalline
silicon solar cells for which life cycle inventory (LCI) data exists [44]. IRENA forecasts that market
shares of second generation thin film solar cells (CdTe, CIGS) will slowly increase to make up
approximately 10% of the market in 2030 [45]. Thus, the PV technology mix here includes close
to 90% of crystalline silicon, with multi-layered panels accounting for two-thirds. The remainder is
split approximately equally between CdTe and CIGS technologies for which data also came from the
ecoinvent LCI database [46]. In these inventories, the lifetime of PV panels are approximately 30 years.
Thus, we concentrate on commercial PV technologies and do not consider future technologies such as
Perovskites given the uncertainty regarding their deployment.
2.2.2. Biofuels
We consider second generation biofuels and the corresponding LCI data is relatively well
documented. Although the impact of biomass would have to be regionalized, we only consider
the metal requirements, especially catalysts, for biorefinery processes and no regional disparities.
The use of biogas for transportation remains marginal and a mix of biodiesel and ethanol dominate
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the market [47]. In Figure 1, energy from biomass, including biofuels and the generation of heat and
electricity are aggregated into a single category.
2.2.3. Storage Technologies
Intermittent renewable energy sources, namely solar and wind, require some forms of storage
to balance supply and demand. The need for storage technologies increases non-linearly with the
penetration of intermittent renewables. Many storage technologies, including batteries, also require
specialty metals [48]. In Europe, the electricity surplus from renewable energy sources (approximately
40 TWh per year) is either curtailed, sold to neighboring countries or stored in pumped hydro and
storage (PHS) plants [49]. Storage clearly depends on regional potential and installed capacity of solar
and wind, as well as on the level of flexibility of the electric system (power plants, transportation grid,
demand response). Therefore, in order to estimate the storage requirements regionally and globally,
we derived the daily solar and wind profiles as well as the loads of five regions (EU, US, India, Brazil,
and South Africa), representative of the five continents over a full year [50,51]. India represents Asia
Pacific on its own for the lack of open data to model such profiles for China. Storage requirements
were estimated by the daily surplus of renewable electricity in each region. The regionalized versions
of the scenarios in Figure 1 were then used to scale up these storage requirements. We only considered
intraday electricity storage, which can itself be covered by several technologies, centralized and
decentralized [52]. We assumed that 50% of this storage would be covered by decentralized batteries
and simulated three different mixes of five battery chemistries, including one non-lithium technology,
for which LCI data is available [46,53,54] (see Appendix A for details). The estimated global storage
requirements per scenario are given in Figure 2. For comparison purposes, we also show other
estimates by IRENA, the Energy Watch Group and the World Bank [3,43,55].
Figure 2. Storage requirements corresponding to energy scenarios and compared with 3 existing estimates.
2.3. Metal Inventory of Renewable Energy Technologies
The metals embodied in each renewable energy technology were quantified based on a life
cycle perspective. In life cycle inventory (LCI) or impact assessment (LCIA), products (goods and
services) are modeled with respect to their functions and measured by a functional unit. In the case
of RE technologies, the functional unit is 1 kWh, such that LCI data sets provide the life cycle metal
requirements per kWh. Data sets were sourced from the ecoinvent LCI database version 3 [46] which
inventories 29 metals found in RE technologies (as shown in Figure 3). The data sets are so called
“cradle to gate”, meaning they account not only for the metals in the technology itself, but also those
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used for its manufacturing, installation, end of life, as well as its connection to the closest point of
distribution (e.g., connection to the grid for wind turbines and PV panels) over the lifetime of the
technology. Thus, we used intensities in kg of metal per functional unit and technology before scaling
to the global energy system using the energy and technology scenarios above. For technologies that
are not available in the ecoinvent database (e.g., emerging battery chemistries), we estimate their
metal inventory based on literature references [48,53,56,57]. The metal intensity of each technology is
summarized in Appendix B and details are available in supplementary data [58].
2.4. Metal Demand, Reserves and Resources
We model the energy system in 2050 and assume, for the sake of simplicity, a linear rate of
deployment of RE technologies between 2017 and 2050. The model is not dynamic and targets the state
of the energy system in 2050. To emphasize the growing demand for metals from RE technologies,
we compare it with the aggregate demand from incumbent industries, which we assume to remain
constant. In other words, we assume that high productivity gains for specialty metals in non-energy
applications will offset part of the growth in demand. We also test the sensitivity of recycling rates,
using four different recycling scenarios: (1) Current recycling rates for each metal remain unchanged
for 2050 (conservative estimate) [59]. (2) A moderate 5% increase in recycling rates for each metal,
between now and 2050, and (3) a more aggressive 50% increase is applied uniformly. (4) Specialty
metals are recycled at the current rates of their parent metals, which are assumed to remain unchanged
for 2050 (as in scenario 1), according to the wheel of metals by product [60,61]. A list of recycling rates
for each metal and scenario is available in Appendix C.
The demand for metals from both the deployment of renewables and incumbent activities is then
compared to the current reserves and resources reported by the US Geological Survey (USGS) [62].
The USGS defines resources as the “concentration of naturally occurring solid, liquid, or gaseous
material in or on the Earth’s crust in such form and amount that economic extraction of a commodity
from the concentration is currently or potentially feasible”. Reserves refer to “that part of an identified
resource that meets specified minimum physical and chemical criteria related to current mining and
production practices, including those for grade, quality, thickness, and depth”. Where USGS estimates
are aggregated for rare earths and PGMs, we disaggregate by metal based on the literature [18].
The difference between reserve and resource estimates illustrate some of the technical and economic
constraints in bringing metals to markets which may stimulate material or technology substitutions.
Finally, we compute the ratio of reserves, respectively resources, over total demand up to 2050
measured by the sum of the growing demand from renewable energy technologies and the current
demand from incumbent industries. Recycling simply reduces total demand, as in open loop recycling
rather than displacing the demand for primary sources from renewable energy itself. The results
yield a depletion horizon for each of the 29 metals and five scenarios. The demands from energy and
technology scenarios translate into ranges of depletion horizons per metal and provide a measure
of uncertainty.
3. Results
The results show that some metals are sufficiently scarce to set limits to the deployment of a fully
renewable energy system before 2050. In this section, we present the results for reserve and resource
depletion separately for comparison purposes, with the same mix of storage technologies including the
five battery chemistries covering the average battery requirements, as shown in Figure 2. The current
recycling rates are used and we then illustrate more specifically the impacts of recycling and storage
scenarios for the scarcest of the metals. The corresponding cumulative metal demands are listed in
Appendix D and the details are available in the Supplementary data.
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3.1. Depletion Horizons of Metal Reserves
Figure 3 shows the ranges (in red) of depletion horizons for each metal across the five energy
scenarios in Figure 1 if we were to deploy a fully renewable energy system by 2050. The black dots
indicate the depletion years given the current demand alone, that is, without the deployment of a
renewable energy system. For example, the ranges (in red) shift to the left of the depletion horizons
for cadmium (Cd), cobalt (Co), lithium (Li) and Nickel (Ni) reserves, which indicates that renewable
energy technologies will absorb a significant part of these metals in comparison with the demand from
other, non-energy applications.
Figure 3. Depletion horizons based on reserves with demand from the energy sector (in red) ranging
across energy scenarios and demand without the energy sector (in black). N.a. means no data available.
Figure 3 also shows that the reserves of eight metals (Cd, Co, Au, Pb, Ni, Ag, Sn, Zn) are likely to be
depleted before a renewable energy system can be deployed on a large scale in 2050. This is irrespective
of the energy or technology scenarios and the level of energy demand. The depletion ranges for Cd,
Co and Ni are longer, meaning greater uncertainty. Lithium (Li) reserves also exhibit a long depletion
range between 2060 and the end of the century, that depends on the energy and storage scenarios. It is
important to note that for some of these scarce metals (Cd, Co, Li, Ni), the deployment of a renewable
energy system moves the depletion horizons closer from that set by incumbent (non-energy) industries
(red bars and black dots differ). Competition for these metals might thus become a reality in the
coming decades between traditional and new energy industries.
Other metals fare better with a depletion horizon beyond 2100 and should not experience any
foreseeable supply constraints. Unfortunately, reserve data is missing for indium (In) such that we
cannot conclude at this stage. The cumulative metal demands underlying the results in Figure 3 (and
Figure 4) are available in Appendix D.
3.2. Depletion Horizons of Metal Resources
Resources are more abundant than reserves by definition and less subject to techno-economic
changes. Hence, resources represent a more absolute measure of scarcity than reserves. The difference
with reserves essentially shows the challenge for exploration and exploitation technologies to respond
to changes in demand. Figure 4 shows the depletion horizons based on resources for the 29 metals.
It shows that five of them (Cd, Co, Li, Mo and Ni) are scarce in resource terms. Moreover, it is the
additional demand from the deployment of renewables that makes a significant difference for Cd, Co,
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Li and Ni. Cd, Co and Li also exhibit long depletion ranges across scenarios which means substitution
in generation and storage technologies might alleviate such problems.
Another two metals (Pb and Zn) were shown to be scarce based on reserves in Figure 3, but are
relatively abundant in terms of resources. Thus, short-term constraints on the availability of these
metals is mostly due to a market imbalance and might be addressed with exploration and advanced
extraction technologies to align production capacities with demand in the medium term. Unfortunately,
data on resources is missing for nine metals (Au, La, Mn, Nd, Ag, Ta, Te, Sn and Zr), several of which
were identified as scarce based on reserves.
Figure 4. Depletion horizons based on resources with demand from the energy sector (in blue) ranging
across energy scenarios and demand without the energy sector (in black). N.a. means no data available.
Although some metals are scarce, most of the available resources shown in Figure 4 can last
well beyond our foreseeable future. In addition, the extended ranges (in blue) for some scarce metals
suggest that substitutes are likely to be found before resource constraints arise. Besides substitution,
technology scenarios also have an impact, in particular for storage and recycling as explained below.
3.3. Storage Scenarios
We assumed batteries to cover half of the intraday electricity storage requirements. Figure 5
shows how sensitive the metals, which reserves were identified as scarce, are to battery energy storage.
In addition to the medium storage scenario accounted for in the results above, Figure 5 shows a high
and low storage scenario, as well as the no battery energy storage option. The impacts of such storage
scenarios proves to be negligible on the depletion horizon of most metals, with the exception of cobalt
(Co), nickel (Ni), and most importantly lithium (Li). The depletion horizon of Li drops from 2360
without storage to between 2075 and 2060 depending on the storage scenario.
Thus, alternative centralized and decentralized storage technologies such as power-to-gas coupled
with renewables, compressed air or flywheels, could defer potential constraints on metals for batteries.
Demand response strategies might also lower the need for storage by aligning electricity demand with
supply from intermittent renewables.
39
Resources 2019, 8, 29
Figure 5. Depletion horizons based on reserves per storage scenario.
3.4. Recycling Scenarios
Similar to storage scenarios, changes in recycling rates have minimal impact on the depletion
horizon of most metals. Figure 6 shows the impact of four distinct recycling scenarios: current recycling
rates (which are used in the results above), a marginal 5% increment in recycling rates, a 50% increase
in recycling rates and for specialty metals, a recycling rate comparable to that of their parent metals.
For example, the global recycling rate of In currently stands at 1% but would increase to 50% in the
case of parent metal Zn. For most specialty metals, the current recycling rates are extremely low,
and even if they increased significantly, the stocks would not be sufficient to cover a significant share
of the demand from recycling. Moreover, metals for which recycling rates are close to their maximum
(e.g., Al, Fe, Cu, Au) are not only in high demand from incumbent industries, but they also have long
residence times in use. The depletion horizon for iron (Fe), around 2070, might be surprising but
stocks in use have already peaked in many OECD countries at 12 tons per capita [63]. At this stage,
secondary steal becomes more economic than primary sources. Nevertheless, recycling scenarios make
a difference for four key metals, Cd, Co, Li and Ni, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Depletion horizons based on reserves for each of the four recycling scenarios.
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4. Discussion
In absolute terms, this analysis shows that although some metals are scarce, a fully renewable
energy system is unlikely to deplete metal reserves and resources up to 2050. Metal productivity gains,
as well as substitutions at the technology and metal levels, should become more viable technically and
economically before the ore grades decline and the energy costs of extraction rise [39].
In this sense, our results are most relevant from a relative perspective, as they identify those
metals that are likely to become scarce first, and thus, contribute to prioritizing R&D and industry
efforts towards the substitutions of RE technologies or metals per se. Such alternatives can be at
the expense of energy efficiency. For instance, asynchronous motors without permanent magnets in
the rotors of wind turbines exist but are slightly less efficient than conventional motors. Similarly,
replacing silver with copper as conductive elements in crystalline silicon solar cells would slightly
reduce their conversion efficiency. Thus, the level of technological development and the global energy
demand and technology scenarios determine whether future energy systems will be “high or low tech”
and renewable energy scarce or abundant.
In the context of decarbonization to mitigate climate change, a fully renewable energy system
could provide as much energy as we wanted, since its carbon intensity is significantly lower than
the current fossil-fueled system. We show here that even if the energy system was fully renewable,
supply constraints on several elements other than carbon would still compel us to reduce our energy
demand. However, our analysis shows that shifting from a fossil-based to a RE-based system does not
alleviate the problem of resource depletion, it merely shifts it from fuel to metal. The key difference
between these two energy systems is that a RE-based system offers many alternative options when
metal scarcity rises, such as substitution and recycling. In the list of priorities, we can start to reduce the
cobalt intensity of energy technologies. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the results for cadmium
and nickel. Equally important according to our results is the dependency of energy technologies on
precious metals, in particular gold and silver. Stocks in use and recycling rates are high, but again,
other uses are competing for them at a comparative advantage.
Intraday electricity storage with batteries has a significant impact on the usual suspects, cobalt,
lithium and nickel. While storage itself compounds the impacts of renewable energy scenarios,
alternatives to batteries exist. These alternatives would certainly not make batteries obsolete, but would
lower their demand to a level which might be adequate with the availability of resources. Moreover,
a large and well interconnected grid might reduce the problem of intermittency in sunny days followed
by windy nights in different regions. Similarly, the minimal impact of recycling scenarios comes
essentially from the fact that a global energy system has to be built over 30 to 40 years, not much
longer than the typical lifetime of equipment. Therefore, a high recycling rate does not compensate for
growth in demand for most metals, even iron which has one of the highest global recycling rates and
stocks in use of all metals.
To our surprise, the results on depletion horizons do not change significantly when the global
energy demand in 2050 varies from 120 EJ to 450 EJ of renewable energy (see Figure 1). The number
of metals for which the range of uncertainty is large increases slightly from reserves to resources,
which was expected, but remains small. This shows that the determining factor for depletion horizons
is more how renewable energy sources are converted into useful energy, or the mix of RE technologies,
rather than the energy scenarios themselves [64]. Our results may therefore prove particularly relevant
in steering future applied research and development in line with material constraints over the medium
and long term [65]. Concentrating our efforts towards material or technology substitutions is a priority
since many alternatives which do not rely on scarce metals already exist.
Finally, our assessment focused exclusively on metals for supply-side technologies, neglecting
metal requirements to manufacture demand-side technologies such as electric vehicles, fuel cells and
energy efficiency measures. As part of the demand side, a more accurate assessment is also needed to
account for the demand for specialty metals from non-energy industries. Moreover, what happens
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beyond 2050 in terms of maintenance of a fully renewable energy system is another important research
question which remains open.
5. Conclusions
The objective of the research presented in this article is to perform a comprehensive assessment of
metal supply constraints for a fully renewable energy system in 2050. Out of 29 necessary metals in
the lifecycle of renewable energy technologies, the reserves of 8 metals might be depleted before then.
However, the renewable energy industry would only mobilize a small additional share of the demand
for specialty metals compared to the global demand from incumbent industries. The exceptions are
Cd, Co, Li, and Ni, for which the depletion horizons vary across renewable energy scenarios. This is
consistent with previous results [15,19]. However, the comparison between reserves and resources
indicates where technical rather than geological bottlenecks might be alleviated through investments.
In terms of resources, Cd, Co, Li and Ni also show the largest dependency on the demand of renewable
energy systems.
We conclude that deploying an energy system based exclusively on renewables requires major
changes to global energy demand and the development of appropriate technologies less reliant on
specialty metals. While past research and development efforts have focused on improving the efficiency
of energy conversion technologies (e.g., solar cells, wind turbines), which have generated a growing
reliance on specialty metals, we might witness a side step to potentially less efficient technologies
in the future in order to lower the risks of supply constraints. Whether future energy technologies
will be high or low tech has great implications on resource depletion. Nevertheless, the fossil fuel
equivalent of our remaining carbon budget would be wisely spent on the extraction of metals required
for renewable energy technologies.
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Appendix A
The battery energy storage scenarios are reported below with a short description of each battery’s
chemistry. The battery storage capacity for each scenario was increased by 25% to account for cycling
losses in charging and discharging.
NCA—Lithium nickel cobalt aluminium—is a battery cell consisting of a graphite anode,
LiNiCoAlO2 cathode and Lithium carbonate electrolyte. It has high energy density and good cycle life,
but thermal stability is moderate [56].
NCM622—Lithium nickel manganese cobalt—is a battery cell consisting of a graphite anode,
LiNi0.6Mn0.2Co0.2O2 cathode and Lithium carbonate electrolyte. NCM622 contains a higher nickel
content than NCM111, which leads to higher energy density, decreased costs and lower thermal
stability. Market diffusion is expected by 2020 [57].
NMC811—Lithium nickel manganese cobalt—is a battery cell consisting of graphite + silicon
anode, LiNi0.8Mn0.1Co0.1O2 cathode and Lithium carbonate electrolyte. The presence of small
quantities of silicon in the anode increase the energy intensity. This next generation technology
is currently under R&D and is expected to diffuse by 2025 [57].
LFP—Lithium iron phosphate—is a battery cell consisting of a graphite anode, LiFePO4 cathode
and Lithium carbonate electrolyte. It has high cycling life and safety parameters at low costs. However,
its energy density is low [56].
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Zebra NaNiCl—high temperature Sodium Nickel Chloride Battery—is a sodium metal halide
battery designed to operate under high temperatures (>270 ◦C) and for long periods of discharge
(≥6 h). LCI data was sourced from ecoinvent [46].
Table A1. Battery chemistries mixes.
2050 MIX 1 MIX 2 MIX 3
NCA 20% 25% 20%
NCM622 0% 5% 0%
NCM811 30% 45% 80%
Zebra (NaNiCl) 50% 10% 0%
LFP 0% 15% 0%
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Appendix C
Table A2. Recycling scenarios.
Current +5% +50% Parent Metal
Aluminum (Al) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Bromine (Br) 1% 6% 53% 50%
Cadmium (Cd) 10% 15% 57% 50%
Chromium (Cr) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Cobalt (Co) 50% 53% 76% 94%
Copper (Cu) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Gallium (Ga) 1% 6% 53% 50%
Gold (Au) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Indium (In) 1% 6% 53% 50%
Iron (Fe) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Lanthanum (La) 1% 6% 53% 50%
Lead (Pb) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Lithium (Li) 1% 6% 53% 81%
Magnesium (Mg) 25% 29% 64% 25%
Manganese (Mn) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Molybdenum (Mo) 25% 29% 64% 25%
Neodymium (Nd) 1% 6% 53% 25%
Nickel (Ni) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Palladium (Pd) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Platinum (Pt) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Rhenium (Re) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Rhodium (Rh) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Silver (Ag) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Tantalum (Ta) 1% 6% 53% 50%
Tellurium (Te) 1% 6% 53% 50%
Tin (SN) 1% 6% 53% 50%
Titanium (TiO2) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Zinc (Zn) 50% 53% 76% 50%
Zirconium (Zr) 1% 6% 53% 25%
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Aluminum (Al) 2.2 × 103 1.7 × 102 9.4 × 10 4.6 × 10 5.2 × 10 1.3 × 102
Bromine (Br) 1.2 × 10 2.3 × 10−4 1.2 × 10−4 4.9 × 10−5 7.9 × 10−5 1.0 × 10−4
Cadmium (Cd) 8.0 × 10−1 6.3 × 10−1 3.3 × 10−1 1.3 × 10−1 2.1 × 10−1 2.8 × 10−1
Chromium (Cr) 3.3 × 10−1 4.5 2.0 1.2 1.8 2.7
Cobalt (Co) 3.8 7.1 × 101 2.1 × 101 1.6 × 101 1.5 × 101 1.5 × 101
Copper (Cu) 6.9 × 10−1 1.5 × 102 5.7 × 101 3.2 × 101 1.8 × 101 7.8 × 101
Gallium (Ga) 1.7 × 10−2 5.8 × 10−3 3.1 × 10−3 1.2 × 10−3 2.0 × 10−3 2.6 × 10−3
Gold (Au) 1.1 × 10−1 3.5 × 10−4 1.8 × 10−4 7.6 × 10−5 1.2 × 10−4 1.6 × 10−4
Indium (In) 2.5 × 10−2 4.7 × 10−2 2.5 × 10−2 1.0 × 10−2 1.6 × 10−2 2.1 × 10−2
Iron (Fe) 5.2 × 104 1.2 × 103 8.4 × 102 1.5 × 103 1.9 × 102 9.0 × 102
Lanthanum (La) 1.2 1.6 × 10−4 8.8 × 10−5 3.5 × 10−5 5.7 × 10−5 7.5 × 10−5
Lead (Pb) 1.6 × 102 1.0 5.5 × 10−1 2.6 × 10−1 3.9 × 10−1 5.1 × 10−1
Lithium (Li) 1.5 2.0 × 10 1.0 × 10 5.7 6.9 1.7 × 10
Magnesium (Mg) 5.7 × 102 1.5 × 10−2 8.3 × 10−3 3.4 × 10−3 5.4 × 10−3 7.1 × 10−3
Manganese (Mn) 5.6 × 102 5.6 2.9 1.6 2.0 4.6
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Molybdenum (Mo) 1.0 × 10 6.6 × 10−2 2.9 × 10−2 1.6 × 10−2 2.3 × 10−2 3.1 × 10−2
Neodymium (Nd) 8.1 × 10−1 1.9 × 10−2 7.8 × 10−3 9.3 × 10−3 1.1 × 10−2 1.5 × 10−2
Nickel (Ni) 7.3 × 10 8.5 × 10 4.5 × 10 2.4 × 10 3.0 × 10 7.2 × 10
Palladium (Pd) 7.7 × 10−3 4.1 × 10−5 1.1 × 10−5 1.0 × 10−5 7.9 × 10−6 5.7 × 10−6
Platinum (Pt) 7.1 × 10−3 1.9 × 10−4 5.3 × 10−5 5.1 × 10−5 3.5 × 10−5 2.3 × 10−5
Rhenium (Re) 1.8 × 10−3 1.6 × 10−8 7.3 × 10−9 3.7 × 10−9 4.8 × 10−9 5.9 × 10−9
Rhodium (Rh) 1.4 × 10−3 3.3 × 10−5 8.8 × 10−6 8.8 × 10−6 5.9 × 10−6 3.7 × 10−6
Silver (Ag) 8.7 × 10−1 4.5 × 10−2 2.2 × 10−2 8.5 × 10−3 1.4 × 10−2 1.0 × 10−2
Tantalum (Ta) 4.5 × 10−2 5.6 × 10−3 2.9 × 10−3 1.2 × 10−3 1.9 × 10−3 2.5 × 10−3
Tellurium (Te) 1.4 × 10−2 1.4 × 10−4 7.7 × 10−5 3.1 × 10−5 5.0 × 10−5 6.5 × 10−5
Tin (Sn) 1.0 × 10 3.3 × 10−2 1.7 × 10−2 7.3 × 10−3 1.1 × 10−2 1.4 × 10−2
Titanium (TiO2) 2.4 × 102 2.3 × 10−1 1.1 × 10−1 5.3 × 10−2 7.5 × 10−2 9.8 × 10−2
Zinc (Zn) 4.6 × 102 2.0 8.3 × 10−1 4.7 × 10−1 6.5 × 10−1 1.1
Zirconium (Zr) 4.1 × 10 4.1 × 10−2 2.2 × 10−2 8.9 × 10−3 1.4 × 10−2 1.8 × 10−2
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Abstract: Achieving a “carbon neutral” world by 2100 or earlier in a context of economic growth
implies a drastic and profound transformation of the way energy is supplied and consumed in
our societies. In this paper, we use life-cycle inventories of electricity-generating technologies and
an integrated assessment model (TIMES Integrated Assessment Model) to project the global raw
material requirements in two scenarios: a second shared socioeconomic pathway baseline, and a 2 ◦C
scenario by 2100. Material usage reported in the life-cycle inventories is distributed into three
phases, namely construction, operation, and decommissioning. Material supply dynamics and the
impact of the 2 ◦C warming limit are quantified for three raw fossil fuels and forty-eight metallic
and nonmetallic mineral resources. Depending on the time horizon, graphite, sand, sulfur, borates,
aluminum, chromium, nickel, silver, gold, rare earth elements or their substitutes could face a sharp
increase in usage as a result of a massive installation of low-carbon technologies. Ignoring nonfuel
resource availability and value in deep decarbonation, circular economy, or decoupling scenarios can
potentially generate misleading, contradictory, or unachievable climate policies.
Keywords: industrial ecology; integrated assessment models; life-cycle inventories; mineral
resources; decoupling; prospective scenario analysis; TIAM-FR; socioeconomic metabolism
1. Introduction
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), limiting global warming
to 2 ◦C is possible on the condition of a drastic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) [1].
One of the most effective mitigation actions consists of reshaping the energy system with energy
processes that produce fewer or negative CO2 emissions. Such a transformation requires energy
and materials, which translates into tensions over natural assets—namely space (land, air, oceans)
and material resources. Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are tools that explore the interactions
between the environment and socioeconomic spheres. These tools produce scenarios that are used by
policymakers to plan GHG mitigation actions while minimizing socioeconomic costs. Nonfuel mineral
resources are typically not considered in IAMs [2,3], seemingly due to their apparent non-energy or
non-GHG-related nature. However, nonfuel resources constitute every product in the technosphere.
They are necessary to build new low-carbon infrastructures and technologies to maintain or improve
living conditions while mitigating global warming. Raw materials are often exploited unsustainably
and their processing chains can involve significant environmental impacts [4]. Thus, socioeconomic
development, energy consumption, and environmental impacts are strongly related to resource usage.
Different approaches exist to project the future material requirements of specific regions,
sectors, or technologies depending on an evolving environment. A common approach—focusing
on material demand—is to combine data on material usage with development scenarios employing
evolution-characteristic parameters such as population growth, monetary flows, energy produced,
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additional number of products, etc. [5–15]. Data on material usage might only include direct
“consumption” by processes or material content in products. In this case, potentially large material
requirements in the supply chain of a process can be omitted. To address this issue, some authors
have used life-cycle inventory (LCI) data, which include indirect consumption generated by the
upstream and downstream activities of processes [16,17]. In particular, this approach has been
successfully demonstrated on low-carbon technologies to project the consumption of iron, aluminum,
copper, and cement according to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA’s) decarbonation scenario
(BLUE Map) [18] by 2050. However, a global bottom-up study covering the full mineral resource
footprint of energy needs has never been made to our knowledge.
In order to investigate the consumption of all substances found in the life cycles of
electricity-generating (EG) technologies, we introduced an original method [19] to combine life-cycle
inventories (LCIs) with the electricity outputs of the TIMES integrated assessment model (TIAM-FR).
This method used ecoinvent 3.3, one of the most complete process LCI databases. The growing number
of datasets contained in ecoinvent result from life-cycle assessments (LCAs) performed by different
authors in order to compare the environmental impacts of given activities and products. Each activity
has its material and energy inputs and outputs reported. The calculation of an LCI gives a list of
substances, the usage of which the activity is responsible for. Here, we take the same approach to
assess the mineral resource use of EG technologies along two scenarios: a second shared socioeconomic
pathway (SSP2) baseline [20] and a 2 ◦C target scenario. We set out to analyze and compare the
dynamic material requirements of three groups of raw fossil fuels and forty-eight groups of mineral
resources during the construction, operation, and decommissioning of each power plant in 15 world
regions. We present three main types of result: First, we project the requirements of fossil fuels and
metallic and nonmetallic mineral resources in both scenarios. Second, we analyze each substance
individually, calculating its increasing or decreasing usage relative to the 2020 decade, as well as the
decade-to-decade increase or decrease in its usage. Third, we calculate the ratio between the 2 ◦C and
baseline scenarios for each time period, to quantify the relative difference of resource usage due to the
2 ◦C target. In particular, we focus on the five substances showing the highest values of each indicator,
depending on the time period.
This prospective LCI approach to global electricity generation provides important insights into
the link between decarbonation scenarios, climate targets and mineral resource requirement pathways.
2. Method
2.1. TIAM-FR Model
TIAM is a bottom-up optimization model pertaining to the TIMES family. It was developed by
the Energy Technology Systems Analysis Program (ETSAP) group of the International Energy Agency
(IEA) in order to provide global energy scenarios with emission mitigation targets. TIAM-FR is the
version of TIAM developed at MINES ParisTech Center for Applied Mathematics. In each of the
15 world regions considered (see Supplementary Table S1 for a list of regions and their acronyms),
TIAM-FR establishes a balance between a set of demand drivers (population, economic growth, energy,
and service needs) and supply technologies (fuel, electricity, transportation, etc.) distributed in five
sectors (agriculture, commercial, industry, residential, and transportation). 2010 is taken as a reference
year for which the system’s state is entirely and exogenously defined. The 2010–2100 horizon is
divided in 11 periods. An optimization algorithm minimizes the total net present value of the total
annual cost, discounted at 5% to the selected reference year 2010. A full description of the TIAM
model is available publicly [21,22]. Most technology costs and data are freely accessible from the
ETSAP community’s website [23]. Some cost data were obtained from experts or manufacturers.
Production, trade, consumption, and socioeconomic data were obtained from international institutions
(e.g., FAO, World Bank, etc.). Energy data were purchased at IEA’s data services when they were not
freely accessible. TIAM-FR has been previously used for global and regional analyses [24] and water
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consumption assessments [25], and was recently updated with a detailed bioenergy sector [26,27]
including carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies. Using TIAM-FR, we determine
a baseline scenario that is comparable to a second shared socioeconomic pathway (SSP2) [20].
The assumptions regarding population and gross domestic product growth for each region were
previously reported in the Supplementary Material of [19]. From the baseline scenario, a 2 ◦C scenario
is obtained by setting a maximum global warming target of 2 ◦C by 2100 (with an overshoot tolerance
of 0.1 ◦C). GHG emissions, total primary energy supply, and total final consumption are reported in
the Supplementary Material of the present article. The SSP2 baseline scenario is in agreement with
primary supply, final consumption, and GHG emissions found in the literature [28,29].
2.2. Linking Electricity Outputs with Life-Cycle Inventories
We compute material usage scenarios for EG technologies using a method previously
described [19]. It is based on the combination of the TIAM-FR electric outputs and life-cycle inventories
of EG technologies. Each of the 109 EG technologies in the TIAM-FR model is attributed a process-based
LCI extracted from the ecoinvent 3.3 database. We deliberately choose not to use other sources of LCI
datasets to keep the consistency provided by ecoinvent. Indeed, each life-cycle inventory in ecoinvent
was built from elementary processes, which can be traced back through the entire processing chain.
For the TIAM-FR technologies that are not represented in ecoinvent (e.g., marine and CCS technologies),
we select alternative datasets in a close technological family. This approximation adds a layer of
uncertainty; however, it allows us to cover all electricity generation. In the future, the increasing
number of technologies analyzed in ecoinvent will help reduce the recourse to such approximations.
Potential recycled materials are taken into account using ecoinvent’s “at the point of substitution”
(APOS) system linking method. This method expands the technology’s system boundaries to include
waste treatment activities. For all datasets, we separate infrastructure activities from transformation
activities, which allows us to distinguish the material consumption during the construction, operation,
and decommissioning phases. We allocate 90% of the infrastructure LCI to the construction phase and
10% to the decommissioning phase as described in [19]. The transformation LCI is allocated to the
power plant operation phase. We study all raw fossil fuels and mineral resources that are extracted
from the ground as defined in ecoinvent. Water, biomass, and non-energy gases are not considered
in this study. The material use results are represented in 16 energy source categories: bioenergy,
bioenergy with CCS, coal, coal with CCS, coal–bioenergy cofiring, coal–bioenergy cofiring with CCS,
gas, gas with CCS, geothermal, hydro, marine, nuclear, oil, solar photovoltaics (PV), solar thermal,
and wind.
3. Results
3.1. Global Electricity Generation
Global greenhouse gas emissions, primary energy supply, and final consumption are described
in the Supplementary Materials (Figures S1, S2, and S3). The evolution of the power mix associated
with the SSP2 baseline and 2 ◦C scenarios towards 2100 is represented in Figure 1. Three outputs are
shown: the annual new capacities, electricity production, and end-of-life capacities of EG technologies.
Global electricity production reaches 233 EJ/year in the 2 ◦C scenario in 2100, 13 EJ/year higher than
in the baseline scenario. However, the way electricity is produced in the 2 ◦C scenario significantly
differs from the baseline after 2040.
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Figure 1. Annual new capacities, electricity production, and end-of-life capacities of electricity-generating
technologies, in the baseline scenario (left) and 2 ◦C scenario (right). CCS: With carbon capture and
sequestration technologies. Data are found in Supplementary Material (Table S2).
In the baseline scenario, electricity production is mostly coal-based and remains so until the
end of the century. Coal is the major contributor to the increasing electricity supply until 2060,
when wind and solar capacities take over to fulfill 23.6% of global electricity generation by 2100.
In both scenarios, electricity production follows a similar trend until 2030 when, in the 2 ◦C scenario,
coal and gas electricity production peak at 39 EJ/year and 25 EJ/year, respectively. After 2030,
solar and wind capacities are increasingly installed as lower GHG emissions are needed to reduce
the total system’s cost. Conventional coal capacities are phased out by 2070. Solar photovoltaics
(PV) becomes the leading electricity producer, reaching 27 EJ/year in 2050. During the 2040–2050
period, up to 200 GW/year of solar PV and 90 GW/year of wind capacities are added to the world
grid to limit global warming to 2 ◦C by 2100. 30 GW/year of natural gas power plants are installed
concurrently as backups (intermittent power capacities are limited to 50% of total capacities in the
TIAM-FR model). Hydropower, nuclear, and geothermal capacities develop in the 2 ◦C scenario to
production levels of about 30 EJ/year in 2100. After a transition phase occurring between 2030 and 2060,
electricity generation from solar PV increases slowly and fewer additional solar capacities are needed.
Wind farms are still added to the grid to compensate for the massive end-of-life wind capacities
observed in 2070. Concurrently, carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies become mature,
allowing new coal and bioenergy power plants to be commissioned. Coal infrastructures with CCS
produce up to 12 EJ/year in 2100. End-of-life capacities mostly consist of conventional coal, oil,
and gas in the first half of the century. These are partially replaced by more efficient technologies
(e.g., pulverized coal and gas–oil combined cycle), allowing increased electricity generation, while the
total installed capacity remains constant before 2030. After 2040, an increasing number of wind turbines
enter the end-of-life phase, while the massive installation of solar PV from 2040–2050 translates into
an extensive retirement phase during the 2080–2100 period. These solar PV capacities are replaced
in order to maintain production, yielding a second surge of solar panel installation. Results for each
world region are in the Supplementary Material (Table S2).
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3.2. Raw Material Footprint of Electricity-Generating Technologies
Constructing, operating, and decommissioning power plants requires different kinds and amounts
of energy and materials, not only due to "direct" activities at the plant site, but also during upstream
and downstream “indirect” activities. The total amounts of metallic and nonmetallic mineral resources
and fossil fuels involved in the construction, operation, and decommissioning of EG technologies are
calculated following the combination of the TIAM-FR model with the ecoinvent LCI database. In this
study, metallic mineral resources represent the metal content in ore, with the remaining ore being
considered as nonmetallic mineral resources. Material usage results are shown in Figure 2 for both
scenarios. Total use of metallic mineral resources (Figure 2a(iv)) increases in both the baseline and 2 ◦C
scenarios due to the increase in electricity generation. Before 2030, this is mostly driven by bioenergy,
fossil fuel, and hydropower plants. In the baseline scenario, the total use of metals is shared equally
between the construction and operation phases (40-55 Tg/year [teragrams per year] in 2050). In the
2 ◦C scenario, the use of metallic mineral resources decreases during operations to half of the 2010
level, while becoming much larger in the power plant construction phase after 2050 (up to 12 times that
of the operation phase in 2090). In the second half of the century, the use of metals increases sharply
due to the development of geothermal power. Although geothermal electricity production is lower
than solar PV, its large requirements of reinforcing steel generate a significant material usage. At the
end of the horizon, use of metals for decommissioning are 3.7 times greater in the 2 ◦C scenario than in
the baseline, mostly due to end-of-life geothermal capacities. Demand for metallic mineral resources
increases dramatically when new capacities are needed. Apart from economic growth, the 2 ◦C climate
target sets additional pressure on mineral resource supplies. This pressure could vary depending
on the evolution of recycling. However, we did not address the availability of recyclable end-of-life
products in the technosphere.
Figure 2b shows the usage of nonmetallic mineral resources. Most of these resources are
used during the construction of hydropower facilities, which involve massive earthworks and large
quantities of concrete. However, there are considerable uncertainties and variations in the material
footprint of hydropower technologies [30] depending on their design, location, and how material
usage is accounted for. Significant nonmetallic resources—about 988 Tg/year in 2050 in the baseline
scenario and 439 Tg/year in 2050 in the 2 ◦C scenario—are used by coal and bioenergy power plants
due to resource extraction for operations. The use of nonmetallic mineral resources peaks in 2050 in the
baseline scenario, and in 2060 in the 2 ◦C scenario. The decommissioning of coal, nuclear, and wind
power plants uses similar amounts of nonmetallic resources in both the baseline and 2 ◦C scenarios
until 2040. In the 2 ◦C scenario, cumulative nonmetallic mineral resource usage is of 121,971 Tg in
2050 and 264,370 Tg in 2100, compared to 105,116 Tg and 203,172 Tg in the baseline scenario.
Consumption of fossil fuels is mostly due to EG technology operations. The decline of coal
in the 2 ◦C scenario is responsible for decreasing fossil fuel consumption until 2060, when mature
CCS technologies enable the operation of new bioenergy and coal power plants without generating
additional GHG emissions. In the 2 ◦C scenario in 2100, fossil fuels for decommissioning activities
are five times greater than in the baseline scenario (Figure 2c(iii)). However, these fossil fuels only
represent 2% of the total fossil fuel consumption.
Summing up all resources and phases (Figure 2d(iv)), we found that the 2 ◦C target generates
47% less material consumption in 2050 than in the baseline scenario, decreasing to 67% in 2100.
However, accounting only for mineral resources (excluding fossil fuels), the 2 ◦C climate target
generates a cumulative total use that is 16% higher over the 2010–2050 period and 31% higher over the
2010–2100 period compared to the baseline scenario. Regarding the metals only, the cumulative
total use is 20% higher over the 2010–2050 period and 46% higher over the 2010–2100 period.
Thus, the 2 ◦C target implies a transition in the resource required by EG technologies from fossil
fuels to mineral resources.
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Figure 2. Use of fossil fuels, metallic and nonmetallic mineral resources in electricity-generating technologies
during their construction (i), operation (ii), and decommissioning (iii) phases, as well as the total amount (iv)
in the baseline and 2 ◦C scenarios (in Tg/yr, or teragrams per year). (a) Metallic materials; (b) Nonmetallic
materials; (c) Fossil fuels; (d) Total. Full data can be found in Supplementary Material (Table S3).
3.3. Most-Impacted Substances
Figure 3a,b show the five highest increases for each decade in the use of each group of substances
relative to the 2020 decade (2016–2024), in the baseline and 2 ◦C scenarios, respectively. Figure 3c,d
shows the relative increase in substance usage between two subsequent decades. Figure 3e shows
the five highest ratios between the 2 ◦C and baseline scenarios in each decade. Values have no
units since they are expressed in relative amounts (1 ≡ 100%). Results for the three raw fossil
fuels and forty-eight metallic and nonmetallic mineral resources are provided for each region in the
Supplementary Material (Table S3). In the 2030 baseline decade, construction raw materials are subject
to the highest increase in usage by EG technologies relative to 2020. Sand, gypsum and anhydrite,
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clays, gravel, chromium, and nickel are mobilized in the construction phase of EG technologies where
large amounts of steel and concrete are needed. During the 2040 decade, graphite, silver and gold
are increasingly used, mostly as a result of solar PV development which requires silver and gold as
conducting elements, and graphite electrodes for the fabrication of silicon wafer. Wind turbines drive
sand and sulfur demand up due to the need for glass fiber and sulfuric acid. After 2045, the five highest
increases in material usage relative to 2020 are sand, graphite rock, silver, gold, and rare earth elements.
Figure 3. Relative increase (×100%) in the material use during decade p (horizontal axis) in the
baseline scenario (BAU) compared to decade 2020 (a); in the 2◦C scenario compared to decade 2020 (b);
in the baseline scenario compared to decade (p-1) (c); in the 2◦C scenario compared to decade (p-1)
(d); and material use ratio between the 2◦C and baseline scenarios (e). Trace elements, for which total
usage is less than one metric ton, are not reported. Full data are in Supplementary Material (Table S3).
In the 2 ◦C scenario, borates (chemical agent), cadmium, and indium are the top five most
increasingly used materials in the 2030 decade relative to 2020. This results significantly from the
development of CdTe (cadmium telluride) and CIGS (copper indium gallium selenide) solar PV thin
films. After 2040, the use of graphite, sand, silver, rare earth elements, and gold is multiplied by up to
56
Resources 2019, 8, 33
four times relative to the baseline scenario. Although marine and solar thermal electricity productions
remain moderate, their relatively large material footprints generate a significant material usage in
the 2060 decade. Sand (glass for concentrating solar power systems (CSP) and glass fiber for wind
turbines) is one of the most increasingly mobilized raw materials.
It is important to note that a high usage increase for raw materials used in small quantities relative
to their resource potential is not necessarily a subject of concern. The results for each substance should
be interpreted in the context of its share of the global market and supply risk. Substances that are used
in small quantities are generally those with the highest uncertainty (substances for which annual usage
is less than one ton are not reported).
Looking at the relative growth between two subsequent decades in the baseline and 2 ◦C scenarios
(Figure 3c,d), we observed that the highest increase in usage is during the 2040 decades for both
scenarios. The baseline requirements of graphite, sand, silver, gold, and rare earth elements are
multiplied by 1.7 to 3.4 in about 10 years. In the 2 ◦C scenario, graphite use soars while strontium
takes over sand in the highest period-to-period increase in usage. Strontium appears in the life-cycle
inventories of solar PV and geothermal technologies, for the production of zinc and thermal insulation
materials. In the 2050 decade, baseline use of cobalt is 2.3 times higher than their 2040 consumption.
In the 2 ◦C scenario, aluminum requirements increase 3.5 times in one decade. In 2060, material usage
growth is more moderate as newly built low-carbon capacities enable to cut large GHG emissions.
Geothermal facilities continue to develop in the 2 ◦C scenario. This increases the requirements
of barite, iron, and nickel, used in geothermal structure and drillings. During the 2070 decade,
material requirements decrease relatively to 2060 in the 2 ◦C scenario, with the exception of a 20%
increase in demand for uranium for nuclear power plants. After 2075, raw materials are mobilized to
replace end-of-life power plants, while CCS fossil-fueled technologies develop (causing an increase of
30% in coal use during the last decade).
Copper does not feature among the five highest increases in this study. However, it has
become a resource of concern since it is widely used in electric appliances. Its reserves
were identified as insufficiently increasing to cover future requirements due to low-carbon
technologies and global electrification [31–33]. We detail the results for copper in the
Supplementary Material (Figures S4 and S5), along with a comparison to previous studies of the
direct metal use from EG technologies (Figure S6) [9,15,16,34]. We found average copper requirements
of 0.69 Tg/year in the baseline scenario and 0.96 Tg/year in the 2 ◦C scenario, over the 2010–2050
period, which is in agreement with Deetman et al. [15]. Copper usage growth for EG technologies
could be of 0.05 Tg/year in the baseline scenario and up to 0.1 Tg/year in the 2 ◦C scenario during the
shifting period (2040–2050). For comparison, global mine production of copper grew at an average
rate of 0.57 Tg/year between 2012 and 2017.
3.4. The 2 ◦C Target
By calculating the ratio between the 2 ◦C and baseline scenarios, it was possible to rank the
mineral resources that were most influenced by the 2 ◦C temperature target. Figure 3e shows the
five highest ratios for every decade. In 2020, gypsum and anhydrite, gravel, clays (for concrete),
chromium, and nickel (for steel) are 30% to 40% higher than their baseline consumption. In the 2030
decade, the 2 ◦C constraint generates an average four-fold increase in sand usage compared to the
baseline scenario. The influence of the 2 ◦C constraint is highest on sand in 2060 (× 6.0), but is also
substantial on a number of substances like barite, graphite rock, silver, gypsum and anhydrite, rare
earth elements, and others. At the end of the horizon, the 2 ◦C warming limit has a strong influence
on material usage, which is multiplied up to five times compared to the baseline. Nonmetallic
mineral resources, some of which are nonrenewable are impacted by decarbonation even more than
metals. However, this assessment does not allow us to distinguish useful resources from tailings and
overburden. Such a distinction in LCI databases such as ecoinvent could help better determine the
value and criticality of a given substance.
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4. Discussion and Path Forward
4.1. Static vs. Evolutionary LCIs
The approach presented here uses attributional LCIs that are static, which means they are not
modified according to an evolving background. This generates bias on long-term scales when the
background of a process significantly differs from the initial inventory [19]. However, this approach
offers the triple advantage of: (1) capturing real situations with existing activities, (2) being able to
compare EG technologies on a more objective basis, and (3) providing highly reproducible results
without the need for the additional assumptions of a consequential analysis. Using evolving LCIs
can be conceptually more valid, but it can also lead to special case scenarios that are perceived as less
likely or less consensual. The difficulty of dealing with uncertainty in LCIs and integrated assessment
models and prospective exercises has been previously discussed [28] but is not resolved here.
4.2. Resource Depletion and Footprint
The influence of prospective energy scenarios and climate targets on future mineral resource
use is still largely unknown. Conversely, the influence of mineral resource availability on integrated
assessments with climate targets has not yet been studied.
As many mineral resources are extracted and transformed by human activities faster than
they re-form [4], future socioeconomic development and climate action may be constrained by
mineral resource availability. The direct consequences of resource exploitation unsustainability
include an increasing number of challenges for the mining sector (exploration and extraction) [35],
resource depletion, and a growing number of critical raw materials for various stakeholders [36].
Eventually, supply disruptions may result in volatile commodity prices, enhanced intersectoral
competition [37], "black swan" events [38], increased environmental impacts, geopolitical tensions,
and climate action withdrawals when a given resource supply becomes a greater concern than its
associated environmental impacts.
Concurrently, lower-grade mining ore [4,39–41] may result in the need for more exploration,
extraction, processing, and waste for each unit of raw material produced. Additional GHG
emissions could result from low resource availability if mining technologies run on fossil fuels.
Alternatively, low-carbon mining technologies may reduce GHG emissions but have a larger mineral
resource footprint, raising important questions about resource efficiency [40]. Environmental impacts
based on mineral resource demand scenarios have been studied previously [18,42,43]. These studies
have considered decarboning electricity generation to 2050, but have not addressed an increasing
mineral resource footprint of upstream activities, which could lead to significantly different
results. Accounting for reuse and recycling may in turn mitigate the mineral resource footprint.
Thus, variations in efficiency and resource intensity should be accounted for considering the rebound
effect [44] and, if possible, taking a cradle-to-cradle life-cycle perspective compatible with the laws
of thermodynamics.
4.3. Other Energy Sectors
Aspects of nonfuel mineral resources that can potentially impact energy scenarios could represent
key constraints in energy and environmental policies, especially when strong GHG mitigation actions
are taken. Our results show that without significant changes in the constitution of EG technologies,
several mineral resources will be needed by multiple times their current requirements, as a result of
the wide development of material-intensive low-carbon technologies. However, resource requirements
for EG technologies might only represent a fraction of the total resource consumption in the global
economy. This is why a similar approach should be extended to cover other technologies and sectors
of the energy system. It could be useful to policymakers, energy modelers, industrial ecologists,
and industrials interested in the future material footprint, criticality, and environmental impacts of
their products, technologies, and activities. In addition, life-cycle analysts could use such a tool
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as a basis for developing scenario-based consequential LCAs, making it easier to highlight errors
and data gaps, as well as to determine adequate system boundaries in a life-cycle sustainability
analysis (LCSA) [45]. The multiregional description of the energy system in TIAM-FR could be used to
perform regional criticality analysis of various substances, possibly leading to geostrategic analysis.
Global electrification of the world may modify the material footprint of the electricity generation
and electric products. Based on this study, prospective criticality and supply chain assessments in
relation to environmental policies could help identify the resources for which criticality or supply risk
is high [46]. However, an endogenous integration of nonfuel resource cycles in TIAM-FR still has to
be achieved.
4.4. Towards Simpler and More Complex Models
Resource prices, reserves, access, functions, services, geographical distribution, trade, cycles,
and non-GHG environmental impacts are features that could potentially be integrated into IAMs to
take into account resource constraints.
Dynamic material flow analysis, life-cycle inventories, and energy system modeling can all be used
as prospective tools to analyze the evolution of the socioeconomic metabolism and its environmental
impacts. Thus, there is an opportunity for a symbiotic relation in a common framework, to achieve
energy and environmental impact scenarios compatible with sustainable mineral resource flows.
However, a major challenge to such an achievement is the definition of socioeconomic laws for a system
that is dynamic, complex, and nonlinear in practice. A promising framework to investigate the systemic
connections between material cycles and human activities was proposed by Pauliuk [47], building on
the socioeconomic metabolism concept [48]. In this framework, the socioeconomic metabolism could be
further characterized by a thermodynamical approach, considering the anthroposhere as a dissipative
structure [49]. Future models will ideally represent the complexity of the socioeconomic metabolism,
minimizing the number of required assumptions.
4.5. Shared Socioeconomic (Metabolism) Pathways
Development pathways have strong implications for mineral resources, not only in climate
change mitigation scenarios but also in baseline pathways as shown in this study. The interests that
drive societies evolve rapidly and modify the conditions of what is socially and environmentally
acceptable. Adaptation to material restrictions may also be possible through societal changes and
resource management policies. The extent to which economic growth and GHG emission mitigation
are priorities compared to other environmental and societal-related impacts should be further analyzed
and debated. SSPs (shared socioeconomic pathways) provide a suitable framework to discuss these
questions. In their current form [29], they contain substantial information on energy, climate, economy,
and social aspects, but do not contain equivalent information about mineral resource stocks, flows,
services, and use in the socioeconomic system. In the perspective of mineral resource integration in
IAMs, we suggest that the SSP narratives could be complemented with "raw materials" storylines
whereby material in-use stocks and flows would be described in more detail using qualitative and
quantitative indicators. Such narratives could better address the features of a circular economy
(reuse, recycling, frugal innovation, etc.) as well as the key issue of decoupling environmental impacts
from economic growth.
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Abstract: Metals are an essential part of modern living. Ensuring the future supply of metals is a key
issue in politics, science, and economics because the available amount of mineral resources is limited.
To measure the depletion of mineral resources, several indicators are used. Some of them are based on
the ore grade, which has been decreasing over time and is thus taken as a sign of resource exhaustion.
However, does this assumption hold true? This paper shows that the development of ore grades is
mainly the result of the increasing demand and the outstanding technological improvements that
made mining of low grade ores profitable. The usage of ore grades as an indicator may, therefore,
lead to erroneous conclusions about the safeguard objects. These are not the metals themselves,
but the environment that is impacted by their extraction.
Keywords: resource depletion; ore grade; metals; copper; influencing factors; indicators
1. Introduction
Mineral resources, especially metals, are essential for the development of our society. As the
available amount of these resources on Earth is limited, their depletion is a key issue in politics,
economics, and science [1–3]. To measure resource depletion, several indicators have been
developed [4]. Some of these indicators, such as those used by the common impact assessment
methods ReCiPe [5], IMPACT 2002, and the EI99 [6,7], are based on the metal content of the ores (ore
grade). It is assumed that an ongoing extraction leads to a decline in the quality of the deposits still
available, such as a decrease in their ore grade. It has been shown in numerous studies that the ore
grades of mined deposits have been falling over time [8–11]. What has to be questioned, however,
is why the ore grades have been decreasing. Is this a geological phenomenon and hence a sign for
resource depletion? Or is it rather a complex interplay of geological, economic, technological, and social
factors? This question plays a central role, as already discussed by Northey, Mudd, and Werner [12].
It is the starting point for further considerations on the appropriate indicators to evaluate resource
scarcity and the actual safeguard objects, and thus leading to corresponding strategies for action.
Therefore, this paper examines the influencing factors on the development of ore grades, using the
example of copper. Copper has been one of the first metals to be mined and still plays an essential role
for our modern society. Its valuable properties—for example, its high conductivity—make it a useful
material for a wide range of applications. Nevertheless, other metals are also faced with declining ore
grades and, depending on several factors such as demand and extraction, the arguments might hold
true for them, although further research is needed to make valid statements.
2. The Development of Ore Grades
There are some basic theoretical concepts describing the quality of the available amount of
minerals in our earth. The first investigations on tonnage and grade of metal deposits go back to
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Lasky [13]. Lasky’s Law states that while the cumulative quantity of ore is increasing logarithmically,
the metal content of the total available quantity decreases linearly. This model can be applied to
individual deposits as well as to a number of deposits. The density function of the total resource
base was examined by Ahrens [14,15] and Skinner [16]. Ahrens assumes a log-Gaussian distribution.
Skinner, in contrast, states that the density function follows a bimodal distribution. Even if the bimodal
distribution seems plausible, it has not yet been proven, because we do not know the actual density
function of the entire resource base on Earth.
Investigations on the development of the actual copper contents of mined ores are also available.
A well-known study is provided by Mudd [8]. In his report, “The Sustainability of Mining in Australia”,
the author highlights the development of Australian raw material extraction and its implications for
the environment. He considers not only copper but also other important mineral raw materials,
such as coal, titanium, gold, nickel, and diamonds. The main data sources for his work are reports
from mining companies and publications from authorities such as Geoscience Australia. As many
reporting systems—for example, the Australasian Code for Reporting of Exploration Results, Mineral
Resources, and Ore Reserves (JORC Code)—were not introduced until the 20th century, older data
are taken from individual publications on mines or regions and are not complete for all years and
raw materials. Nevertheless, the resulting error is negligible for a general trend statement over the
long term. With regard to the ore grade, there is a general downward trend for all commodities [8].
Data on copper ore grades are also available for the United States. The United States Geological
Survey (USGS) publishes annual reports, such as the Minerals Yearbook (USGS var.), which include
production statistics for more than 90 materials. The compiled data are based on industry surveys
conducted and statistically evaluated by the USGS. Figure 1 shows the development of the metal
content of copper ores for Australia and the United States.
 
Figure 1. Copper ore grades and production in Australia (1844–2007) and the United States (1880–2010).
Data for Australia are taken from the work of [8]; data for the United States 1924–2010 are taken from
the work of [17], and previous years from the work of [18].
What is interesting about Figure 1 is the sudden drop in the metal content of Australian ores
around 1885 from a level of approximately 15% to 5%, despite almost constant production. Taking a
look at the data basis, it becomes apparent that the data availability is poor in this period of time.
Around the years 1882 to 1889, only about 30% of copper production in Australia is covered, and in
some cases, much less. In general, data availability between 1850 and 1890 is less than 50% of
production with few exceptions, while in the other periods, it is usually in the upper quarter [8].
In addition, production volumes in Australia are relatively small and spread over a few mines,
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so individual mines have a relatively large influence. One of the mines, Mt Morgan, was partially
destroyed by fire in 1927 and was not fully productive again until the 1930s. Mt Morgan had a low ore
grade (0.5–1%) compared with the other mines, but a relatively high production share (approximately
20%), which led to a short-term increase in the average ore grade for these years [8]. Another increase
in the ore grade was caused by Olympic Dam, which was discovered at the end of the 1970s, and the
associated IOCG (iron oxide copper gold) deposit type was introduced [19]. Such events are more or
less random, but have a great influence on the ore contents shown. Also, the base of measurement of
ore grades might be different for earlier data. As exploration and sorting was done by eye or hand,
respectively, a process of pre-concentration by these activities took place.
Compared with Australian copper ore grades, the metal contents in the United States are lower
and their development is smoother. Crowson [11] also confirms this in comparison with the global
average for the last decades. One reason is the deposit type available in each region. There are mainly
porphyry deposits in the United States, which (as will be discussed later) have a low ore grade on
average [11,20]. In Australia, deposits of the IOCG type currently have the largest share of resources
(approximately 60% in 2010 and 2013). This type of deposit has an on average higher ore content
than porphyry deposits [20–22]. Another reason is that the data represent different values. The USGS
reports the yield, while for Australia, the mill head grade is given. The yield is the obtained amount
of metal per amount of ore extracted. Data from the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century
often state this value. Compared with the mill head grade, which indicates the metal content of the ore
processed in the mill, the yield also includes the technical efficiency of the processes and is thus slightly
lower than the corresponding mill head grade. Yield and mill head grade have become more and more
similar with the increase in efficiency over the years [23,24]. This leads to a flattened curve in the case
of the United States. The term ore grade is often used for the head grade and the yield, which makes it
difficult to clearly separate the different figures. Usually, the ore grade refers to the metal content of
the available reserves and/or resources. The reserves are the part of the raw materials that is known
and can be mined economically under current conditions. Resources, on the other hand, describe
the amount of ore (within a deposit) that cannot be economically extracted under current conditions
or is associated with a higher degree of uncertainty, for example, with regard to its shape, quantity,
and quality. In addition, there is the geopotential, which contains the existing, but not yet known
potential of further raw material deposits. The limits of reserves and resources are thus dynamic
and change, for example, with the current price [25]. However, it is important to be aware of which
values are stated in order to make valid statements, because the discussed difficulties may lead to
interpretations that are not compatible with the original data basis. There are several influencing factors
that determine the grade of the ore mined, such as technology. Over time, an increasing efficiency,
for example, made the mining of low grade ores economically feasible. This is reflected in the data
shown in Figure 1, which refers to ores that actually were or are mined, not to the still available known
or even unknown deposits. The influence of these factors often leads to a decrease in ore grades of
mined deposits, but does not reflect depletion.
3. Influencing Factors on the Ore Grade
The influencing factors on the ore grades of mined deposits will be discussed in the
following section.
3.1. Deposit Types and Demand
We extract our raw materials from the Earth’s crust, which accounts for about half a percent of
the Earth’s total mass and consists mainly of oxygen and silicon [26–28]. Metals are contained in very
small quantities in the Earth’s crust. For example, the average proportion (Clarke value) of copper is
about 28 ppm, while that of gold is only 1.5 ng/g [29]. The extraction of this average concentration is
(at the moment) economically impossible. However, local enrichments of these elements took place as
a result of different geological processes, and thus offer a suitable starting point for their extraction.
65
Resources 2018, 7, 88
The average enrichment factor required for extraction depends on the type of raw material and the
currently available technology. To extract aluminum profitably, for example, the enrichment factor
has to be approximately four, which leads to an average ore content of 30%. In contrast, chromium,
which is also mined with an ore grade of 20% to 30%, must be enriched approximately 3000 times
because of the low average crustal concentration. For copper and nickel, the necessary enrichment
factor is about 75, while for gold, it is 250 [30,31]. There is also a difference between the deposit types
of one metal. Copper offers an illustrative example. Most (about 60%) of the currently known global
resources are contained in so-called porphyry deposits, followed by sediment-hosted deposits (about
15%) and IOCG deposits (about 10%), among others [20]. Each of these deposit types is characterized,
among other things, by its mass of ore contained and its medium ore grade. Currently mined or under
development IOCG deposits have an average of 6 million tons of valuable metal at an average ore
grade of approximately 0.9% Cu, sediment-hosted deposits contain 4.5 million tons at about 1.9%,
and porphyry deposits contain about 3 million tons at about 0.5%. Massive sulfides (MS), which make
up less than 2% of the global resources, have only about 0.3 million tons of copper at an ore grade of
about 1.4% Cu (but they have remarkable amounts of other metals like zinc) [20]. Figure 2 shows the
currently known resources (deposits) by type, ore content, and ore grade. What can be clearly seen
is that most copper is contained in large deposits, which, however, are characterized by a low metal
content of the ore. The low ore grade of large deposits reflects not only geology, but also economics.
In order to state their resources, companies have to define a so-called cut-off grade, which gives the
lower limit of ore grades that distinguishes waste from ore resources. This lower limit is influenced
by production costs, which might be lower for bigger operations as a result of economies of scale
resulting in a lower stated ore grade [12]. Another point that is important to note here is that in the
future, new deposits or part of deposits as well as totally new ore types might still be discovered.
Figure 2. Resources (measured and indicated in conformity with the Australasian Code for Reporting
of Exploration Results, Mineral Resources, and Ore Reserves (JORC) or South African Mineral Codes
(SAMREC)) and ore grades of copper mines and projects classified by deposit types [20]. MS—massive
sulfides; Ortho—orthomagmatic; IOCG—iron oxide copper gold; diss—disseminated hydrothermal;
Por—porphyry; Sk—skarn; Sed-host—sediment hosted.
Assuming a rising copper demand in the long term, low-grade deposits offer a valuable source
to cover this high demand and, therefore, their extraction is unavoidable [23]. If the ore contents are
compared with the production over the past decades, this is made clear once again (see Figure 1).
The growing population, its development, and the associated increasing use of technologies lead
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to a steady increase in the annual demand for raw materials. Initially mined regionally and for
the company’s own needs, today, enormous quantities are extracted globally and increasingly large
deposits with lower ore contents are used. However, this does not mean that there are no deposits with
high ore grades left. An example is the Timok Project [32]. Some of the resources have a copper content
of 17% to 19% at a level of about 2.8 million tons of copper [33]. This corresponds to approximately
the annual consumption of the United States around the turn of the millennium, while currently,
consumption is even lower.
Moreover, ores with a high metal content are often part of a larger deposit. High-grade ores are
produced by secondary enrichment, that is, they represent the oxidic zone of a deposit. Whereas in the
past, only this part was mined, today, the entire deposit is used, which reduces the average ore grade
of the deposit and thus of the mined ore [34]. However, as more of the available resource is extracted,
this might be seen as a more efficient use of the deposit in general, which, for example, makes an
important contribution to the economy of the communities hosting the mining operations.
At the beginning of copper mining in Australia, the ore content of the secondary enrichment zones
was still so high that the ores were shipped to Wales for metallurgical processing, where the necessary
know-how was available. Only in the course of the years, when the metal contents of the ore sank,
were metal smelters established locally [35]. Thus, if only a few tons of copper were needed today or if
only the high grade parts were mined, it would certainly be possible to obtain mineral resources from
sources with a higher metal content than the average ore used, and there might be periods of lower
demand in the future. It has to be kept in mind that the decision for developing a deposit into a mine
is not entirely based on size or ore grade; there are several other factors like economics, accessibility,
and political stability that come into play. Porphyry deposits, for example, are not only huge, but also
near to the surface, and thus easy to access and mine by mass mining methods.
3.2. Exploration
The fact that low grade deposits are mined today is also the result of growing knowledge of
their formation, occurrence, and the corresponding technologies. Whereas exploration used to be
done with the naked eye at the beginning of mineral extraction, more sophisticated methods were
gradually added. In addition, the economic pressure on mine operators increased, which made more
precise exploration necessary, as this was the only way to make a reliable statement about the yield of
a deposit and to attract investors. The first institutions dealing with mining from a scientific point of
view were founded in the middle of the 18th century. About 100 years later, the USGS was established,
and from this time onwards, geological explorations were carried out in all industrial countries. At the
end of the 19th century, technical innovations such as diamond drills enabled deeper, more accurate,
and cheaper explorations. In the 20th century, further technical developments were added, such as
aerial survey and satellite imagery. From the 1980s onwards, geographic information systems (GIS) and
computer models were used, for example (see Figure 3). Besides technical innovations, an increasing
understanding of the structure of the earth, such as the discovery of plate tectonics in the 1960s, led to
a more targeted search. This resulted in more precise models of individual deposits, and thus also to
discoveries of new parts of already mined deposits. Altogether, these developments have enabled
the resource base to be constantly expanded [35–37]. If we look at the reserve figures for copper over
the last 50 years, we can also perceive an increase. This shows that the reduction in reserves can be
compensated by exploration work and the development of extraction technologies (which will be
discussed below). In times of high demand and associated high metal prices resulting from a supply
deficit, exploration also increases [38–40], and there is no end in sight. In a report from the German
Academy of Sciences, it is pointed out that there is no institution in the world with the capability of
evaluating all the mineral deposits on Earth [41] (p.26). Therefore, there are still some white spots on
the world map, contrary to the assumption that everything has already been explored [42] (p. 123).
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Figure 3. Development of exploration technology and mineral production [36,37].
3.3. Mine Size and Structural Changes
The choice of large deposits is not only the result of the high demand; economic reasons play
also a central role. Despite the progress mentioned above, exploration and development of a deposit
involves high financial costs. One way companies seek to achieve economies of scale is by spreading
their fixed costs over a larger production volume [43]. This can be illustrated by the development of
the capacities of mines, which is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Share of annual production according to mine size for the years 1976 and 2000 [43].
While the decision to develop a mine before the 1980s was based on the expected copper price, in
recent decades, there has been a trend towards developing only the world’s largest known deposits [44].
Most of these large deposits are porphyry. In the United States, the trend towards these deposits
dates back to the beginning of the 20th century. While in 1907, the proportion of porphyry deposits
in the United States was still about 10% of the mined ore, in 1914, it was already about 50% and
in the mid-1930s, about 70% [23]. Worldwide, porphyry deposits accounted for 34% of global mine
production in 1975 and 62% in 1998, followed by a slight decline to 55% in 2009 [11]. This shows that the
increasing extraction of porphyry deposits has significantly contributed to the reduction of the average
ore grade. The period from the 1920s is also known as “The Porphyry Era” [23]. This era is marked
by a regional shift in mine production, as shown in Figure 5. In 2008, almost half of the extracted ore
came from Latin America, which has large porphyry deposits for geological reasons. For comparison,
in 1931, its share was just under 20% [11,45]. The development towards large porphyry deposits is
reflected not only in the size of the individual mines and their geographical location, but also in the
structure of the mine operators. In the 1920s, three companies, Anaconda Copper Mining Company,
Kennecott Copper Corporation, and Phelps Dodge Corporation, produced approximately 35% of the
total American copper production, 10 years later, they produced as much as 74% [18].
Figure 5. Regional share of annual production [11,17].
69
Resources 2018, 7, 88
3.4. Technological Developments
Porphyry deposits were already known in the 19th century, but it was not feasible to mine them
profitably; they were regarded as worthless. Only with the development of corresponding technologies
did it become possible to extract low-grade deposits [18,23]. The trend towards porphyry deposits is
also linked to the trend towards open-pit mining. This leads to a further decrease in the ore content,
as large scale open pit mining methods allow profitable extraction of such ores because of lower
mining costs. A comparison of the ores mined above and below ground reveals a clear difference
in their ore grade. This is exemplified by the data for the United States from Leong et al. [18] for
the years 1917 to 1936 and based on Weber [23] for the year 2013. In the first period, the difference
averaged 1.3 percentage points; in 2013, it was around 0.5 percentage points (with a ratio of surface
to underground mining operations of around two-thirds to one-third). Open-pit mining is a highly
productive mining technique, as many of the large deposits are close to the surface. The associated
method is known as the Jackling method and is one of the most important innovations from the
beginning of the 20th century. Daniel C. Jackling, who developed the method, is also known as
the Henry Ford of copper mining. He successfully applied the mass production methods already
used in other industries to copper mining. In Bingham Canyon, for example, all underground mines
were quickly converted into open-pit mines and the ore was mined with machines suitable for mass
production [46–48]. At that time, it was difficult for small underground mines to keep up. In addition,
there were numerous technological advances, which were necessary, among other things, to realize
mass production in hard rock mining. This progress has been made in both open-pit and underground
mining. In open-pit mining, large shovel excavators were used from around the beginning of the 20th
century; this technology had been adopted from iron ore mining and led to a further decrease in ore
grades, because larger equipment is less selective and the ore is diluted by waste or low grade material.
A new invention was the block caving process for the underground extraction of copper ores with a
low metal content [18,23]. This method is usable for big ore bodies with favorable rock conditions for
natural breakage as it uses the internal rock stresses to fracture the rock. Therefore, an ore block is
undercut by blasting; gravity causes the fractures to spread out and forces the ore block to collapse,
following that the ore can easily be extracted [49]. Figure 6 shows the development of mining methods
from 1880 to 1936. Today, 80% to 95% of copper ore is extracted by open-pit mining [50] (p. 197).
 
Figure 6. Shares of mining methods for the years 1880 to 1936 [18].
Even before this time, however, progress had already been made. While copper was still
largely mined by hand until the 1880s, more mature and increasingly mechanized technologies
were gradually used. Initially, workers used shovels to expose the ore and crushed it by hand before
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loading it onto carriages pulled by animals. The mechanization of these steps took place gradually.
This was compounded by the increasing use of electricity instead of steam from the year 1900 (see
Figure 7) [18,23,51].
Figure 7. Mechanical power use in US metal mines [51].
Besides mechanization, the increase in the efficiency of mining, concentration, and refining
technologies took place. At the end of the 18th century, drills were gradually optimized and operated
using compressed air and explosives were used instead of black powder. This improvement had a
particular impact on underground mining and increased the efficiency of the workers employed so
that their labor could be used for other purposes. The transport systems were also upgraded and
the first ventilation systems were installed. In open-pit mining at the beginning of the 20th century,
the more efficient loading devices paid off. Instead of steam-powered ones, electric shovels were used,
which were mounted onto a crawler instead of a truck. This allowed an increase of up to 200% of the
loaded quantity. In general, larger and/or electrically operated devices were used for transport [18,48].
The mentioned developments could be described as a shift in activities from the selective mining of
rich ores to the large-scale mining of low-grade ores [23].
Furthermore, technical improvements and innovations in ore comminution and concentration
contributed to the success of low grade ores. The increase in efficiency achieved by technical progress
is excellently illustrated by an example from Corry and Kiessling [23]. At the beginning of the 20th
century, the yield after grinding was around 60% to 75% and increased to 90% by the mid-1930s.
This means that the yield from an ore with 1% copper in 1935 (90% efficiency) was the same as from
a 1.5% ore in 1900 (60% efficiency). This also led to the fact that old processing residues were now
partly regarded as ore and processed again. Another outstanding invention was the flotation process.
So gradually, the mining of more complex and chemically more diverse ores became possible [36].
In addition to purely technological advances, more and more was invested into the training of workers,
which also had a positive influence on the yield [18,23].
Recent technological developments include the hydrometallurgical process, in which the
metal is dissolved from the rock using chemicals before being further processed by solvent
extraction/electrowinning (SX/EW). This method is used for copper oxides, which could not
previously be mined, and for sulfide ores with a very low copper content. This process was introduced
in 1968 and had its breakthrough in the mid-1980s. Since then, the share of total production has
increased from 30% of American production in the 1990s to about 45% in 2005 [17,36]. There are
also numerous innovations and process variants, for example, in the smelting process. However,
the outstanding technical improvements were introduced at the beginning of the 20th century; today’s
innovations (apart from the hydrometallurgical process) are often process improvements to reduce the
consumption of consumables and supplies and to reduce emissions. Nevertheless, new disruptive
innovations cannot be ruled out (e.g., deep sea mining).
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3.5. Price and By-Products
The previously listed improvements were able to offset the increasing production costs due to
lower grade ores, so that the real price of copper has been constant over time [19,48]. This clearly
contradicts the assumption that there is a shortage. The price is determined by demand and supply.
If there is a supply shortage, the price rises. However, the constant real price in this case confirms that
demand can be met at reasonable conditions.
The current market price also has a short term influence on the mined ore. Selective mining
takes place in times of low metal prices. At times of high market prices, overburden previously
considered worthless becomes ore. Looking at the price of copper and the grade of ores in the United
States, this effect can be seen around 1930, when the global economic crisis took place. At that time,
copper prices fell relatively sharply, leading to reduced mining [45]. At the same time, however,
an increase in the average mill head grade can be observed. From 1933 onwards, there was an upward
trend in copper prices and the average metal content fell from 1.9% in 1934 to 1.5% in 1936 (as the
published reports do not include data from Alaska, this trend is somewhat more pronounced) [52].
Figure 8 shows the relative price and head grade change compared with the previous year for the
period from 1920 to 2010; a positive price change is usually associated with a negative change in the
copper content of the mined ore and vice versa. Not all aspects are taken into account in the evaluation,
for example, a slight time shift of the effects may result from accumulated inventories; furthermore,
the price of copper is influenced by a multitude of factors.
Figure 8. Relative change of copper ore grade and price for the United States from 1920 to 2010 (own
calculations based on the work of [17]).
In addition to the prices for the main product, the share of by-products also represents a surplus
value. Depending on the type of deposit, other different metals can be contained. Porphyry deposits
usually contain copper, gold, silver, and molybdenum. Sediment bound deposits, which mainly occur
in Africa, contain cobalt in addition to copper. However, there are also deposit types that have zinc and
lead included as other valuable materials. Figure 9 shows the metal content of several deposits using
copper equivalents. Copper equivalents give the percentage of valuable metal in a deposit, reflecting
the monetary value of all metals normalized to that of copper. If the copper equivalents are compared
to the copper ore grade, it can be seen that some deposit types like massive sulfides, which are often
smaller, have a high added value due to the by-products they contain. On average, about 16% of the
economic value of copper deposits is due to their co- and by-products [41] (p. 72).
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Figure 9. Resources and ore grades of copper mines expressed in Cu–Eq (own calculations based on
the work of [22], Cu–Eq are calculated using the amount and price of all in a deposit included and
extracted metals, efficiencies are neglected).
Figure 10 shows the development of the amount of molybdenum, gold, and silver produced in
the United States as a by-product of copper production per ton of copper (over individual years).
The amount of silver extracted is quite stable over the period evaluated, whereas the proportion of
gold falls over the same period. In 2000, approximately 45% less gold was mined per ton of copper
than in 1950. For molybdenum, the case is reversed. Molybdenum production from copper mining
more than doubled (the figures also include the by-product quantity from other mass metals, but this
proportion is negligible in comparison with that from copper). One reason for this is the demand for
molybdenum, which had been increasing steadily since the mid-1930s and only flattened out towards
the beginning of the 1980s.
Figure 10. By-products per ton of copper production (own calculations based on the work of [17]).
On the other hand, the increasing share of porphyry deposits in the total copper production also
contributes to this, as only porphyry deposits contain molybdenum as a by-product. The proportion
of molybdenum, which is mainly extracted from copper as a by-product, rose from 27% in 1942 to
over 56% in 2015, with the other half of annual production currently being extracted as the main
product [17]. Unfortunately, no statement can be made for cobalt, as this is hardly produced in the
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United States. Apart from the copper content, it can be shown that the amount of by-products obtained
has increased overall and thus contributes more to the profitability of a mine.
4. Discussion
The ore contents of the mined copper deposits have been decreasing over the last decades. Mudd,
for example, confirms this not only for copper, which has been used here as an example, but also for
many other metals that are mined in Australia [8]. Often, this trend is used to support the view that
we are running out of resources. However, as shown by this work, this conclusion cannot be drawn
from the available data. Instead, we need to interpret this trend positively and see the enormous
technological progress associated with it.
Regarding the decreasing ore grades, the first statement may seem appropriate, but we have
to acknowledge that these figures show the ore grade of the actual mined deposits, not what is still
available in our earth, and there are several other factors that have an influence on the choice of
whether or not to mine a deposit. It could be shown that the exponential increase in the consumption
of copper, for example, led to the mining of ever larger deposits, which often have lower ore grades.
This is because of the preferred deposit types. New technologies have been developed to extract these
deposits, and large shovel excavators and froth flotation, for example, have made it possible to use
ores with a low concentration of metal. What was called ore at the end of the 20th century was still
overburden at the beginning of the same century, because it was not possible to extract the raw material
under economic conditions. The long-term constant real copper prices reinforce this statement by
showing that people have found a way to serve demand (using low grade ores) at reasonable prices.
Therefore, the ore content alone is not suitable for making a statement about the availability of raw
materials, but rather to show the enormous progress made by the technologies used.
Nevertheless, the decreasing metal content of the ores leads to an increased expenditure of input
materials, overburden, energy, emissions, and so on, which must not be ignored, as it has a considerable
influence on our environment, but which was not the subject of the paper here. Further, it is precisely
this increasing ecological expenditure associated with falling ore grades, as well as the increasing
conflicts of use, that are restricting the availability of resources from a sustainable point of view. In our
opinion, these environmental impacts should be placed more at the center of the assessment of resource
extraction than a very speculative discussion about possible resource depletion based on the data
discussed in this paper.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, N.R. and M.S.; Investigation, N.R.; Data Curation, N.R.;
Writing—Original Draft Preparation, N.R. and M.S.; Writing—Review & Editing, M.S.; Project Administration,
M.S.; Funding Acquisition, M.S.
Funding: This research was funded by the Ministry of the Environment, Climate Protection, and the Energy
Sector Baden-Württemberg within the NEXUS project (grant number [L7516001]).
Acknowledgments: We thank Leopold Weber for providing the data and Friedrich-Wilhelm Wellmer and the
anonymous reviewers for their valuable remarks.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
References
1. European Commission. Report on Critical Raw Materials for the EU. Report of the Ad hoc Working Group on
Defining Critical Raw Materials; European Commission: Brussels, Belgium, 2014.
2. Graedel, T.E.; Harper, E.M.; Nassar, N.T.; Nuss, P.; Reck, B.K. Criticality of metals and metalloids. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 2015, 112, 4257–4262. [CrossRef]
3. Meadows, D.H.; Meadows, D.L.; Randers, J.; Behrens III, W.W. The Limits to Growth. A Report for the Club of
Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, 2nd ed.; Universe Books: New York, NY, USA, 1972.
4. Rørbech, J.T.; Vadenbo, C.; Hellweg, S.; Astrup, T.F. Impact Assessment of Abiotic Resources in LCA:
Quantitative Comparison of Selected Characterization Models. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2014, 48, 11072–11081.
[CrossRef] [PubMed]
74
Resources 2018, 7, 88
5. Goedkoop, M.; Heijungs, R.; Huijbregts, M.; de Schryver, A.; Struijs, J.; van Zelm, R. ReCiPe 2008. A Life
Cycle Assessment Method Which Comprises Harmonized Category Indicators at the Midpoint and the Endpoint Level;
Report I: Characterisation; Ruimte en Milieu, Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en
Milieubeheer: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2008.
6. Jolliet, O.; Margni, M.; Charles, R.; Humbert, S.; Payet, J.; Rebitzer, G.; Rosenbaum, R. IMPACT 2002+: A new
life cycle impact assessment methodology. Int. J. Life Cycle Assess. 2003, 8, 324. [CrossRef]
7. Goedkoop, M.; Spriensma, R. The Eco-Indicator’99. A Damage Oriented Method for Life Cycle Impact Assessment;
Methodology Report; PRé Consultants: Amersfoort, The Netherlands, 2001.
8. Mudd, G.M. The Sustainability of Mining in Australia: Key Production Trends and Environmental Implications;
Research Report No. RP5; Department of Civil Engineering, Monash University and Mineral Policy Institute:
Melbourne, Australia, 2009.
9. Northey, S.; Mohr, S.; Mudd, G.M.; Weng, Z.; Giurco, D. Modelling future copper ore grade decline based on
a detailed assessment of copper resources and mining. Resour. Conserv. Recycl. 2014, 83, 190–201. [CrossRef]
10. Calvo, G.; Mudd, G.M.; Valero, A.; Valero, A. Decreasing ore grades in global metallic mining: A theoretical
issue or a global reality? Resources 2016, 5, 36. [CrossRef]
11. Crowson, P. Some observations on copper yields and ore grades. Resour. Policy 2012, 37, 59–72. [CrossRef]
12. Northey, S.A.; Mudd, G.M.; Werner, T.T. Unresolved Complexity in Assessments of Mineral Resource
Depletion and Availability. Nat. Resour. Res. 2017, 543, 367. [CrossRef]
13. Lasky, S.G. How tonnage and grade relationships help predict ore reserves. Eng. Mineral. J. 1950, 151, 81–85.
14. Ahrens, L.H. A Fundamental Law of Geochemistry. Nature 1953, 172, 1148. [CrossRef]
15. Ahrens, L.H. The lognormal distribution of the elements (A fundamental law of geochemistry and its
subsidiary). Geochim. Cosmochim. Acta 1954, 5, 49–73. [CrossRef]
16. Skinner, B.J. Second iron age ahead. Am. Sci 1976, 64, 258–269.
17. USGS. Minerals Yearbook: Volume I.—Metals and Minerals. Years 1932–2015. Available online: https:
//minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/myb/ (accessed on 10 October 2018).
18. Leong, Y.S.; Erdreich, E.; Burrit, J.C.; Kiessling, O.E.; Nighman, C.E.; Heikes, G.C. Technology, Employment
and Output per Man in Copper Mining; Works Projects Administration National Research Project E-12;
Work Projects Administration, National Research Project in cooperation with Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of
Mines: Philadelphia, PA, USA, 1940.
19. Schodde, R. The key drivers behind resource growth: An analysis of the copper industry over the last 100
years. Presented at the MEMS Conference Mineral and Metal Markets over the Long Turn, Phoenix, AZ,
USA, 3 March 2010.
20. Weber, L. Interpretation von Reserven- und Ressourcenangaben aus wirtschaftsgeologischer Sicht.
Berg Huettenmaenn. Monatsh. 2015, 160, 71–78. [CrossRef]
21. Jaireth, S.; Porritt, K.; Hoatson, D.M. Australian Copper Resources: Sheet 2: Deposit Types. 1:10,000,000 Scale
Map. Available online: https://www.data.gov.au/dataset/australian-copper-resources-sheet-1-resources-
by-region-sheet-2-deposit-types-may-2010 (accessed on 20 December 2017).
22. Weber, L.; (Vienna, Austria). Personal communication, 2016.
23. Corry, A.W.; Kiessling, O.E. Mineral Technology and Output per Man Studies. Grade of Ore; Works Projects
Administration National Research Project E-6: Philadelphia, PA, USA, 1938.
24. Gordon, R.B. Production residues in copper technological cycles. Resour. Conserv. Recyl. 2002, 36, 87–106.
[CrossRef]
25. Wellmer, F.-W. Wie lange reichen unsere Rohstoffvorräte?—Was sind Reserven und Ressourcen?
UmweltWirtschaftsForum 2014, 22, 125–132. [CrossRef]
26. Anderson, D.L. Theory of the Earth; Blackwell Scientific Publ.: Boston, MA, USA, 1989.
27. Javoy, M. Chemical earth models. C. R. l’Acad. Sci.-Ser. IIA-Earth Planet. Sci. 1999, 329, 537–555. [CrossRef]
28. Grotzinger, J.; Jordan, T. Press/Siever Allgemeine Geologie, 7th ed.; Springer Spektrum: Berlin/Heidelberg,
Germany, 2017.
29. Rudnick, R.L.; Gao, S. Composition of the Continental Crust. In Treatise on Geochemistry, 2nd ed.;
Holland, H.D., Turekian, K., Eds.; Elsevier: Oxford, UK, 2014; pp. 1–51.
30. Evans, A.M. Erzlagerstättenkunde; Ferdinand Enke: Stuttgart, Germany, 1992.
31. Evans, A.M. Ore Geology and Industrial Minerals. An Introduction, 3rd ed.; Blackwell Publ.: Malden, MA,
USA, 2012.
75
Resources 2018, 7, 88
32. Nevsun Resources Ltd. Timok Project: Company Website. Available online: https://www.nevsun.com/
projects/timok-project/ (accessed on 30 July 2018).
33. Nevsun Resources Ltd. 2017 Press Releases: Mineral Resource Statement for Timok Upper Zone
Project-Cukaru Peki Deposit-Serbia. Available online: http://www.nevsun.com/news/2017/october26-
updated-pea-for-timok-upper-zone-copper-project/ (accessed on 6 December 2018).
34. West, J. Decreasing metal ore grades: Are they really being driven by the depletion of high-grade deposits?
J. Ind. Ecol. 2011, 15, 165–168. [CrossRef]
35. Winter Birrell, R. The Development of Mining Technology in Australia. Ph.D. Thesis, University of
Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia, 2005.
36. Wilburn, D.R.; Goonan, T.G.; Bleiwas, D.I. Technological Advancement. A Factor in Increasing Resource Use;
Open File Report 2001-197, Version 1.03; 2001. Available online: https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/
ofr01197 (accessed on 21 December 2017).
37. Peters, W.C. Exploration and Mining Geology, 2nd ed.; John Wiley and Sons Inc.: New York, NY, USA, 1987.
38. Wellmer, F.-W.; Böttcher, G.; Schmidt, H. Gewinnung mineralischer Rohstoffe und IDNDR.
Geographische Rundschau 1994, 46, 450–456.
39. Tilton, J.E.; Lagos, G. Assessing the long-run availability of copper. Resour. Policy 2007, 32, 19–23. [CrossRef]
40. Mudd, G.M.; Jowitt, S.M. Growing Global Copper Resources, Reserves and Production: Discovery Is Not
the Only Control on Supply. Econ. Geol. 2018, 113, 1235–1267. [CrossRef]
41. Wellmer, F.-W.; Buchholz, P.; Gutzmer, J.; Hagelüken, C.; Herzig, P.; Littke, R.; Thauer, R.K. Raw Materials for
Future Energy Supply; Springer: Cham, Switzerland, 2018.
42. Bardi, U. Extracted. How the Quest for Mineral Wealth Is Plundering the Planet; Chelsea Green Pub Co.:
White River Junction, VT, USA, 2014.
43. Crowson, P. Mine size and the structure of costs. Resour. Policy 2003, 29, 15–36. [CrossRef]
44. Schodde, R. What Do We Mean by a World-Class.-Deposit? And Why Are They Special? Presented at the
AMEC Conference, Perth, Australia, 8 June 2006.
45. Julihn, C.E.; Meyer, H.M. Minerals Yearbook 1932–1933; Kiessling, O.E., Ed.; United States Government
Printing Office: Washington, DC, USA, 1933.
46. Brunn, S.D. Engineering Earth. The Impacts of Megaengineering Projects; Springer: Dordrecht,
The Netherlands, 2011.
47. Arrington, L.J.; Hansen, G.B. The Richest Hole on Earth. A History of the Bingham Copper Mine; Utah State
University Press: Logan, UT, USA, 1963.
48. David, A.P.; Wright, G. Increasing returns and the genesis of American resource abundance. Ind. Corp Chang.
1997, 6, 203–245. [CrossRef]
49. Hustrulid, W.A.; Bullock, R.C. Underground Mining Methods. Engineering Fundamentals and International Case
Studies; Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration: Littleton, CO, USA, 2001.
50. Giurco, D. Towards Sustainable Metal Cycles: The Case of Copper. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sydney,
Sydney, Australia, 2005.
51. Committee on Resources and Man. Resources and Man. A Study and Recommendations; W. H. Freeman and
Company: San Francisco, CA, USA, 1969.
52. Furness, J.W.; Meyer, H.M. Copper. In Minerals Yearbook 1938; Hughes, H.H., Ed.; United States Government
Printing Office: Washington, DC, USA, 1938; pp. 81–108.
© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution




Critical Natural Resources: Challenging the Current
Discourse and Proposal for a Holistic Definition
Marie K. Schellens 1,2,* and Johanna Gisladottir 1,3
1 Department of Physical Geography, Environment and Resource Dynamics Group, Stockholm University,
114 19 Stockholm, Sweden; jog31@hi.is
2 Environment and Natural Resources Programme, Faculty of Engineering, University of Iceland,
101 Reykjavik, Iceland
3 Environment and Natural Resources Programme, Faculty of Political Science, University of Iceland,
101 Reykjavik, Iceland
* Correspondence: marie.schellens@natgeo.su.se; Tel.: +32-495-618015
Received: 25 October 2018; Accepted: 28 November 2018; Published: 1 December 2018
Abstract: Studies on critical natural resources have grown in number over the last decade out of
concern for resource availability and its potential impacts. Nonetheless, only a handful of studies
explicitly define criticality for natural resources. Through a systematic literature review, we identified
four main perspectives in the descriptions of critical natural resources: (1) economic importance is
overemphasized at the expense of sociocultural and ecosystem support functions of natural resources;
(2) a Western perspective dominates the research discourse; (3) apart from the field of economics,
the debate lacks input from social sciences; and (4), non-renewable resources are overrepresented
compared to renewables. Based on the current discourse and its apparent inclinations, we propose a
new definition of criticality for natural resources aligned with risk theory. We argue for the need to
balance out the perspectives described above to provide decision-makers with impartial information
for the sustainable management of natural resources.
Keywords: critical; criticality; definition; natural capital; natural resources; raw materials;
systematic mapping
1. Introduction
Natural resources are found all around us in the natural environment. However, they are only
identified as such when value is attributed to them by humans [1]. The adjective “critical” has
been added to natural resources increasingly often, both in scientific publications and grey literature.
This comes alongside growing awareness of global trends, such as population growth, increased
consumption, and pollution. Nonetheless, most often what “critical” entails is not explained and
the attributive has been used interchangeably with other adjectives, such as “strategic” or “scarce”,
which causes confusion over its meaning [2]. Moreover, concepts such as “critical natural capital”,
“keystone resources”, and “critical raw materials” have emerged in different scientific fields [3–5].
They all address the notion that some resources are more critical than others and that, consequently,
the management of those resources requires guidance. To the extent of our knowledge, there has not
been any systematic exploration of what authors mean exactly with these concepts and where their
understanding is the same and where it diverges.
Criticality assessment methodologies are the main way of evaluating and communicating the
criticality of natural resources. They are used as systematic screening tools to identify resources of
concern. Thereby, the assessments inform and guide policy making, research and development, as well
as product design [6,7]. Governmental organizations and policymakers have been actively involved in
the discourse and assessments of critical natural resources, evidenced, for example, in reports by the
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US Department of Energy [8] and the European Commission [9]. Classifying them as critical through
these assessments leads to some natural resources being prioritized over others. The discourse has
influence on decision-making since the classification provides guidance for the management of natural
resources. Diverging assumptions and understandings of criticality of natural resources can thus lead
to different resource management and policy outcomes. Therefore, it is important to identify the main
understandings and underlying assumptions captured in the different concepts.
Following this aim, the research question guiding this work is: How have critical natural resources
been defined and what aspects constitute its understanding? To answer this question, this paper maps
out the discourse on the criticality of natural resources. Accordingly, we investigated common grounds
and divergent interpretations of the concept. The methodology of the review is presented in the
following section. In the results and discussion sections, we introduce observations from the review
which are directly followed by our interpretation for each insight. Several perspectives were identified
in the current literature, and based on those observations, we propose a new definition of natural
resource criticality.
2. Materials and Methods
We applied systematic mapping, a type of systematic literature review [10]. It is considered a
suitable methodology for a transparent and reproducible review that covers multiple research fields.
Compared to regular systematic reviews, a systematic map does not attempt to answer specific research
questions but rather rigorously gathers and describes available information around open-framed
questions [10]. The method is suited for answering policy-relevant questions, clustering knowledge,
identifying knowledge gaps, specifying further (more specific) research questions, and, as is the case for
this paper, developing a greater understanding of concepts. Moreover, it aligns well with Jabareen’s [11]
grounded theory method to contribute to the theorisation of concepts from multidisciplinary bodies
of knowledge.
A brief, step-wise overview of the process we followed to develop this systematic map goes
as follows: (1) establish a review team, set the scope and research question, and develop inclusion
and exclusion criteria for documents; (2) document search for evidence; (3) screen documents found;
(4) code evidence and store it systematically in a database; (5) describe and visualize the findings in a
report [10].
The established review team consisted of the two authors with divergent backgrounds in natural
and social sciences. For step two described above, we gathered documents in May 2017 by applying
a similar search string to two scientific article databases: Scopus and Web of Science. The search
string was carefully designed and tested with appropriate synonyms and combinations of search
terms to (1) restrict the number of nonrelated articles and (2) to find as many relevant documents for
our research question as possible. The latter criterion was tested by making sure a set of previously
identified articles relevant to the research question were among the gathered documents. The aim of
the search string was to find publications that included the keywords “natural resources”, “resources”,
“materials”, or “natural capital” in proximity to “critical”, “strategic”, or “key” and close to a keyword
demanding an explanation (i.e., “definition” or “classification”). The exact search strings we used can
be found in Appendix A. Since the search was only conducted in English, no publications in other
languages were found, which is one of the limitations of this work.
The documents identified in our search were screened and selected based on their title and
abstract according to predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria. Broadly, the selection criteria aimed
to include documents which contained a definition or classification of natural resources. It also needed
to include a description of their criticality that was not specific to one resource but generalizable to
at least a set of resources. The specific exclusion and inclusion criteria can be found in Appendix B.
After reading the selected documents, a reference and bibliography search was performed, where all
literature citing and cited by the selected documents was screened for inclusion. The reference search,
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applying the same selection criteria for title and abstract, expanded the set of documents to analyse in
full text from 63 to 199 documents.
Additionally, we searched through grey literature, that is, documents published in a
nonstandard way for academic practices. A number of web-based databases for grey documents
exist, such as www.opengrey.eu, documents.un.org, search.un.org, and publications.europa.eu. They
are, nevertheless, incomplete or not functioning properly. We initially explored those databases with
search strings similar to the ones defined in Appendix A. They only provided us with a handful
of relevant documents. The citation and reference search we did on our gathered scientific articles
included all the relevant grey documents found as well as additional ones. They included nonpublished
manuscripts, reports from governmental and other organizations, conference proceedings, statutes of
public law, books and book chapters, dictionary entries, and theses. The documents were selected and
analysed in the same manner as the scientific journal articles.
We performed the searches and subsequent selection of documents from May to June 2017.
Ultimately, 105 full-text documents were selected for further analysis. Appendix C presents a flow
diagram of the number of documents in every step of the selection procedure. Appendix D lists all
articles that were finally included and reviewed.
As listed above, the final step was the analysis of the selected documents by systematically
coding the evidence and producing a systematic map database of coded text fragments. We used an
open-source qualitative coding and analysis program called TAMS Analyzer (4.49b5ahEC, Matthew
Weinstein, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA) [12]. We followed Clapton et al.’s [13] guidelines
for coding or keywording documents. Researcher triangulation lowered subjectivity in keywording
by content clustering. Both authors created their own keywords based on initial analyses of each
10 documents. We discussed and merged our coding schemes to proceed in an equivalent and
structured way. Halfway through the full-text analysis, we rediscussed and adjusted the coding
scheme, as well as at the end. In case of doubt or disagreement, outside experts were asked for
their opinion.
This resulted in the clustering of text fragments in three main topics or codes: definitions of natural
resources, classifications of natural resources, and definitions and descriptions of criticality for natural
resources. The third code, criticality, was subdivided into the following six subcodes: economics,
environment, physical availability of resources, politics, strategy, and technology. Furthermore,
each individual document was coded with the year of publication, country of first author, journal
publication, and the first author’s type of institution (e.g., university, private company, governmental
agency, etc.). The quality of the coding process was ensured through the collaborative nature of
the research. That included frequent consultation within and outside of the coding team, as well as
through the documentation of procedures and decisions [13]. Text fragments, grouped by their specific
codes and potential overlaps with other codes, were then analysed to reveal patterns in the data.
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Natural Resources and Their Classification
Before being able to explore the criticality of natural resources, it is necessary to form an
understanding of the term. Broad inclusion and exclusion criteria of the search method were set to
both include documents defining and categorizing natural resources as well as documents concerning
their criticality. Figure 1 presents the codes concerning definitions of natural resources in the reviewed
documents, gathered from 38 of the 105 reviewed documents. They could be split up into three main
themes. One related definitions of natural resources to the physical environment. For example, they
focused on biophysical processes of nature or the finiteness of stocks. A larger group of codes described
natural resources as a dynamic concept, or even a social construct, dependent on its value in relation to
human needs and wants. This view, namely, that “resources become” instead of that “resources are”,
was already elaborately described in an industrious volume by E. W. Zimmermann in 1951 [14]. A more
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recent example of this view was given by Cutter and Renwick [15], who argued that environmental
cognition, “the mental process of making sense out of the environment that surrounds us”, lies at
the base of natural resources: “A resource does not exist without someone to use it. Resources are
by their very nature human-centered. Different individuals or groups value resources differently”.
The largest group of codes described the intersection between these two views of natural resources,
acknowledging both its provision by the natural environment and its value in relation to human
activities. Andersen [1], for example, states that “natural resources exist independently of humans but
are only identified as resources, and thus ascribed value, in relation to human activities”.
There were 29 other codes related to defining natural resources which did not fit into the
value driven and/or physical environment themes. Several of them describe the concept of natural
capital, coined by ecological economists, as an addition to human capital and manufactured capital.
It comprises natural resources and “the ecosystems that support and maintain the quality of land,
air and water, and biodiversity” [16]. Another group of leftover codes pointed to the distinction
in definitions between reserves and resources, exclusively for minerals, based on classification by
the United States Geological Survey (USGS). Respectively, they represent “a mineral deposit that is
currently economic (reserves) and another which may become economic in the future (resources)” [17].
The economic (and technological) feasibility indicates again, however indirectly, a human-value driven
definition. The five text fragments in the middle of the diagram could be considered as the most
comprehensive ones. They explain natural resources from a combined environmental and value-driven
approach, while also adding an extra aspect. Le Billon [18], for example, stated that definitions of
natural resources are often disputed due to contesting ideas of ownership over them. Dewulf et al. [19]
(p. 5312) introduced the aspect that natural resources “may have a three-dimensional (volume) or a
two-dimensional nature (surface)”. Terrestrial and aquatic surfaces, according to them, are for example












Figure 1. Venn diagram describing the amount of text fragments defining natural resources, coded
into three themes. The total amount of text fragments (n = 111) were gathered from 38 of the 105
reviewed documents.
The coded text fragments make clear that both the physical environment as well as human
valuation are important components of a definition of natural resources. Between all the reviewed
definitions, the following one presents this duality the best in our opinion, found by Castleden [23] in a
geography textbook by Daniels et al. [24]: “A substance in the physical environment that has value or
usefulness to human beings and is economically feasible and socially acceptable to use”. Castleden [23]
thereby notes that natural resources’ value can go beyond an economic one and include, for example,
a role in human identity, relationships, and spirituality.
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What constitutes natural resources and how they are classified is very closely related. Most often,
they are classified according to their rate of regeneration: renewable and non-renewable resources.
Renewable resources are defined as resources that regenerate on a human timescale (e.g., water, fish,
and forests). Non-renewable resources do not regenerate over human timescales, for example, minerals.
This simple subdivision is considered misleading, or even harmful by some scholars, as it leads to
the belief that renewable resources will always stay available for human exploitation, regardless of
their management [15]. Therefore, renewable resources can be further subdivided into unconditionally
renewable resources, such as solar power, and conditionally renewable resources, such as wildlife.
The unsustainable management of conditionally renewable resources can exhaust their regenerative
capacity and make them non-renewable. Various terms are used to indicate these three subsequent
classes of natural resources, which are presented in Table 1. From this simple table, an inconsistency in
terminology is apparent between Cutter and Renwick [15] and Dewulf et al. [19]. While the former
applies the term “flow resources” to conditionally renewable resources, the latter applies the same
term for unconditionally renewable resources. To avoid confusion, we follow the terminology and
classification of natural resources by Jowsey [25] in the rest of the paper.
Table 1. Natural resource classifications based on regenerative capacity.
Source Non-Renewable Renewable
[25] Non-renewable Conditionally renewable Unconditionally renewable
[19] Exhaustible non-renewable Exhaustible renewable Inexhaustible renewable
[19] Stock Fund Flow
[26,27] Depletable Critical zone Continuous
[15] Non-renewable/stock Renewable/flow Perpetual
Examples Oil, genetic biodiversity,diamonds, metals, etc.
Fish stocks, soils,
groundwater, timber, etc. Solar, tidal, wind power, etc.
3.2. Overview of the Reviewed Publications on Criticality
An overview of the timing and location of the publications, which includes codes on the criticality
of natural resources, is presented in Figure 2, as well as the subcodes/topics discussed in them.
Their number amounts to 75 out of the total of 105 documents within the review. The first publication
in this review dates from 1984 and focused on strategic minerals [3]. In the 1980s and 1990s, the topic
was only sporadically present, and criticality was mainly related to strategy and defence. Although
less dominant in the more recent literature, this continued to be a regularly discussed aspect of
criticality. In the late 1990s and mid-2000s, a branch of publications focusing on critical natural
capital appeared where environmental concerns were introduced into the criticality debate. From 2008
onwards, the topic started to gain more attention and grew notably up to a peak in 2015. It kept a
strong presence in the literature until May 2017, when the gathering of publications for this review
started. Since this new wave of interest, economic aspects of criticality have been introduced and
have received most of the attention, next to technological, political, physical availability, strategic,
and environmental aspects.
According to our interpretation, environmental concerns become present in the literature after
the publication of the Brundtland Report [28] and the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 that both focused on
sustainable development. The Kyoto Protocol was first published in 1998 [29] and the United Nations
Millenium Decleration came out in 2000, which stressed the importance of sustainable development
and protecting our common environment [30]. This suggests that these events, and increased global
environmental awareness more generally, might have impacted the criticality discourse. Furthermore,
the economic crisis of 2008 is likely linked to the increase in publications discussing the criticality
concept more intensively. The European Commission report from 2010 on critical raw material [5] can
also have further put the issue on the agenda, which links with the EU’s action plan for the Circular
Economy [31]. Since then, more weight has been placed on economic as well as technological concerns
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over the earlier defence and environmental concerns. Nonetheless, the topic of criticality in relation
to the environment has not disappeared completely from the debate. The UN’s 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development came out in 2015 [32], which put a strong emphasis on environmental issues,
further raising awareness on their importance in the global community.
Figure 2. Overview of the publications included in the review on criticality of natural resources (n = 75):
(a) number of publications over time, with indication on the number of subcodes per criticality aspect;
(b) number of publications per type of organization of first author; (c) number of publications per
type of journal (j. = journals, several grouped together from similar disciplines, see Appendix E for
included journals).
Based on the location of the first author, 60% of the 75 publications were published by residents of
the United Kingdom, Germany, or the United States. Additionally, publications from the Netherlands,
Italy, and Canada together accounted for another 21%. The remaining publications were all produced
in Western countries with the exception of two from Asia (i.e., [33,34]). Authors from the United
Kingdom were the first ones to enter the debate alongside their Canadian colleagues until 2000. Dutch
scientists joined after 2000 and US scholars followed in 2004. We found publications from Germany
since 2009. Researchers from Italy, represented solely through the European Commission’s Joint
Research Centre, joined the debate in 2014. The two Asian publications in our review were both
published in 2015.
These findings might indicate that natural resource criticality is a primarily Western concept.
However, the search was performed in English which excludes publications in other languages. In the
gathered publications, Korean, Japanese, and Russian reports were mentioned among others [35,36].
Additionally, there were no signs of standpoints in the criticality discussion from the global south.
This plausible over-representation of Western perspectives could influence the understanding of
criticality of natural resources since other parts of the world are not considered to the same extent.
Analysing the first author’s affiliation shows that 59% of the publications were developed at
universities, 17% at governmental research institutes and agencies, 17% at independent research
institutes, and 4% at private companies (Figure 2). This indicates that various layers of society
82
Resources 2018, 7, 79
consider the topic to be important. The range of academic journals and other publishing media that
covered studies on the criticality of natural resources was also diverse. Journals concerning resources
(e.g., Resources Policy) and industrial production (e.g., Journal of Cleaner Production) accounted
each for 15% of the reviewed literature. Resource journals were used as publishing media from the
start, while the topic only started to appear, although frequently, in industrial production journals
after 2014. Reports, often by governmental or independent research institutions, encompass 9% of the
reviewed materials from 2008 onwards. Technology journals contain 7% of publications from 2011
on. Articles in the Journal of Ecological Economics represent 17% of publications which were mainly
published in the 1990s and 2000s. One reason for this high percentage was the CRITINC research
project about critical natural capital that ended in 2003 with a special issue on the topic in the Journal
of Ecological Economics [37]. Many of the identified journals grouped above are interdisciplinary.
What stood out from this review of publication platforms was that, except for a couple of economics
related publications, there were few publications originating from the social sciences.
3.3. Definitions of Criticality
According to a number of scholars, the adjectives “critical”, “strategic”, and “scarce” have not
been differentiated clearly from each other and, therefore, have been used interchangeably [2,38,39].
The historical conceptualisation and use of the concept “strategic” for natural resources is described
by Haglund [3]. In brief, the concept was coined shortly after World War I, when shortages of certain
natural resources revealed the need for industrial capacity and input to win wars. From the 1930s
onwards, the concept “critical” was introduced, initially, as a separate category but later aggregated
into one concept “strategic and critical materials”, which was still in use in the 1980s [3]. Currently,
the terms “critical” and “strategic” are used separately where “critical” refers to threats to national
economies, while “strategic” relates almost exclusively to military and defence needs [5,39,40].
Despite being a highly debated topic, many of the reviewed publications point out the fact that
there is currently no universally agreed upon standard definition of criticality concerning natural
resources (e.g., [2,41]). The variation in terminology is attributed to the multiple applications of
the concept in diverse contexts, such as time or spatial scales [42,43]. Some authors prefer not to
have a common definition so that “criticality is a relative concept and the relevant dimensions can
(and should) be defined by the user according to his/her particular needs” [44] (p. 728). Some of
the publications in this review did present a definition of criticality in relation to natural resources,
shown in the Table 2 below.
Table 2. Verbatim definitions of the concept “critical” related to natural resources from the review in
chronological order.
nr. The Defined Concept Definition Source
Year of
Publication
1 Strategic and criticalmaterials
Strategic and critical materials are those materials
required for essential uses in a war emergency, the
procurement of which in adequate quantities, quality,
and time is sufficiently uncertain for any reason to
require prior provision for the supply thereof
[45] 1947
2 Strategic and criticalmaterials
Those materials that (A) would be needed to supply
the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs
of the United States during a national emergency,
and (B) are not found or produced in the United
States in sufficient quantities to meet such need
[46] 1979
3 Critical natural capital
Vital parts of the environment that contribute to life
support systems, biodiversity and other necessary
functions denoted as ‘keystone species’ and
‘keystone processes’
[47] 1993
4 Critical natural capital Ecological assets that are essential to well-beingor survival [48] 1993
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Table 2. Cont.
nr. The Defined Concept Definition Source
Year of
Publication
5 Critical natural capital
Critical natural capital consists of assets, stock levels
or quality levels that are:
1. Highly valued; and either
2. Essential to human health, or
3. Essential to the efficient functioning of life
support systems, or
4. Irreplaceable or unsubstitutable for all
practical purposes (e.g., because of antiquity,
complexity, specialisation, location)
[49] 1994
6 Critical natural capital
Critical elements of the capital stock should be:
1. Essential to human health, but should also
reflect the need for ecosystem health;
2. Essential to the efficient functioning of life
support systems;
3. Irreplaceable or unsubstitutable for all
practical purposes
4. In addition, irreversibility of environmental




7 Critical natural capital That part of the natural environment whichperforms important and irreplaceable functions [21] 2003
8 Critical natural capital
That set of environmental resources which performs
important environmental functions and for which no
substitutes in terms of human, manufactured or
other natural capital currently exist
[37] through
[50] 2003
9 Critical natural capital
Natural capital which is responsible for important
environmental functions and which cannot be
substituted in the provision of these functions by
manufactured capital
[37] 2003






The ecosystem services which are most important to
our survival and well-being and cannot be
substituted (focused mainly on production and




based on an ecocentric
perspective
The ecosystems which are most important to
maintain environmental health/integrity (focused
mainly on maintenance of regulation and
habitat functions)
[50] 2003
13 Critical materials Those [materials] for which a threat to supply fromabroad could involve harm to the nation’s economy [39] 2008
14 Raw material criticality
To qualify as critical, a raw material must face high
risks with regard to access to it, i.e., high supply
risks or high environmental risks, and be of high
economic importance. In such a case, the likelihood
that impediments to access occur is relatively high








(in the context of the
general risk matrix)
In this context, raw material criticality can be
interpreted as the systemic risk of damages to an
economy due to disturbances in raw material supply
[51] 2012
16 Strategic or criticalmaterials
If their supply is concentrated in one country or
could be restricted by a few corporate interests, and
because they are important economically or for
national security
[52] 2012
17 Criticality of metals The extent of current and future risks associatedwith a certain metal [53] 2013
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Table 2. Cont.
nr. The Defined Concept Definition Source
Year of
Publication
18 Criticality of metals The quality, state or degree of being of thehighest importance [17,54] 2013, 2014
19 Criticality
The combination of the potential for supply




The term ‘criticality’ describes an evaluation of the
holistic importance of a resource, which can be
interpreted as an assessment of the risks connected




A dynamic, multidimensional characteristic of
materials. In other words, criticality in its meaning
of “state of being critical” can refer to something as
being vital, absolutely essential as well as to
something that is verging on the state of emergency
[33] 2015
22 Criticality ofecosystem services
The criticality of ecosystem services depends on
(i) the essential role of these services for human
existence and well-being,
(ii) the non-substitutability of the services with
regard to their unique contribution to human
well-being, and
(iii) the risk of the services becoming irreversibly
extinct if the natural capital that provides them is
degraded beyond critical thresholds.
[58] 2015
23 Criticality of a rawmaterial
A measure of the (economic) risk arising from its
utilisation (incl. production, use, and end-of-life) for
a specific consumer over a certain period
[59] 2017
The definitions found in the literature (Table 2) can be compared with the general definition of the
term critical by Oxford English Dictionary Online [60] describing the terms’ use and understanding
in the everyday language: “Of the nature of, or constituting, a crisis: (a) Of decisive importance in
relation to the issue. spec. [. . . ], (b) Involving suspense or grave fear as to the issue; attended with
uncertainty or risk”. Many of the definitions in Table 2 describe criticality with respect to natural
capital and raw materials or metals. Only two definitions, by Roelich et al. [55] and Helbig et al. [57],
take a general stand or refer to resources explicitly. Further, many of the definitions seem to be derived
from assessments of criticality and its specific methods, which has been noted before by Graedel and
Nassar [54].
The various definitions we identified included keywords such as: risk (or threat, emergency),
importance (supplemented by vital, essential), and, less commonly, unsubstitutable or irreplaceable.
According to Frenzel et al. [59], many authors are not aware of the “true meaning of risk” and its
fundamental links to criticality, leading to conceptual and methodological issues in research on critical
natural resources. Correspondingly, de Groot et al. [50] argue that threat related to a resource should be
discussed alongside the importance of a resource in the conceptualisation of critical natural resources.
Concerning the importance of natural resources, de Groot et al. [50] claim that certain functions
of natural resources are important “to the maintenance of the natural capital itself (especially the
regulation and habitat functions)”, while other functions of natural resources are “of direct benefit
to human society” [50] (p. 190). Mancini et al. [44] developed a prioritization scheme of needs that
resources fulfil, namely, the relative importance of their functions, adapted from the psychologist
Maslow’s pyramid of human needs (Figure 3). Unsubstitutable resources can be found at the base of the
pyramid, described by Armstrong as “indispensable supports for the most basic functionings, and [. . . ]
vital supports for anyone’s life” [22] (p. 15). Examples have been provided by [17], who are researchers
mainly focused on minerals and metals. They [17] single out nitrogen, phosphate, and potash as the
only minerals essential to life itself and, thus, unsubstitutable. They argue that all other minerals are
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substitutable because “it is the need or desire for the products that generates a demand for minerals,
rather than demand for the mineral itself. As a result, there is always the possibility of finding an
alternative material to provide the required functionality” [17] (p. 1). Next to minerals, [50] also give
renewable resources, like clean air or fertile soils, as examples of unsubstitutable resources belonging
in the base of the pyramid. Accordingly, they add to [17] that, although many functions of natural
resources can be replaced by human inventions, it might be undesirable because it “is often technically
difficult and usually imperfect, it is often socially undesirable and economically not very sensible” [50]
(p. 197).
Several other aspects important to the definition of criticality for natural resources were
brought up by our review. According to [50], inherent to the “importance” part of criticality is the
question: important for whom? In general, most literature provides the answer that it is critical
or important to (a certain part of) human society. In addition to that, some authors mention
nonanthropocentric perspectives that consider parts of the natural environment as resources or
even critical resources to other species than humans [23,50]. Within the dominant anthropocentric
perspective, the criticality concept is guided by different interest groups such as, critical to: global
human society (or humanity) [61], a region [35], a country [62], a corporation [63], an economic or
industrial sector [64], or a specific product or technology [65]. This is one of the reasons why definitions
and criticality assessments are considered context dependent by many authors, as mentioned earlier.
 
Figure 3. Prioritization of natural resource needs adapted from Mancini et al. [44].
A second aspect raised in some of the reviewed documents was the need to interpret the criticality
of natural resources as dynamic, as it is not an inherent property of a resource [1,54]. Rather, the “state
of being critical” [33] will evolve over time, for example, due to technological innovations, geopolitical
changes, or climate change. Lastly, some articles discuss the importance of assessing the criticality of a
certain natural resource relative to other ones (or to other interest groups or through time), as opposed
to selecting an arbitrary threshold to divide critical and noncritical resources, e.g., [66].
3.4. Aspects of Criticality
As introduced in Figure 2, the concept of criticality contains different aspects captured by the
subcodes. There were 773 in total, with the majority of the codes (22%) related to economic aspects
of criticality. Technical aspects were second in line (15% of codes), physical availability as well as
environmental aspects each accounted for 11%, political aspects of criticality were covered by 10%
of the codes, and strategic aspects by 6%. Finally, sociohuman aspects and holistic approaches to
criticality accounted for the rest (4% of the codes).
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Thus, economic criticality concerns were most frequently discussed. Two of the main topics
under economic aspects were risks of supply disruption and the ensuing economic consequences.
The latter was also referred to as economic importance or vulnerability. Economic characteristics of
natural resources mentioned as part of one or both of these topics included, for example: current and
future supply and demand trends [7,40,63], price increases and volatility [39], competing demands [64],
sensitivity of the relevant value chains [67], and consumption level [36]. Frenzel et al. [59] (p. 2),
state that “most criticality assessments focus exclusively on economic aspects in their practical
implementation”. We would argue that this economic inclination is at the expense of other values
and functions of the natural resources at risk. An underlying assumption seems to be that as long as
economic interests are ensured, societal well-being will also be achieved.
Regarding technological aspects of criticality, continuous technological development changes
the demand for natural resources, for example, emerging clean energy technologies which require
rare earth metals and new bio-based materials that need algae [42,68]. A frequently mentioned
aspect of these technological demand dynamics is the availability and performance of substitutes
(e.g., [7]). Yet, as mentioned earlier, [17,22,50] counter these concerns by stating that only resources
that perform life and ecosystem support functions are nonsubstitutable, represented in the base layer
of Mancini et al.’s [44] prioritization pyramid of resource needs (Figure 3). Furthermore, technological
development can enhance the efficiency of natural resource use and, thereby, reduce their criticality,
for example, increased agricultural yield or extraction potential [69]. Recycling is a major topic related
to this, complemented by the possibilities of reduction, reuse, and recovery [33]. The literature on
this aspect was oriented towards non-renewables in industry. Yet, this argument could also apply to
renewable resources. We recognise that technology, with its influence on both demand and supply,
is closely interconnected with economic aspects. In general, innovation is seen as important to reduce
the criticality of resources.
Physical availability or scarcity of natural resources is mentioned often in the criticality debate
(11%). For non-renewable resources, its reserves are often compared to annual consumption or
production rates, resulting in its remaining lifetime or depletion time. In general, many authors claim
that the extent of natural resource stocks is less important to criticality than accessibility, which is
rather defined by geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions [70–72]. This is partly due to uncertainties
in reserve estimates and because criticality is often analysed on a shorter timescale than the depletion
time of the resources being considered [5,55,73]. However, [74] showed that decreasing ore grades
globally have required increasing amounts of energy for extraction. This trend is generally expected to
continue with the discovery of new reserves [75]. Still, there is uncertainty about projected resource
availability and the energy needed for extraction because of imprecise or lacking data and technological
advances in prospecting, mining, recycling, and energy efficiency [75].
When considering renewable energy resources, innovation and transformation to a renewable
energy system requires many non-renewable, mined resources [76]. Hence, the physical availability
of renewable and non-renewable resource stocks is closely linked. The importance of physical
availability has mainly been debated in relation to non-renewable and energy resources. However,
when considering conditionally renewable resources, the necessity to maintain a certain level of
resource stock for it to be able to renew itself and provide life and ecosystem support functions is
emphasized [4]. We argue that more emphasis should be placed on the biophysical reality of renewable
and non-renewable stocks for criticality considerations as compared to the economic concerns over
stocks, such as yearly production rates.
When considering environmental aspects of criticality, the main topics discussed are the
environmental side-effects of natural resource extraction and production on human health, ecosystems
and their biodiversity, or the climate [77]. Some argue that good environmental standards and
regulations in the resource’s country of origin could lower the risk for supply disruption and,
consequently, lower the criticality of the resource [5,65,72]. However, [78] (p. 587), interpreted
the European Commission’s [5] report differently. They believe the resource’s criticality will increase
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with “stricter environmental regulation in an exporting country impairing imports of a resource type”.
Most authors refer to environmental impacts and regulations without exactly stating how they might
impact the criticality of the resource. Lastly, some publications also mention that the degradation of
conditionally renewable resources can cause them to become critical, namely, when the ecological
carrying capacity is exceeded and the resources lose their ability to renew themselves or perform their
regulatory functions [44,78].
Another clear theme within natural resource criticality is political concerns. The largest concern
is the low quality of governance or political instability in the supplying countries, in combination
with the high geographical concentrations of resources in those countries [71]. Schillebeeckx [79]
calls this situation “politically scarce”, where higher possibilities for political or social unrest might
disrupt the supply of the resource. Bedder [6] is one of the few who mention corporate concentration
as well as country concentration that can increase criticality due to oligopolistic market imbalances.
Consequently, net import reliance and trade relationships can significantly impact the criticality of
a resource: export restrictions and quotas in supplying countries increase the criticality, while trade
agreements lower criticality for importing countries [7,8]. This way of comprehending export quota
and trade agreements indicates to us that the concept of criticality is mainly used by and applied to
importing, industrialized, Western countries. Export quota would protect the exporting country from
losing access to its own critical natural resources and are thus only considered negative for countries
that rely heavily on imports.
Further, [50] consider criticality evaluations a “political process” and others agree that the
criticality of natural resources is influenced by the “prevailing political vision”, as the concept is largely
used in governmental and consulting reports with the purpose of informing decision-making [33,36,80].
Our review (Figure 2) shows that the discussion is now more balanced by numerous scientific
publications critiquing and contributing to the concept. Nonetheless, we can argue that the main
interest is still political and that information is gathered to inform decision-making. Additionally, we
would argue that the dominance of the initial defence aspects and the current economic inclination
around the concept are an artefact of its political roots.
Strategic concerns of critical natural resources are closely related to political aspects and power
over resources. Currently, “strategy” is not a dominant aspect of the criticality discourse (Figure 2).
Most authors, almost exclusively, relate “strategic” to military and defence needs, as part of an overall
criticality concept [5,39,40]. Now, strategic concerns are also attributed to another interest group
than governments: namely, businesses [43]. The term “strategic”, as well as “critical”, has gone
through a substantial expansion and transition over time. Haglund [3] explains that this is common
for political concepts due to changing societal conditions and contested interpretations of the concept
and, thus, does not consider it useful to define it. Despite the tendency of political concepts to change
their meaning over time, we suggest authors clearly define what they mean by the term “critical
natural resources”. Without proper definitions and conceptualisations in a majority of the reviewed
publications, it is difficult to compare the use of the concept, even more so due to its multidisciplinary
character. Only through discussions and debate of these multidisciplinary concepts can we deepen
our understanding of the problems we are trying to comprehend and continue to build up (and upon)
scientific knowledge from a collaboratively created body of literature [11].
The final two identified aspects of criticality are infrequently mentioned: sociohuman aspects
and a holistic or integrated view. Regarding sociohuman aspects, some publications make a link
between criticality and inadequate social conditions during extraction of resources and related
regulations, such as human rights violations, resource conflicts, illicit trade, and precarious working
conditions [44]. We discovered an inconsistency and ambiguity in the literature on whether regulations
to protect employees, local inhabitants, and the environment from negative impacts of extraction
processes increase or decrease the criticality of that resource (e.g., [8] vs. [81]). The inclusion of
social and environmental regulation into evaluations of criticality shows an interest in broadening
the debate from purely economic interests towards including social and environmental concerns.
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Furthermore, only a handful of publications mention the sociocultural value of natural resources
(e.g., [21]). The publications acknowledge that resources have important economic, life-support,
and ecological functions. However, they do not recognise their immaterial sociocultural functions,
such as physical and mental health, education, identity (heritage value), freedom, and spiritual values,
that increase the general well-being of human society [21].
Despite the dominant economic and geopolitical interpretations of resource criticality, the above
overview and several of the publications in the review demonstrate that criticality is determined by an
interaction of many factors. They include economic, technological, physical availability, environmental,
political, strategic, and social aspects of the concept [4,44,50,57,80]. Therefore, some authors plea for
a more challenging, interdisciplinary approach to explore sustainable options for natural resource
use, acknowledging and comprehending the dynamic interplay between all these aspects [21,44,82].
Nevertheless, [2] warn for the paradox of comprehensiveness versus accuracy. We do not agree
with claims made by, for example, [3,81], that a broad aggregate concept of criticality would make it
practically useless or inaccurate. Risks are everywhere. Only accounting for certain aspects of risks
to natural resources while leaving other aspects behind is a distortion of the information that serves
as a basis upon which natural resource policies are built. A clear specification is needed of which
functions of a natural resource are threatened and in what way (e.g., economic, sociocultural or life,
and ecosystem support functions). Mancini et al.’s [44] ranking of importance between the different
functions of natural resources (Figure 3) is useful for that purpose.
Thus, overall, we found a dominance of the economic aspect of criticality. Furthermore, we
identified an under-representation of the importance of physical availability, uncertainty on how to
incorporate environmental and social impacts, as well as a dominant Western perspective. The political
roots and goals of the concept steered its conceptualisations towards defence and, later, economic
aspects. We suggest that there is a need for a holistic, integrated concept of criticality for natural
resources, open to different value orientations regarding natural resources to balance the uncovered
perspectives. Possible methodological limits in reaching these findings are discussed in Section 3.5
before reaching our conclusions.
3.5. Criticality Assessments
It is not our goal to give a full review of natural resource criticality assessment methodologies,
especially considering the number of existing reviews of the topic (e.g., [59]). However, an extensive
analysis of the criticality discourse cannot be done without touching upon them, since they are the
main way of application and communication of the concept.
3.5.1. The Tools of Criticality Assessments
Several types of tools exist for quantifying and communicating natural resource criticality.
They most often include detailed time series and scenario analyses per natural resource or hierarchical
risk ranking based on indicator selection and aggregation [62]. The criticality matrix is most often
applied, locating various resources as dots between two dimensions or axes of basic risk theory:
(1) the probability of a disruption in the resource supply, often termed “supply risk” and (2) the impact
caused by such a constraint, termed “vulnerability” [72,83]. The overall risk is the product of these
two dimensions, creating hyperbolic contours of constant criticality within the plot [40]. However,
these axes are often modified to the extent of losing the connection with risk theory, for example,
by changing the terminology and indicators of the axes or by adding or omitting an axis [50,57,59].
Thus, when selecting indicators for a criticality matrix, attention and strictness are required to avoid
using vague or ambiguous terminology of the axes.
Furthermore, the more methodologically oriented publications in the review showed that
criticality assessments need to be directed towards a specific interest group [66] and timescale [81].
They should also be relative to other contexts, such as other resources, spatial, or timescales [66,84].
Additionally, periodic re-evaluations are required when a static tool is used to assess the dynamic and
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evolving state of resources [67,82]. It is important to highlight that these considerations are exactly the
same ones as mentioned before as important parts of the definition of criticality for natural resources.
3.5.2. A Predominance of Non-Renewable Resources in Criticality Assessments
The scope of natural resources considered in criticality assessments is mainly limited to minerals
or, even more narrowly, to metals [5,36,67,77,85]. According to [36] (p. 7620), “supply risks of fossil
fuels and their impacts on economies have been examined for decades, only in recent years have
studies appeared that evaluate the criticality of a broad set of nonfuel minerals”. Also, in Table 2,
9 of the 24 criticality definitions relate specifically to materials (i.e., minerals and metals). Graedel
and Reck [66] (p. 696), contend that it is desirable for evaluations to be “broad in terms of elements
addressed”. A plausible explanation is that the language used to describe shortages in renewable
resources has been expanding to other concepts than solely criticality. Many conditionally renewable
resources can become scarce or critical if their management is unsustainable. Therefore, concepts
linking to sustainability thinking—such as sustainable yield, used in [86], sustainable natural resource
management, used in [87], and resource governance, used in [88,89]—could add to the debate on
criticality of renewable resources without being captured in our systematic literature review.
We would argue that there are possibilities to broaden the scope of natural resources discussed in
criticality debates and assessments by explicitly including renewable resources. This has been shown in
assessments by Chapman et al. [35] of natural rubber, pulpwood, and soft sawnwood for the European
Commission’s report [73] and by Sonderegger et al. [90] of water. Additionally, de Groot et al. [50]
developed a framework to assess the criticality of renewable resources, although no applications
of it were found. Generally, these approaches correspond to the more common criticality matrices
for minerals based on risk theory, with the modification or addition of some indicators. The four
abovementioned research documents show that a holistic approach to criticality evaluations of natural
resources is possible and that it is not necessary to separate renewables and non-renewables or to do
so in their terminology: natural capital and materials, such as minerals and metals, as in Table 2.
Moreover, we argue for the need to widen the scope of natural resources included in criticality
assessments. Renewable resources perform the main functions necessary for basic life and ecosystem
support, located at the base of Mancini et al.’s [44] resource prioritization pyramid for human needs
(Figure 3). Klinglmair et al. [78] (p. 586) agree that “impacts on the carrying capacity of ecosystems
and their intrinsic capability of renewal may lead to impact on human needs and life greater than
shortage in, e.g., mineral resources”. The relative level of criticality can only be established per
resource and compared among them when a criticality analysis incorporates a wide array of natural
resources. Most of the pyramid’s basic functions (Figure 3) are not valued within economic markets.
Consequently, even if renewable natural resources are incorporated into the mainstream criticality
assessments, the natural resources most critical to humanity will probably be overlooked as current
analyses are mainly based on economic arguments and indicators.
Overall, we need to be aware that criticality assessments have communicative power and can be
highly influential when it comes to decision-making, even when the assessment is executed without a
rigorous conceptual and theoretical foundation. In order to design policies that ensure sustainable
management of natural resources, balanced information is needed. Therefore, we propose that
criticality assessments should include two things: first, a wide range of natural resources, including
renewables resources along with the traditional non-renewables; second, an evaluation of resource
importance based on human needs (e.g., with Mancini et al.’s [44] resource prioritization pyramid
(Figure 3)). That includes sociocultural values and life and ecosystem support functions in addition to
the standard economic arguments and indicators. If these two conditions are met, we expect other
resources, such as clean water, clean air, forests, fertile soil, etc., to have a much higher criticality
level relative to certain metals and rare earth minerals that are now commonly considered critical.
Consequently, these resources might gain more attention in policy circles.
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We consider it appropriate to define a concept before applying it in assessments and
methodologies. In the literature we reviewed, only a handful of publications did so, despite the
widespread use of resource criticality assessments (Table 2). As a consequence, many of the existing
definitions are derived from the assessment methods, instead of the other way around. We argue
that a holistic definition of criticality for natural resources, aligned with risk theory, might reduce
inconsistencies and increase comparability among assessment methods. This could provide a common
basis for balanced information to decision-makers while opening up to various value orientations for
natural resources.
3.6. Proposal for a Holistic Definition
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, definitions of critical natural resources were
presented within academic disciplines that only engaged in cooperation or debate to a limited extent,
for example, the clear division between definitions of critical materials and critical natural capital
(Table 2). Nonetheless, the information gathered on a definition of “critical” for natural resources
indicates common ideas of the concept: both an aspect of uncertainty or threat, as well as importance.
These keywords relate directly to the two dimensions of risk according to standard risk theory and
analyses [83]. Although this might be an artefact of creating definitions based on the tools used for
criticality assessments, risk theory brings fundamental understanding to the concept of criticality.
Therefore, we see it fitting to align our definition with risk theory. Simultaneously, risk analyses
frameworks provide a foundation for criticality assessments.
We propose the following, generally applicable, definition of criticality for natural resources,
which is an adaptation of the Oxford Dictionary [60] definition:
Criticality is a relative and dynamic state of a natural resource:
(a) of decisive importance, ranked according to a hierarchy of human needs, in relation to the issue
or interest group specified, and
(b) attended with uncertainty or a threat.
We argue that this definition is aligned with risk theory [83] because of its two components:
importance of the function of this resource, linked to the severity of outcomes of specified objectives,
and threat or uncertainty. Moreover, the definition accounts for a specific interest group, timescale, and
the dynamic and relative character of criticality, all previously mentioned as important for definitions
and assessments of criticality. By relative, we mean a resource cannot be critical in itself, but that
additional perspectives need to be addressed. For example, a resource should be relative to itself
through time or to other resources at the same time. Local perspectives can be compared to the global
scale. Criticality could also be relative from one place to another or from the perspective of one
population group to another.
This definition allows for and encourages a holistic understanding of natural resource criticality.
Firstly, by allowing for the perspectives, values, and assessments from any kind of interest group
(i.e., also global, local, and non-Western perspectives). Secondly, it can be applied to renewable as well
as non-renewable resources, preferably to both at the same time (i.e., within a wide array of natural
resources). Lastly, we propose that the resource’s importance should be explicitly ranked according
to a hierarchy of human needs (e.g., Mancini et al.’s [44] resource prioritization (Figure 3)). Thereby,
we suggest that the criticality of a resource increases when moving down the pyramid to basic human
needs. Another less instrumental way of establishing a hierarchy of resource needs could be based
on relational value frameworks, as advocated by Castleden [18]. Both allow to lessen the dominance
of economic interests over other sociocultural and life-support values of natural resources. That way,
the proposed definition of criticality could ensure more balanced information in criticality assessments
and policy recommendations. We invite those who are interested to comment, contest, and develop
our proposed definition.
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Before summarizing our conclusions, we would like to point the reader to some of the recent
literature within and outside of our review that does approach critical natural resources from the
more neglected perspectives. Criticality of renewables have been assessed for water [90] and soils [91].
Moreover, this latter reference provides a more global perspective by teaming up authors from Kenya,
the United States, Ghana, the United Kingdom, Argentina, Italy, Germany, and Denmark. Chiesura
and de Groot [21] introduced critical sociocultural functions of renewable resources. Even though
political science, psychology, sociology, ethics, and other social sciences are more and more present
in natural resource research, we have not encountered any thorough social science scholarship that
engages with concepts of resource criticality.
Lastly, there are some limitations in our methodology and analysis which carry forward into the
presented understanding of the concept of “critical natural resources”. First, the systematic literature
search was limited to English documents. This could partly explain the lack of non-Western publication,
for example, from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Hamel [92] states that 75% of international scientific
periodical literature in social sciences and 90% in natural sciences is published in English. Consequently,
we can assume to have captured the international scientific literature while probably missing out
on non-English national scientific journals, books, and reports. Another disadvantage of our search
strategy is that grey literature, such as books and reports, are more difficult to systematically discover
because they are not gathered in large publicly available databases like scientific journal articles are.
This means that in our data, scientific perspectives probably prevail over practitioners’ knowledge.
Further, in our search string (see Appendix A), we accounted for the terms “resource”, “material”,
and “natural capital” in relation to criticality. There are more terms describing natural resources that
we did not include, such as “environmental assets” and “ecosystem services”. From our preparatory
literature research, these terms did not occur frequently in combination with criticality. Additionally,
they are explicitly part of definitions of natural capital [93]. Likewise, we assumed other terms for
“natural resources” were largely covered by the included terms.
4. Conclusions
The discourse around critical natural resources ascribes certain resources to be more critical than
others and provides management guidance for them. By doing so, the discourse has a large influence
on decision-making regarding natural resources. Diverging understandings of criticality for natural
resources consequently lead to different policy outputs. Therefore, we set out to analyse the main
understandings and underlying assumptions captured in the criticality debate on natural resources.
By systematically mapping out the discourse, we did not come upon one generally accepted definition
of the concept. Aspects commonly brought up as contributing to resource criticality were: economic,
technological, physical availability, environmental, political, and, to a minor extent, sociohuman and
holistic perspectives.
We identified several trends in the interpretation and use of the concept. First and foremost,
economic concerns dominate the discourse on natural resource criticality at the expense of other values
and functions, especially since the economic crisis of 2008. We argue for the need to balance out resource
criticality considerations with more emphasis on the biophysical reality of natural resource stocks.
Especially for those that provide nonsubstitutable life and ecosystem support functions. Sociocultural
values of natural resources to human well-being should also be given more attention.
Secondly, published material about the topic comes mainly out of Western countries and,
throughout our reading, we did not come across a standpoint on the topic from the Global South.
Third, there is a clear distinction between the two main scientific branches that describe criticality,
that is, ecologically versus industrially oriented disciplines. Moreover, social sciences, except for
economics, are largely missing from the debate. Lastly, the majority of criticality studies solely focus
on non-renewable resources, such as minerals and metals, without considering renewable resources.
This could be the result of renewable resources and their criticality being discussed with different
terminology not captured within this study. We, however, advocate for taking renewable resources
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further into account when discussing criticality and have questioned the usefulness of a distinct
non/renewable split in the discourse. In sum, we addressed the need to broaden the scope of the
criticality discourse to include more perspectives, scientific disciplines, and types of natural resources.
Based on this review, we developed a holistic definition of criticality for natural resources. We
argue that the expansion of the criticality concept does not make it redundant. Rather, a holistic
approach is necessary to provide decision-makers with neutral and balanced information and
recommendations on natural resource management.
Further research possibilities include an analysis of non-English documents on the topic to address
the main methodological limitation of this review. Secondly, it would be interesting to investigate how
the development of the criticality concept for natural resources links to developments in sustainability
thinking. Specifically, the hypothesis came up that there is a broader language to describe crisis
situations for renewables than for non-renewables, which could have led to the over-representation of
non-renewables in criticality assessments compared to renewables. Lastly, a streamlined methodology
for criticality assessments could be developed based on the proposed definition of criticality for
natural resources.
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Appendix A Literal Search Strings Applied to the Scientific Literature Databases
The developed search string for Web of Science:
(“natural resource*”)
AND ((“critic*” OR “strategic” OR “key”) NEAR/20 (“resourc*” OR “material*” OR “natural capital”))
AND ((“defin*” OR “categor*” OR “classif*” OR “typology” OR “character*” OR “properties”) NEAR/20
(“resourc*” OR “material*” OR “natural capital”))
The developed search string for Scopus, approaching the previous syntax as much as possible:
KEY (“natural resource*”)
AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (((“critic*” OR “strategic” OR “key”) PRE/20 (“resource*” OR “material*” OR
“natural capital”))
OR ((“resource*” OR “material*” OR “natural capital”) PRE/20 (“critic*” OR “strategic” OR “key”)))
AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (((“defin*” OR “categor*” OR “classif*” OR “typology” OR “character*” OR
“properties”) PRE/20 (“resource*” OR “material*” OR “natural capital”))
OR ((“resource*” OR “material*” OR “natural capital”) PRE/20 (“defin*” OR “categor*” OR “classif*”
OR “typology” OR “character*” OR “properties”)))
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Appendix B
 
Does this document have as a goal to 
define or classify natural resources?
Does the document de ne, characterize* or 
classify any aspect** of natural resources?
Does the document 
handle several resources grouped together (vs. 
one specific resource)?
Do the authors 
generalise the conclusions about the specific 
natural resource in this document to other 
natural resources?
Does the document 
define or classify any aspect of natural resources 
related to sustainability or criticality towards 
society?
Does the document 
identify at least one characteristic of natural 
resources related to sustainability or criticality 
towards society?




Yes: keep it No
Yes: keep it No: out Not sure from the title and abstract: keep it 
Figure A1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the selection of documents into the review. * with
characterize, we mean identify characteristics or properties. ** any aspect of natural resources
(e.g., resource use, management, production, extraction, impacts, etc.).
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Appendix C
Figure A2. Flow diagram indicating the number of documents in each selection step of document
gathering for the review.
Appendix D
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2017
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11 Bridge, G. 2009 Material Worlds: Natural Resources, ResourceGeography and the Material Economy Geography Compass
12 Buchert, M., Schüler, D., andBleher, D. 2009
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13 Buijs, B., and Sievers, H. 2011 Critical Thinking about Critical Minerals:Assessing risks related to resource security Briefing or working paper
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Waste and Resource
Management
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23 de Groot, R.S., Wilson, M.A., andBoumans, R.M.J 2002
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Abstract: In recent years, increased interest and actions have been taken to better understand,
and mitigate, sustainability impacts of mining activities, by both industry and policy. The present
work reports on a sustainability hotspots screening performed for the EU Horizon 2020 “Integrated
Mineral Technologies for More Sustainable Raw Material Supply” (ITERAMS) project, which foresees
a more efficient water recycling, tailings valorization, and minimization of environmental footprint.
The focus of this paper is on social and environmental issues in mining. Different methodologies
were explored, starting from a qualitative causal loop modelling. Afterwards, an environmental and
social LCA screening was performed using well-accepted databases and methods, thus completing
results with a literature research. The main findings related to the importance of the supply chain,
the vulnerability of local communities, and the toxic emissions from tailings offer a starting point to
reflect on the specific social, socio-economic, and environmental context which may influence these
issues. A better understanding of the environmental and social pressures associated with mining is
not only crucial to orient the sustainability assessment foreseen for the ITERAMS project, but also
to contribute in terms of methodology to the challenges tackled by policy and research worldwide
towards a more sustainable mining.
Keywords: mining; social impacts; environmental impacts; hotspots; social risks; supply chain;
LCA; screening
1. Introduction
1.1. Mining and the Sustainable Development Goals
A mining activity is defined as “the process of extracting metallic, non-metallic mineral or
industrial rock deposits from the Earth” [1]. As reported by the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS), it is often the case that “the term mining is used in the broad sense to include
quarrying, well operations, beneficiating (e.g., crushing, screening, washing, and flotation), and other
preparation customarily performed at the mine site, or as a part of mining activity” [2]. A number of
social and environmental risks and impacts may be generated by these activities, hence preventing
the sector and, at a broader level, our societies from a sustainable development, often quoted as
the “development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs” [3].
In recent years, the mining industry has acknowledged its potential and duty to monitor and
assess the sustainability of the raw materials sector, which is referred to the “key enablers of many
critical sectors of the economy” [4], including for instance metals, minerals, and biotic materials.
A number of programs and initiatives have been undertaken by the industry to take action on those
issues that the mining activities have contributed to create or exacerbate. These issues include health
problems, water and air pollution, environmental degradation, and restricted access to material
resources for local communities. Both this awareness and proper accountability are crucial as the
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mining industry has the chance to contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) by mitigating environmental and social impacts and creating new opportunities. In fact,
the relation between mining and the SDGs has been clearly identified [5].
Considering the implementation of new technologies aiming at an efficient waste water treatment
and at the reduction of the land consumption for tailings treatment and storage facilities, mining
companies can act towards the SDG6 “Clean Water and Sanitation” and SDG15 “Life on Land”.
Furthermore, given that a number of ore processing processes, such as crushing and grinding,
are highly energy demanding [6], an increase in the energy efficiency of the sector may result in
a reduction of the Green House Gas (GHG) emissions, hence in the direction of the SDG7 “Energy
Access and Sustainability” and the SDG13 “Climate Action”. Regarding social sustainability, the mining
industry may help to reduce the unemployment rate and promote the economic growth (SDG3
“Good Health and Well-Being”), and create new social opportunities, fighting inequalities and
discrimination (SDG1 “End Poverty”, SDG5 “Gender Equality”, and SDG10 “Reduce inequalities”).
Finally, with reference to the SDG 16 “Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions”, mining companies are
called upon to a responsible supply of raw materials, in particular when there is the risk that the
trading of minerals finances armed conflicts and corruption. The acknowledgement of this latter issue
has led to guidance and regulations to promote due diligence for the supply of conflict minerals [7,8].
1.2. Mining and the European Policy Framework
From this brief introduction, it is clear that the mining sector finds itself under the pressure from
the society that asks for resources to sustain its development; on the other side, the public opinion
and the societal stakeholder request that the raw materials sourcing is performed following social
responsibility along the supply chain and environmental protection. Furthermore, it is expected that
the resource provision is pursued within legal national and international frameworks [9].
The European Union (EU) has launched a number of initiatives and policies addressing the main
social and environmental issues related to raw materials and promoting the effort towards the SDGs,
which are not legally binding. As a foundation for the European Commission (EC) commitment
towards sustainability of raw materials and related activities, the Raw Materials Initiative (RMI) was
established in 2008 [10] with the intention of securing a sustainable and fair resources supply both
within and outside the EU. Furthermore, the provision of secondary raw materials is encouraged
through recycling together with a more efficient resource use. Following the RMI, the European
Innovation Partnership (EIP) on raw materials was launched in 2012 [11] to gather a number of
different stakeholders, including academia, citizens, NGOs, industries, and governments. The EIP
has the mission to put into practice the legal framework defined by the RMI by establishing action
and monitoring plans. For instance, the Raw Materials Scoreboard (RMS) was implemented in
2016 and updated in 2018 [4] to provide quantitative information to be used by the Partnership
and decision-makers to monitor the EIP activities and as a basis for policies. Specifically, the RMS
reports on 24 indicators which are grouped in five main subject areas, namely “Raw materials in the
global context”, “Competitiveness and innovation”, “Framework conditions for mining”, “Circular
economy and recycling”, and “Environmental and social sustainability”. Besides this, the Strategic
Implementation Plan (SIP) is crucial for the EIP which has defined seven specific objectives to be
achieved by 2020 [12]. These targets include the identification of conditions for a stable supply of
primary raw materials in the EU, alternatives to critical raw materials, promotion of pilot actions,
and a network of knowledge.
Besides specific initiatives on raw materials, the EU promotes in any sector social protection,
fair working conditions, and equal opportunities and rights in the labor market [13]. As it may
be difficult to quantify the mentioned social issues and it may be actually challenging to obtain
reliable data on those topics, the EU encourages Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the
transparency of environmental and social consequences of companies’ business [4,14]. In addition,
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) provides guidance on how to communicate sustainability issues
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by developing reporting standards and GRI sector specific indicators for the use of companies and
governments [15,16].
1.3. Motivation
Mining has been repeatedly associated with a negative image. Feelings of insecurity are
often perceived by the local communities because of the risk of environmental degradation [9] and
consequences on human health due to exposure to respirable dust and chemicals and toxic and
carcinogenic emissions from tailings [17–19], triggered by mining activities in the area. In addition,
there is the fear that the industry may have negative consequences on other coexisting sectors in the
area, such as nature tourism and reindeer farming in northern Europe [20]. Depending on the region,
the protection of indigenous rights may become an important issue to account for, particularly in
view of the affection of these populations to land and water resources, which are moreover crucial
for their livelihood [21]. On the other side, the presence of a mine and processing site in a region may
trigger opportunities related to job creation and the construction of infrastructures, such as schools,
hospitals, and roads [22]. Therefore, social impact evaluation in the mining sector has emerged as
a relevant issue regarding both positive and negative aspects [23,24]. Finally, a number of challenges
are associated with water related risks, which may cause damages both on the environment and the
people. These challenges include water balance management, water quality, tailings dam failures,
and site rehabilitation [25].
The present work reports on a sustainability hotspots screening performed in the context of the
EU Horizon (H) 2020 “Integrated Mineral Technologies for More Sustainable Raw Material Supply”
(ITERAMS) project. The focus of this paper is on social and environmental issues related to mining and
on how the outcomes of this preliminary screening study can be used in the context of the sustainability
assessment of the ITERAMS solution. The project addresses the H2020 topic of “Sustainable selective
low impact mining” and has three main objectives [26]:
• Efficient water recycling, through a reduction in water consumption up to more than 90%,
improved water quality, efficient water treatment, and recovery of valuable elements from
process water.
• Tailings valorization, with the creation of geopolymers to be used as backfill material and tailings
cover, or simply sold as products. Furthermore, the rest of the tailings is planned to be deposited
as a filter dry cake.
• Minimization of the environmental footprint, by reducing emissions to the environment,
freshwater intake, and the risk of dam accidents.
The combined solutions proposed by ITERAMS are planned to be implemented and validated in
three sites, the Kevitsa nickel copper mine in Finland, the Neves-Corvo copper zinc mine in Portugal,
and an unspecified platinum mine in South Africa.
The identification and quantification of environmental and social pressures in mining have as
a firm basis the definition of a multifaceted approach to capture, at first, issues in the sector at a broader
level and, secondly, to characterize these topics for the context of the sites under study. The intention of
this work is to present how different challenges related to social and environmental impacts of mining
activities have been addressed for the preliminary sustainability hotspots identification in the ITERAMS
project. The paper shows how the methodologies explored can help to achieve a better understanding
of mining issues; indeed, comprehension is the first essential step towards the improvement of mining
sustainability and the related achievement of social equity and environmental responsibility, as highly
promoted by the SDGs and European policies and initiatives.
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2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Qualitative Modelling Approach
A causal loop diagram (CLD) is an established modeling technique to sketch topics, states,
influencing variables, and relations between them, in a graphical way, for any given subject, with by
intention low formal overhead and boundaries. Drafting a causal loop diagram (CLD) may be useful
in the early phase of a project to better define the system under study, hence identifying the main
variables and how they influence and trigger each other. Often, CLDs allow a deeper understanding
of the system under study, such as the identification of reinforcing variables, positive or negative
feedback loops, or also trade-offs, which often may not be evident at first sight even to domain experts.
This becomes important when tackling sustainability because environmental and social impacts may
be not only complementary and overlapping, but actually contradictory.
The application of CLDs can be found in literature [27–29]. However, they have been rarely used
in Life Cycle Sustainability Assessment (LCSA), despite some guidelines and examples [30–32].
The definition of qualitative cause-effect relationships among the different elements, variables,
risks, and impacts of the ITERAMS project was the first operation performed for the hotspots screening,
thus resulting in a CLD created in the Vensim software [33]. The intention was to obtain an overview
on the issues to be further addressed by the Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) screening and complemented
by literature research. Furthermore, attention was focused on those topics which are more difficult
to evaluate with LCA, but equally important when interpreting the sustainability hotspots, such as
qualitative social aspects and risks. In addition, the CLD shows few reasonings on Life Cycle Costing
(LCC) impacts together with social and environmental ones. Although costs are not the focus of this
paper, they are reported in the full diagram displayed in Section 3.1 “Results from the Qualitative
CLD” not to extrapolate an incomplete picture from the original comprehensive model.
The CLD is referred to mine operation, hence excluding mine installation and closure and
exploring the influence of water and tailings treatment technologies on mining.
Specifically, the different elements in the diagram can be described as following:
• Variables: external measures and requirements that have an influence on ore mining and
processing. This includes, for instance, water quality (see Figure 1a) and security prescriptions,
which affect, respectively, the water cleaning effort and the workers’ safety.
• External conditions: the mining activity often depends on a number of external situations linked
with the area where the site is located, such as hydrological and geological variables, Figure 1b.
They may deeply affect the efficiency and the impacts of the operations; on the other side, it might
be very difficult to influence the action of those external conditions.
• State boxes: elements of the mining and processing operations, which are influenced by the
external variables and conditions, consequently exercising a pressure on the environmental and
social dimensions. See Figure 2a.
• Arrows: they are crucial to define the cause-effect relations in the diagram. A blue arrow from “a”
to “b” and a “+” sign indicate that “if “a” increases, then “b” increases”; a green arrow from “a”
to “b” and a “-” sign indicate that “if “a” increases, then “b” decreases”. For instance, Figure 2b
shows that if dry tailings protection increases, tailings leaking may be reduced; on the other side,
if tailings leaking occurs, the effort spent on leaking treatment increases.
• Inputs: they are elementary and product flows used by processes related to ore mining and
processing. These inputs include any energy and consumable, water, and land use, as displayed
in Figure 3.
• Risks, occurring in different stages of ore mining and processing, see Figure 4a. They can be
reduced by mitigation measures or the implementation of specific new technologies.
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• Impacts: pressures on the environment or societal stakeholders, Figure 4b. They can be






Figure 1. Elements in the causal loop diagram (CLD) for the Integrated Mineral Technologies for
More Sustainable Raw Material Supply (ITERAMS) project (a) Example of variable: water quality





Figure 2. Elements in the CLD for the ITERAMS project (a) Example of state box: waste water output;
(b) Example of relations described via arrows: tailings leaking.




Figure 4. Elements in the CLD for the ITERAMS project (a) Example of risk: risk of untreated and
uncaptured leaking; (b) Example of impact: impacts on workers.
The full CLD diagram is displayed in Figure 5 in Section 3.1 “Results from the Qualitative CLD”.
2.2. LCA Screening Approach
Beside a qualitative causal loop diagram, the LCA methodology was identified as the main
approach to be used for the hotspots screening. LCA is a well-established and internationally
recognized technique to assess potential positive and negative impacts occurring across the life
cycle of a product or service. Hence, this scientific approach was applied both to the environmental
(ELCA) and social (SLCA) dimensions. The already mentioned CLD was a crucial input to the LCA
screening, further complemented with literature research [9,20–25,34,35]. Therefore, it is important to
highlight the meaningfulness of an iterative and complementary procedure among different screening
approaches, namely CLD, LCA, and literature. In fact, this procedure enables a better interpretation of
the outcomes in the specific local context of mining activities.
Mining processes representative for the first target of the ITERAMS solution (sulfide ore mining)
were investigated in the different countries where the validation sites are located (Finland, Portugal,
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and South Africa). The processes were selected from well-accepted and renowned databases and
calculated in the openLCA software. EXIOBASE and ecoinvent databases were used for the ELCA
screening, while the Product Social Impact Life Cycle Assessment (PSILCA) database was identified
for the performance of the SLCA screening. Furthermore, environmental and social impacts were
evaluated with a number of Life Cycle Impact Assessment Methods (LCIAM) in order to (1) cover
all the impact categories important for the project and (2) investigate whether some burdens are
unwittingly shifted from one impact category to another. In addition, the application of different
LCIAMs was crucial for the cross-checking and identification of those topics which emerged as
common sustainability issues to the LCIAMs considered. Specifically, ILCD 2011 Midpoint+, ReCiPe
Midpoint H, CML-IA Baseline, Boulay et al. (2011), and built-in EXIOBASE LCIAM were selected for
the ELCA screening, while social impacts were calculated by applying the Social Impacts Weighting
Method contained in the PSILCA database.
The following steps were undertaken to conduct the screening (as summarized in Table 1):
• Definition of the processes to be investigated: the first focus was set on copper ore mining.
However, when related processes were not available in the databases, the focus was extended to
mining of metal ores.
• Definition of the locations to be considered for the chosen processes: Finland, Portugal, and South
Africa were set as the main focus of the study as the validation sites for the ITERAMS technologies
are located in these three countries. Regarding the ELCA screening performed with EXIOBASE,
the “copper ores and concentrates” sector was analyzed for Finland, Portugal, and South Africa.
On the other side, in the case of the ELCA screening with ecoinvent, the analysis of copper mining
had to be extended to Europe as country-specific processes were not available in the database.
Copper mining impacts could not be assessed for South Africa using the ecoinvent database.
However, moving beyond the first focus of the study, potential environmental impacts of copper
mining in South America were evaluated using ecoinvent, given the intention of applying the
ITERAMS combined solutions to that region as well in the future. Regarding the SLCA screening,
Finland and Portugal were the only two countries analyzed as the third validation site in South
Africa had not been identified at the time of the study. The interpretation of SLCA results, in fact,
requires a number of background information, which cannot be collected in absence of a specific
site location.
• Performance of the environmental LCA screening. The starting point was the comparison of
information contained in the databases and the specific details given by the ITERAMS project
proposal, for instance regarding water consumption for copper ore processing. Afterwards,
environmental hotspots were detected from the calculation of the impacts derived from the
processes in the databases. Finally, this was followed by a reflection on the common and different
issues which emerged from the analysis of the same process occurring in diverse geographic
regions or countries.
• Performance of the social LCA screening. At first, high and very high social risks were identified
considering those directly associated with the mining processes to be analyzed. The identification
procedure of high and very high social risks was based on the analysis of the risk levels reported in
the PSILCA database for the different social indicators assigned to the metal ores mining sector in
Finland and Portugal. Afterwards, potential social impacts were assessed including the upstream
chain, hence leading to the definition of the social hotspots. Finally, results obtained from the
calculation of mining processes were compared to social impacts generated by an average sector
in the country. This latter operation was important to compare sector specific risks and impacts
with the general social situation in the country.
• The study was complemented by the definition of complementary and overlapping issues between
the environmental and social dimensions. Furthermore, possible trade-offs were investigated as
well, as further explained in Section 4.1. Literature research was crucial for the interpretation of
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results and the definition of the background situations with an influence on the impacts detected
with the LCA study.
Table 1 offers an overview of the processes, locations, databases, and LCIAMs investigated for the
LCA screening study.
Table 1. Definition of the locations, databases, Life Cycle Impact Assessment Methods (LCIAMs)




Finland (FI), Portugal (PT), South Africa
(ZA), Europe (RER) and Latin America (RLA) Finland (FI), Portugal (PT)
Database
Ecoinvent v.3.4,
EXIOBASE v.2.2 PSILCA v.2
1
LCIAM
ILCD 2011 Midpoint+, ReCiPe Midpoint H,
CML-IA Baseline, Boulay et al. (2011), and
built-in EXIOBASE LCIAM
PSILCA built-in Social Impacts
Weighting Method
Process
Ecoinvent for RER and RLA-> copper mine
operation |copper concentrate|; copper
production, primary |copper|. EXIOBASE
for FI, PT, and ZA -> copper ores and
concentrates
PSILCA for FI and PT ->
(Mining of) Metal ores
Note: 1 A cut-off of 1E-5 is applied for the creation of the product systems under study.
2.3. Definition of the “Background Situations”
The definition of the context of the mining operations is crucial to interpret the LCA results and,
hence, identify the environmental and social hotspots. In particular, it is possible to determine the
so-called “background situations” which may have either a positive or negative influence on the
so-called “stressors”. The stressors are pressures on the environmental and social dimensions that may
be either mitigated or intensified by background existing conditions. For instance, the dependence of
local communities on local water reserves can be considered as a background situation which may
worsen the impact of water withdrawal for ore processing. Indeed, if those local water resources
are used by local populations for agricultural practices, industrial water withdrawal has a greater
impact than that it would have in an area with a different socio-economic condition. Table 2 shows
an overview on the identified stressors and related background situations to be considered for the
interpretation of the environmental and social impacts of the ITERAMS solution. Specifically, for the
present LCA screening the following criteria were determined, most of them traceable in Table 2:
• Vulnerability of local communities, such as the already mentioned dependence on local water
reserves. The human capital may have an influence on the impacts as well, for instance if
a consistent share of the population suffers from HIV or respiratory problems, impacts generated
by mining operations may worsen the health conditions of those weaker individuals.
• Conflicts with other competing sectors in the area, for instance, in terms of workforce or resource
use. Considering the validation sites in Finland and Portugal, the local community in the area of
the Portuguese mine lives from agriculture of olives and cork [36], while reindeer farming and
nature tourism are two competing sectors in Northern Finland [9,20].
• Availability and status of local water and mineral resources. Information can be usually derived
from national environment institutes. As for Finland, it is possible to highlight that the condition
of freshwater is generally good, with the exception of coastal water where the ecological status is
very poor due to eutrophication [37]. In Portugal, the condition of surface water is classified as
“reasonable” in most areas; however, some areas on the coast and inner central southern territories
display a poor or very poor condition [38]. It is necessary to clarify that data for Finland and
Portugal are referred to 2015 and 2013 respectively.
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• Importance of the sector for the national and local economy, considering for instance the
contribution of mining in the national GDP or the share of local workers hired at the mine
sites. For example, as of December 2015, 52% and 36% of workers in Kevitsa (Finland) are hired,
respectively, locally (from Sodankylä) and regionally (from Lapland) [39].
• Risks at a national level, hence not related to the mining sector. They may include public sector
corruption and sanitation and drinkable water coverage in the country. Indeed, social and
socio-economic national and sector-specific risks can influence each other.
• Stability of risks and impacts over the life cycle, which may be useful to detect the contribution of
the supply chain to overall results, hence leading to the identification of direct and indirect risks
and impacts of the mining activity in a given area.
Table 2. Definition of stressors and background situations which have an influence on the potential
environmental and social risks and impacts.
Category Stressor Background Situation
Environmental
Tailings leaking Tailings composition, soil composition
Emissions from tailings Tailings composition
Geopolymers creation from tailings Tailings composition
Chemical products for flotation Ore to be processed, flotation steps
Instability of water cycle Ore to be processed, flotation steps, water recycle
Pond evaporation Evaporation rate, local climatic conditions
Pond seepage Vicinity of water resources, e.g., groundwater reserves, rivers
Water contamination from tailings Vicinity of water resources, tailings composition
Efficiency of water treatment Tailings composition, ore beneficiation steps and efficiency, typeof reagents
Energy use for ore processing Ore to be processed, flotation steps
Water quality Water treatment process and related efficiency
Water pollution Vicinity of water resources, tailings composition
Air quality Emissions from ore beneficiation processes and tailings
Social
Unemployment rate in the country/area Employment conditions in the area, incentives forindustrial activities
Presence of safety measures at the workplace Safety risk linked to ore beneficiation and wastewatertreatment process
Air quality Emissions from ore beneficiation process and tailings,preexisting air quality conditions
Water pollution Importance of water resources for local communities
Industrial water use Dependence of local communities on local water reserves
Accident rate at the workplace Safety risk linked to ore beneficiation and wastewatertreatment process
Water contamination from tailings Importance of water resources for local communities
Vicinity of touristic areas to the mine Tourist presence in the area, presence of cultural heritage andnatural sites
Contribution of the sector to economic development Importance of the mining sector for the local/national economy,share of the sector in the GDP
Risk of natural disasters Preexisting natural local conditions (e.g., high risk ofearthquakes), type of industrial activities in the area
Access to material resources Availability of ores and other resources in the area, e.g., water
Presence of indigenous population
Share of indigenous population in the area, inclusion of
indigenous people in the local society and economy, presence of
negotiated agreements for indigenous water rights
Fair salary Labor cost, minimum and living wage, workers’ wage
Working time National regulation on working time, number and duration ofshifts per day
Legal issues Type of working contracts, national regulation onworking contracts
Workers’ rights Local situation regarding the respect of workers’ rights andfreedom of association
Child/forced labor National/local regulation on the topic, share of child/forcedlabor in the country/area/sector
Healthy living conditions Pollution level of the country/area and sources of the pollution
Migration Share of migrant workers in the sector, social inclusion policies
End of life responsibility Local/national regulations promoting recycling, reuse, andresponsible disposal
3. Results
3.1. Results from the Qualitative CLD
The CLD explores risks and impacts generated by the different processes of the mine operation,
see Figure 5 for a complete picture. The focus is the investigation of the different variables and resource
inputs which affect the water cycle at the mine site. Furthermore, attention is paid to the issue of
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tailings disposal and on how this may be influenced by diverse hydrological conditions and water
recycling approaches. Specifically, risks derived from process operation, untreated and uncaptured
leaking, and dam accidents are highlighted in the diagram in Figure 5.
 
Figure 5. Complete view of the causal loop diagram representing the operation of the mine. LCC: Life
Cycle Costing.
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The CLD displays the influence of risks and technology choices on social and environmental
impacts with reference to consequences on workers and local communities for the social side and
on ecosystems, resources, land use, and human health for the environmental dimension. However,
the human health issue can be related directly to the social sphere, hence stressing the complementarity
between the two dimensions.
Figure 6 explains the relations among the different elements in the diagram which affect human
health impacts; brackets indicate that the element has already appeared in the diagram, in this case
in Figure 6. Therefore, in this example, it is possible to detect the impact contribution of energy and
material inputs for water cleaning and tailings treatment effort. Furthermore, a number of risks related
to tailings leaking and dam accidents can exacerbate the potential consequences on human health.
Finally, environmental conditions together with tailings deposit characteristics, such as the pond size,
may have an additional role in the proportion by which tailings treatment affects health conditions of




o&r wet separation effort
rainwater treatment effort
water cleaning effort




(o&r wet separation effort)
(rainwater treatment effort)




risk of breakage and damage
(environmental conditons sensitivity, vulnerability)
(pond size)






Figure 6. Tree causality diagram: impacts on human health.
In addition, the CLD investigates the relations around the geopolymers creation which is a crucial
point for the ITERAMS project. For instance, a good geopolymers performance may positively influence
dry tailings protection, hence preventing tailings leaking and evaporation with a consequent reduction
of impacts on human health and ecosystems.
3.2. Results from the Environmental LCA Screening
The ELCA screening reports results calculated with different databases and methods pursuing,
this way, the method of triangulation. The processes analyzed with ecoinvent, namely “copper mine
operation” and “copper production, primary”, include a number of life cycle stages, such as copper
mining in ground, blasting, grinding, flotation, concentration, and tailings disposal. Furthermore,
the processes account for consumables and energy used during ore extraction and beneficiation,
for instance chemicals, electricity, and fuel.
114
Resources 2018, 7, 80
Toxicity categories emerged as crucial if the processes in ecoinvent are calculated with the different
methods considered, see Figure 7a,b. These toxicity categories include both water related ones, such as
freshwater and marine ecotoxicity, and human toxicity, additionally subdivided by the International
Reference Life Cycle Data System (ILCD) method by cancer and non-cancer effects. The results
presented below are normalized according to the following normalization sets:
• ILCD 2011 Midpoint+: EU27 2010 normalization.
• ReCiPe midpoint H: World ReCiPe H normalization. The most recent ReCiPe method (2016) could
not be used as normalization is not foreseen.
• CML-IA baseline: EU 25 normalization.
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 7. Copper production, primary |copper| RER, from ecoinvent (a) Normalized results, ILCD
2011 Midpoint+ (screenshot from openLCA 1.7); (b) Normalized results, ReCiPe Midpoint H (screenshot
from openLCA 1.7).
If the most contributing processes to the previously identified toxicity categories are investigated,
the treatment of sulfidic tailings off-site clearly emerges as an environmental hotspot for both the water
and human toxicity issues (Figure 8). Therefore, this outcome reinforces the purpose of the ITERAMS
project which has tailings valorization and reduction of effluents to the environment as core objectives.
 
Figure 8. Copper production, primary |copper| RER, from ecoinvent. Process contribution (including
the supply chain) to the impact category “Freshwater ecotoxicity”, calculated with ILCD 2011 Midpoint+
(screenshot from openLCA 1.7).
Climate change has not emerged as a major issue from the normalized results presented. However,
literature [6] and primary data from mining companies report that the stages of crushing and grinding
require a consistent amount of electricity which is, hence, responsible for an important share of
GHG emissions during operation. Considering the processes in ecoinvent and the different LCIAMs,
the analysis of the most contributing processes to the climate change impact category confirms
electricity and blasting as the main environmental hotspots. However, input values for electricity
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in the analyzed processes in ecoinvent appear to be underestimated if compared to primary data
and secondary sources. In addition, the electricity reported by ecoinvent for the investigated mining
processes is produced by hydro power; this may be considered as one reason for lower climate change
values than expected.
Blue water withdrawal and consumption indicators were analyzed in EXIOBASE for the sector
“Copper ores and concentrates” in different countries. Blue water is defined as the “water that has been
sourced from surface or groundwater resources and is either evaporated, incorporated into a product
or taken from one body of water and returned to another, or returned at a different time” [40]. Figure 9
displays results for Finland, showing that plastic, chemicals, and blending components have a major
effect on blue water consumption and withdrawal for manufacturing. If total blue water withdrawal
is analyzed, electricity production can be determined as an environmental hotspot, due to cooling
operations. Please note that blue water consumption does not include water used for cooling processes,
which is hence assumed to be released with a similar quality as the withdrawal.
 
Figure 9. Copper ores and concentrates, Finland, from EXIOBASE. Process contribution (direct,
without upstream chain) to the impact categories “Water Withdrawal Blue—Total”, “Water Withdrawal
Blue—Manufacturing”, and “Water Consumption Blue—Manufacturing”, calculated with EXIOBASE
built-in LCIAMs (screenshot from openLCA 1.7).
If the same sector is investigated for South Africa and Portugal, it is interesting to compare the
value of water withdrawal and consumption and the related hotspots between the three countries,
see Table 3. Results include the upstream chain and display that water withdrawal in Finland is
notably higher than in South Africa and Portugal. Furthermore, the results show that impacts are
more widespread in the life cycle in comparison to the outcomes obtained from the calculation of the
processes in ecoinvent with the different impact assessment methods.
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Table 3. Main drivers for blue water withdrawal and consumption in Finland, South Africa,
and Portugal for the sector “Copper ores and concentrates”. Results are calculated for 1 EUR output.
Country Blue Water Withdrawal Blue Water Consumption
m3 Top 3 drivers m3 Top 3 drivers
Finland 0.01266
Electricity (gas), RU; Basic




business services, FI; Basic
plastics, FI


















(gas), PT; heavy fuel oil, PT
3.3. Results from the Social LCA Screening
The SLCA screening enabled, at first, the identification of those high and very high social risks
directly linked to mining of metal ores in Finland and Portugal. Both countries present a very high risk
of mining companies’ involvement in corruption and bribery and of a not socially responsible behavior
in the supply chain. Furthermore, a high (in Finland) and very high (in Portugal) risk of non-fatal
accidents can be highlighted, with an additional very high risk of fatal accidents in Finland. Industrial
water use emerged as an important issue for the Finnish sector, while women discrimination in the
labor force and neglect of trade unionism rights could be considered as social issues in the Portuguese
industry. The full documentation and explanation of social risks and impact categories in the database
are available in the PSILCA manual [41].
The calculation of potential social impacts related to mining of metal ores in Finland highlights
that a number of potential social impacts are not related to the sector as such, but they occur in
the upstream chain. Thus, the life cycle under study (Figure 10) displays the highest contribution
to sector-specific social themes, such as “Social responsibility along the supply chain”, “Non-fatal
accidents”, “Certified environmental management systems”, “Trade unionism”, and “Safety measures”.
However, the last three social topics could not be identified with the previous investigation of high
and very high social risks directly linked to the mining process, meaning that those social impacts are
largely related to processes part of the supply chain. Results are expressed in medium risk hours and
referred to 1 USD output.
Considering that a high risk of water withdrawn for industrial purposes in Finland emerged from
the previous process risk analysis, the process contribution to the related social issue was investigated.
Furthermore, this social theme was seen crucial for the evaluation of the sustainability of the ITERAMS
solution, as additionally confirmed by the CLD and the ELCA screening. Figure 11 displays that
most impacts are linked to the upstream processes of basic metals and chemicals manufacturing,
with a negligible contribution derived from metal ore mining itself.
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Figure 10. (Mining of) metal ores, Finland, from PSILCA. Overall social impacts associated with the
life cycle under study, calculated with Social Impacts Weighting Method in PSILCA. The assessment of
data quality is included in the results (screenshot from openLCA 1.7).
 
Figure 11. (Mining of) metal ores, Finland, from PSILCA. Process contribution (including the supply
chain) to the impact category “Industrial water depletion”, calculated with Social Impacts Weighting
Method in PSILCA (screenshot from openLCA 1.7).
The Portuguese sector of mining of metal ores shows that a number of potential social impacts
are associated with the sector, hence with a less contribution derived from processes happening in the
upstream chain. This outcome is, therefore, different from the picture outlined for the Finnish mining
sector previously analyzed, for which the supply chain emerged as important for most social impact
categories. This may be explained, on one side, with the starting risk levels in the upstream processes
of the two countries; on the other side, the activity variable (working hours) is more than three times
higher for the Portuguese process than for the Finnish one. The activity variable is crucial for the
quantification of a social risk and expresses its importance in the product life cycle. In the context of
the two countries under study, the Portuguese sector needs 0.01827 working hours to produce 1 USD
output of the sector, while only 0.00563 working hours are required in Finland to generate 1 USD
output for the metal ores mining sector.
Figure 12 displays the product life cycle contribution to social impacts for 1 USD output. A high
amount of medium risk hours can be detected for “Trade unionism”, “Social responsibility along
the supply chain”, “Non-fatal accidents”, and “Active involvement of enterprises in corruption and
bribery”. A minor contribution from upstream processes can be noted for the mentioned sector-specific
impact categories. Besides this, social risks at the country level can be highlighted, such as sanitation
coverage and public-sector corruption.
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Figure 12. (Mining of) metal ores, Portugal, from PSILCA. Overall social impacts associated with the
life cycle under study, calculated with Social Impacts Weighting Method in PSILCA. The assessment of
data quality is included in the results (screenshot from openLCA 1.7).
The geographic localization of social impacts related to metal ores mining in Portugal is less
widespread for a number of impact categories if compared to Finland. Figure 13a displays the direct
process contribution, without upstream chain, to “Non-fatal accidents”. The highest share of the
impacts is due exactly to the Portuguese mining sector as such. Basic metals manufacturing and the
construction sector in Portugal can be identified as other social hotspots (both from commodities and
industry fields). Furthermore, in this case, impacts can be localized in Portugal and, to a small extent,




Figure 13. (Mining of) metal ores, Portugal, from PSILCA, calculated with Social Impacts Weighting
Method in PSILCA (a) Process contribution (direct, without upstream chain) to the impact category
“Non-fatal accidents”; (b) Geographic localization of the impact category “Non-fatal accidents”
(screenshots from openLCA 1.7).
4. Discussion
4.1. Identification and Interpretation of the Sustainability Hotspots
The CLD provided a number of useful inputs to be further developed with both the LCA screening
and the literature research. Several cause-effect relations in the diagram confirmed what was expected,
for instance in terms of dam accidents which may be reduced or even eliminated with the ITERAMS
implementation. Indeed, the risk of dam breakage and damage increases with the dam size which,
in turn, generates a higher land use. Therefore, less wastewater output due to a more efficient water
recycling and the production of dry tailings are supposed to decrease risks and impacts on ecosystems,
human health, workers, and local communities. On the other side, the CLD shows less straightforward
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relations among the different items, leading to the identification of a number of trade-offs. The closed
loop water cycle planned by ITERAMS, for instance, may lead to a more efficient water recycling,
but concurrently to higher impacts on human health due to the higher energy required and produced
to isolate the water cycle in the different ore beneficiation steps, Figure 14.
Figure 14. Example of trade-off investigation with a CLD (screenshot from Vensim).
The ELCA screening highlighted tailings treatment as the main environmental hotspot.
In particular, tailings disposal may cause serious damages both to the environment and human
health due to heavy metals toxic emissions which pollute air and water resources. Figure 15, for
example, shows the most contributing flows to the impacts generated by the treatment of sulfidic
tailings in the context of marine aquatic ecotoxicity.
 
Figure 15. Copper mine operation |copper concentrate| RER, from ecoinvent. Flow and process
contribution to the impact category “Marine aquatic ecotoxicity”, calculated with CML-IA baseline
method (screenshot from openLCA 1.7).
Furthermore, although a number of differences in results can be noticed between different
geographic locations, environmental impacts are not excessively globally widespread, meaning that
they are usually confined to the geographic region or continent. On the other hand, a different outcome
may be highlighted for the SLCA screening where the supply chain and geographic impact distribution
emerged as crucial for a number of social issues or even countries.
An interesting insight on social impacts is offered by the comparison between the mining sector
and an average industry in the country. If this operation is performed for Finland (Figure 16), social
impacts of metal ores mining result higher than those of an average Finnish sector, especially regarding
“Contribution to environmental load”, “Social responsibility along the supply chain”, “Industrial water
depletion”, and “Safety measures”.
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Figure 16. Comparison of social impacts between “(Mining of) metal ores, Finland” and an average
Finnish sector. Calculation with Social Impacts Weighting Method in PSILCA, results referred to
1 USD output.
The main social hotspots related to a number of impact categories for mining of metal ores in
Finland are basic metals and chemicals manufacturing in Finland, construction in China and India,
and machinery production in Russia. This outcome stresses the high contribution of the processing
stages, such as flotation, to overall impacts. Furthermore, several impacts occurring in the supply chain
can be localized in Asian countries. In the case of the analyzed Portuguese mining sector, basic metals
manufacturing in Portugal, metal products in China and Angola, and motor vehicles and engines
manufacturing in USA can be regarded as social hotspots. Besides, construction in India and China
together with the direct impacts linked to the mining sector itself show an important contribution to
the product life cycle in Portugal. As for the Portuguese case, the impacts related to the mine and
processing plant installation appear to be rather consistent.
The interpretation of the identified environmental and social sustainability hotspots can be
further developed if the overlapping and complementarity between the two dimensions is further
discussed. Indeed, a number of indicators or impact categories may cover the same issue; however,
they often express different consequences as they investigate impacts on different stakeholders and
characters. Figure 17 shows an example of how water resource depletion due to industrial water
withdrawal and consumption for the mining activities may have consequences on the environment,
leading to the destruction of material resources and environmental degradation. In parallel, the
scarcity or exhaustion of water resources may destroy those local economies which need water for
their operations. In both cases, local communities may be highly affected incurring in poverty and
resettlement if they are dependent on local water reserves for their livelihood, and hence, easily
vulnerable. A second demonstration of this complementarity is provided by tailings leaking which
may lead to soil and, consequently, groundwater contamination with severe health problems for the
local population, but also with ecosystem impairment.
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Figure 17. Complementarity and overlapping between the different sustainability dimensions
investigated with a CLD (screenshot from Vensim).
4.2. Strength and Weakness of the Study
The different approaches presented in the article jointly led to the identification of the
environmental and social hotspots associated with the mining industry and further developed in
the context of the objectives of the ITERAMS project. Such an achievement was made possible by
the mutual iteration between the CLD, LCA, and literature which from time to time triggered new
challenges and reflections.
A number of limitations could be identified with reference to the use of existing databases for the
LCA screening. Indeed, it should be considered that databases use statistical data to build some of the
information they present; hence, uncertainties related to data gaps, quality, and assumptions may be
present [42]. Furthermore, a specific reflection on the uncertainty derived from multi regional input
output (IO) models should be made, considering the use of IO databases (EXIOBASE, PSILCA) for the
study [43].
Regarding the LCA screening, results are taken directly from the selected databases without
altering any input and output value. In this regard, the water and electricity requirements for copper
ore mining and processing in ecoinvent are estimated to be rather low in contrast to primary data that
will, in turn, be used for the next LCA assessment of ITERAMS. In addition, there is some criticism on
the characterization models used to estimate toxicity from heavy metals [44].
Finally, the documentation of the data quality is crucial for the interpretation of results. Data
quality is assessed in openLCA using the Pedigree matrix [41,45], further adapted for SLCA. In this
latter case, for instance, it should be noted that information for “Trade unionism” and “Non-fatal
accidents” is older than five years and that incomplete data are available for “Social responsibility
along the supply chain” and “Certified environmental management systems”. Few indicators, such as
“Trade unionism”, “Pollution”, and “Industrial water depletion”, present a low data quality for the
criteria “Further technical conformance”. This is due to the fact that data for these indicators are
interpolated from the country average as sector-specific information is not available.
5. Conclusions
The sustainability hotspots screening study provided a valuable input to the ITERAMS project.
Indeed, it enabled a better understanding of the environmental and social issues associated with
mining which are crucial for the creation and evaluation of the specific life cycle model of the
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ITERAMS combined solutions. In fact, this work was the first step towards the prioritization of
the efforts and resources for the sustainability evaluation of the project. In addition, it provided
an important overview to be accounted for when drafting the goal and scope of the following LCA
study. Furthermore, this article highlighted the significance of exploring different methodologies
and approaches in sustainability assessment. Indeed, once results are calculated, they need to be
placed in the context of the mining activities, hence evaluating those specific local and national
background situations which influence environmental and social pressures. The study on how the
environmental and social dimensions interact with each other was equally fundamental, displaying
how often environmental risks and impacts end up on risks and impacts on societal stakeholders.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the sustainability screening approach developed in the
context of the ITERAMS project can be applied to both other mining case studies and, more broadly,
to other different situations if the general reflections and insights given on the methodology, tools,
and identification of the background situations are considered.
As a final point, the present study was important for the project as it helped to create a dialogue
among the different project partners. The technical partners and the mining companies had, this way,
the chance to understand the sense and the approach of LCA and sustainability assessment in general.
These understanding and appraisal are crucial for the partners´ commitment and participation to the
next stages of the work, starting from the primary data collection at the different mine sites.
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Abstract: Global manufacturing firms are engaging distant suppliers of critical raw materials to
participate in responsible sourcing. Downstream firms are concerned about risks in mineral supply
chains of violent conflict, human rights violations, and poor governance, but they are limited in
seeing their suppliers. Descriptive data on 323 smelters and refiners of tantalum, tin, tungsten, and
gold (the “conflict minerals”) were complemented by interviews with downstream firms in the
electronics industry. Results provided a narrative of supplier engagement, describing tactics used to
identify “deep suppliers” at chokepoints in metals supply and to persuade producers into joining due
diligence programs. Top-tier firms collaborate through a standards program to overcame barriers of
geography and cultural distance in supply chain management beyond the visible horizon. Curiously,
manufacturers do not need line-of-sight transparency to lower-tier suppliers. Rather, top-tier firms are
“jumping the chain” to engage directly with “deep suppliers” who may—or may not—be their own
actual physical suppliers. The research contributes empirical evidence to understanding multi-tier
supply chains, examines how power is exercised by top-tier firms managing suppliers, and provides
insights on supply chain transparency. Responsible sourcing, based on due diligence guidance and
standards, is becoming expected of companies that are involved in supply chains of raw materials.
Keywords: responsible sourcing; supply chain due diligence; multi-tier supply chains; transparency;
sustainable supply chain management; critical raw materials
1. Introduction
Transparency has become a modern expectation of business [1,2]. Big businesses consult with
local communities and engage with international non-governmental organizations; firms report on
sustainability efforts to investors, to the public, and to other stakeholders. Yet, firms struggle to see
past their immediate suppliers, to understand the sources of raw materials, and to know what risks
are present multiple tiers into the supply chain [3,4]. Some sectors, like food and pharmaceutical,
are more advanced—driven by regulations and imperatives of quality, health, and safety—but
in manufacturing sectors, like electronics, automotive, toys, and aerospace, such efforts are just
beginning [5,6]. Thousands of suppliers feed raw materials and components into global manufacturing
networks to make each product [4]—and modern devices and equipment require a diverse array of
rare materials [7]. As such, manufacturers have typically managed only to the “visible horizon”, that
is they can “see” only a couple tiers into their supply chains [8]. Limited transparency also poses risks
of supply disruption, both physical disruption and reputational disruption. Without knowing one’s
suppliers, there is concern that things will be out of compliance to regulations or fail in quality. More
broadly, it limits sustainable supply chain management and the mitigation of environmental impacts
and social problems that may be present in distant global supply chains. Recent actions specifically to
address “conflict minerals” requirements have begun to reduce this opaqueness in the case of four
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metals, and have opened opportunities for manufacturers to increase transparency and encourage
improvements in social conditions in mining regions by performing “due diligence” [6,9].
This research looks at “responsible sourcing” of minerals and metals: how multinational
manufacturing firms manage supply chains to improve supply chain transparency and reduce negative
impacts at lower-tier suppliers and in supply chains. Downstream companies are driven by regulation
in the United States (U.S.) (and forthcoming in Europe) and by corporate social responsibility (see, for
example [10]), supported by evolving market expectations (see, for example [11]). Specifically, this
project draws on data from both producer and end-user companies of tantalum, tin, tungsten, and
gold (3TG) (Figure 1), which are defined by U.S. regulation as “conflict minerals”. Previous research
has examined assurance programs and reporting efforts by downstream firms to manage upstream
3TG metal smelters and refiners [5,12,13], and has described characteristics of supplier firms [14].
Figure 1. Schematic supply chain of tantalum, tin and tungsten to top-tier firm, showing indicative
flows of raw material to and from smelters and refiners. The top-tier firm and smelters and
refiners are focal companies in a “diamond shaped” supply chain. Note: the gold supply chain
is qualitatively different.
Given the expectations of transparency; given the visible horizon problem in multi-tier supply
chains; and, given the importance of critical raw minerals, including several of the conflict minerals,
this paper seeks to answer the question: How do global manufacturing firms engage with suppliers
in mineral supply chains to enable responsible sourcing? We empirically investigate how top-tier
firms have exercised power in multi-tier supply chains to implement sustainable supply chain
management and how lower-tier suppliers of minerals and metals have responded to the pressures of
sustainable practices.
Raw material supply chains are a relatively new topic for research. Minerals and metals have
not been studied to the degree that forestry, food, fisheries, and agriculture have [15,16]. However,
responsible sourcing of abiotic resources is emerging rapidly [5,17,18], and this paper makes an
empirical contribution in this area. Practically, the analysis presented herein provides insight that may
support supply chain management solutions for a larger set of important materials: two of the four
conflict minerals (tantalum and tungsten) are commonly characterized as critical raw materials [7,19]
that present supply-risk yet are paramount in technologies for a low-carbon economy. Most raw
material criticality assessments use data at the national scale [19,20], and few researchers have paid
attention to managing real supply chains at the firm-level [20–23], where material choices are made.
Looking at how businesses and governments addressed the conflict mineral problem, and develop
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responsible sourcing, can guide high-level policy and private-sector governance of minerals and raw
materials [19,24,25]. Whereas, technical avenues to the critical materials problem, like geological
exploration, efficient mining and metallurgy, and materials substitution, are widely touted [7,19],
management strategies for mineral governance, like responsible sourcing, are also needed. By better
understanding their suppliers, manufacturing firms can “identify and manage critical suppliers” [8]
and improve their ability to mitigate sources of supply disruption while maintaining ethical and
sustainable sources of raw materials [24].
In this study, data on real firms were used to explore both ends of the mineral supply chain.
Upstream, the analysis was on a population of 323 “deep suppliers”—our term for distant lower-tier
producers who are positioned at a focal point to mitigate supply chain problems. Here, these firms were
smelters and refiners: producers who purchase ore and mineral concentrates from mines and traders,
and process these into refined metals and metal chemicals. Downstream, interviews were carried
out with six conflict mineral managers in multinational manufacturing firms who are end-users of
tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold. The results showed both expected and novel tactics used by top-tier
firms to reach deep suppliers and manage risks in mineral supply. Manufacturers work collaboratively
through industry associations to identify, validate, and engage lower-tier suppliers. This includes
emails and letter-writing, but also more extreme tactics, such as direct site visits by multi-national
firms to small producers in remote regions. Downstream firms also provide financial incentives to
deep suppliers to motivate their implementation of due diligence management systems. Surprisingly,
it was revealed that manufacturers do not need line-of-sight visibility to lower-tier suppliers in order
to manage their practices; rather, top-tier firms are “jumping the chain” to engage directly with deep
suppliers who may—or may not—be their own actual physical suppliers.
In the next section, this paper reviews scholarship and practices in mineral supply chains. The
Methods section describes the mixed-methods approach and data set, followed by Results, which
consider the 3TG supply chains collectively and separately. The Discussion section redresses the
research question, considers theoretical contributions, and then discusses practical implications for
responsible sourcing of raw materials more generally.
2. Literature Review
This study draws on several fields of research: business scholarship, specifically firm-level
operations research in sustainable supply chain management; political science and policy studies,
where there is growing interest in private and public sector governance of minerals and metals;
sustainability standards, including assurance and certification approaches; and, sustainability science
and industrial ecology, specifically on critical raw materials and how firms assess and manage critical
raw materials. Together, these perspectives frame how the conflict minerals problem has been managed
and the development of due diligence approaches in mineral supply chains.
2.1. Sustainable Supply Chain Management
Building from Hart’s classic natural-resource-based view of the firm [1], and recognizing that
sustainability actions need to match a company’s strategic and financial objectives [2], sustainable
supply chain management research has emerged since the early 2000’s based on supply chain theory
and methods [2,8,26,27]. Most work emphasizes environmental strategies for green products or
environmental management of risks of suppliers [27], often overlooking social aspects in supply
chains [27,28]. The concept of the “focal company” refers to the top-tier firm in a supply chain who
controls design, directs production, and often faces customers directly [27]. Focal firms are frequently
brand-name manufacturers with high visibility and reputational status. They thus experience a
higher level of scrutiny by stakeholders [1] and they are held to a higher level of responsibility for
environmental and social problems [27]. To meet transparency expectations, top-tier firms report on
their own sustainability practices, but also look to their suppliers to contribute. Big companies engage
and work with suppliers to coordinate supply chains both vertically (“up” and “down” chains) and
128
Resources 2019, 8, 26
horizontally across supply networks [2]. General strategies for sustainable supply chain management
are assessment and collaboration [29], and more specifically may include communication, education
and development, and compliance approaches [28].
In the modern global economy, long complex dynamic supply chains present a “visible horizon”
problem [8] for sustainable supply chain management. Large manufacturers may have 1000 first-tier
suppliers, 8000 second-tier suppliers, and 30,000 third-tier suppliers [4]. Of interest here are lower-tier
suppliers, also referred to as sub-suppliers [30] or extreme upstream suppliers [31], which a top-tier
firm is unable to “see” or engage directly. Identifying and engaging lower-tier suppliers is a key
difficulty for sustainable supply chain management [30]. Manufacturers are often unaware of who
their suppliers are and what are the sources of raw materials used in their own products [32]. Moreover,
their power over suppliers diminishes as the distance upstream into the supply chain increases [3];
a manufacturer typically will have direct contractual control only of tier 1 suppliers although may
have some influence on suppliers at tier 2. For mineral supply chains, the concern is particularly acute,
because some of the greatest negative social and environmental impacts are at or around mines [3],
which may be 8 or 10 tiers removed from the end-product [13,33,34] (see Figure 1).
Although there is scant research on managing lower-tier suppliers [30], literature suggests direct
and indirect means which top-tier firms can apply [3,29] and research shows that working with
strategic partners, like standards programs or third parties, is useful [3,30,31]. Sauer and Seuring
proposed a “cascaded approach” to multi-tier sustainable supply chain management specific to
mineral supply chains [35]. In the current work, we add to this discussion, based on our empirical
examination of supply chains of the four 3TG metal industries. Research looking at the structure and
shape of multi-tier supply chains suggests that beyond the visible horizon there will be a tendency
for overlap in multi-tier supply chains, creating “diamond-shaped” supply chains that present a
sensitivity to disruption risk [36]. In mineral commodity supply chains, such overlapping supply
chains are significant: even though a manufacturer may have thousands of fabrication and assembly
suppliers at the third-tier [4], there are limited numbers of commodity processors (e.g., makers of metal
alloys and chemicals) and raw materials producers (e.g., producers of basic chemicals and refined
metals). Consequently, there are chokepoints [5], where material is moving through a limited number
of specialized facilities. In some cases, particularly for critical raw materials, there will be fewer than
50 facilities that process the entire global supply of one metal [33]. Sauer and Seuring have considered
how in mineral supply chains these companies can act as “upstream focal firms” [37] that have the
ability to oversee upstream mineral extraction and processing. Our research looks at chokepoints in
3TG supply chains, and responds to scholars who have considered theoretical factors in multi-tier
sustainable supply chain management [3,8,35]. Chokepoints present a constriction in complex global
supply chains where there are few actors and fewer sites, thus providing strategic opportunities for
efficient engagement, education, development, and standardization.
2.2. Governance of Mineral and Metal Supplies
Governance of minerals and raw materials has emerged as an important concern [24] for both
public and private sectors. Society is increasingly relying on greater diversity and varieties of materials
to satisfy modern wellbeing, while also transitioning to a low carbon economy [7,19,38]. Europe,
the United States, Japan, Korea, and other nations have identified “critical raw materials” that are
economically crucial yet that also face supply risks. National agencies have assessed raw material
criticality [19,20], and support research on technical solutions, including geological exploration,
efficient mining and metallurgy, and materials substitution [7,19]. New trade relationships and strategic
material stockpiling are other national strategies that support military needs and important industries.
Traceability of minerals is generally low when compared to biotic commodities. Traceability of
food, for example, is necessary if there is a product recall [39]. Or consider wine, which from taste
alone can be traced to a location or producer, or bananas that remain intact from farm to table and
can be clearly marked. Chemical tests performed at the molecular level are effective at tracing food,
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fibre, and wood. Even minerals, “geochemical fingerprinting” of structure and trace elements can be
used [40]—but only to the smelter where minerals are converted into metal form. Once in metal form,
chemical traceability is not feasible.
2.3. Critical Raw Materials Management
Minerals and metals present particular challenges for firms seeking transparency in their supply
chains. Tracking and tracing of minerals sources are difficult for business reasons, like the number of
actors in supply chains, the complexity of international commerce, including trade of intermediate
materials, and business confidentiality; and, for physical reasons, like mixing of mineral ores, mixing
of primary materials with recycled sources, chemical transformation of minerals to metals, and
physical conversions of form like melting [5,13,33,34]. Given concerns about critical raw materials,
and acknowledging it is at the firm-level that material engineering and design decisions are made,
firm-level approaches to dealing with critical raw materials are less well studied, including few case
studies [23,41], methodological suggestions [20,21], and business strategies [22].
Sustainability standards and certifications are a growing approach used by business to govern
supply chains. Suppliers are expected to implement standards of sustainability performance and
management systems that have been written by downstream buyers. Conformance of suppliers is
assured via third party auditing, and it is often presented as supplier certification. Some sectors,
like forestry, food, and pharmaceutical are relatively advanced in this mechanism [16], where health,
safety, and quality requirements necessitate vertical coordination along supply chains. In sectors like
electronics, automotive, toys, and aerospace, supply chain sustainability standards and programs are
just beginning and are relatively understudied, with few exceptions [42]. Certification approaches that
are relevant to mineral extraction and metal supply chains are have been reviewed [5,18,25,33]. Efforts
on diamond certification involve national authority [42], whereas business-led initiatives are newer.
Some industry-specific studies have been done for other minerals and metals, including mention of
steel [43], aluminum [5,18], and gems [44], but the most research has been on conflict minerals (see for
example [5,13,33]).
2.4. Conflict Minerals
The core problem of conflict minerals is that extraction activities in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) are financing conflict and associated with forced labor and human rights
violations [5,6,13,45,46]. Section 1502 of the United States Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) defined tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold as “conflict minerals” in 2010.
Starting in 2014, U.S. publicly traded companies were regulated to report to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding the use of conflict minerals in their products [47]. It is important
to clarify that the U.S. regulation concerns only reporting of 3TG sources and due diligence measures:
it does not restrict imports or control the use of raw materials. Of course, by reporting publically on
sources, U.S. firms are motivated to develop more responsible supply chains. In 2021 the European
Union Conflict Minerals Regulation takes effect and also has firm-level reporting requirements [48].
Although not a regulation, there is a parallel guideline published by the China Chamber of Commerce
of Metals, Minerals, and Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC), regarding metal trade for
Chinese firms. Importantly, these government efforts mean that all sources and all supply chains of
each the four metals are subject to scrutiny, requiring downstream firms to be transparent about the
origins of tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold used in their products. This motivates firms to look far
beyond manufacturing activities in the United States or Europe, and beyond a focus on mining in
Central Africa.
2.5. Due Diligence
The United States and EU rules, and the Chinese guideline, refer to the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals
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from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (OECD guidance) [9], which outlines policies, due diligence
frameworks, and management systems for mineral supply chain actors. Under the OECD guidance,
companies that are involved in mineral supply chains are asked to consider a wide range of concerns
that are associated with all stages of mineral resource extraction, metal processing and manufacturing.
All actors in mineral supply chains, from miners to end-users, are encouraged to implement the
five-steps of due diligence described in the OECD guidance:
• STEP 1: Establish strong company management systems
• STEP 2: Identify and assess risks in the supply chain
• STEP 3: Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks
• STEP 4: Carry out independent third-party audit of refiner’s due diligence practices
• STEP 5: Report annually on supply chain due diligence
The OECD five-step process compares to the definition for due diligence that is provided by
Hofmann, Schleper, and Blome, as an approach of “gathering of internal and external information and
gaining a sound knowledge of the company, its industry, financial condition, customers, competitors,
suppliers, business processes, technology and, above all, management; [and] sharing relevant upstream
information with downstream partners” [6].
The OECD guidance uses the term “conflict-affected and high-risk areas” (CAHRA) to refer
to regions where there is probability of serious physical harm to people, including violent conflict,
sexual violence, and non-state armed groups, but also includes concerns, such as forced labor, child
labor, torture, and financial crimes such as money laundering. CAHRA are assessed at national and
sometimes subnational levels using various indicators of conflict, poor governance, and human rights
violations. The OECD guidance acknowledges the importance of the chokepoint at smelters and
refiners, which OECD refers to as the “control point” in mineral supply chains. The due diligence
approach encourages firms to monitor material flows [45], and collaborate to provide supply chain
transparency [6]. The OECD guidance has led to numerous business-led programs and standards that
support due diligence and responsible sourcing in mineral supply chains.
3. Data and Methods
A parallel convergent mixed method was used, where both descriptive variables and qualitative
interview data were analyzed separately, and then integrated. Descriptive data were provided by the
Responsible Minerals Initiative, a global industry association based in the U.S. that runs a due diligence
program on mineral supply chains. The program provided details on the 323 known smelters and
refiners of tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold (Table 1). Data on upstream suppliers were complemented
by interviews with downstream manufacturing firms. Semi-structured interviews were completed
with six current and former members of the program’s smelter engagement team. Together, these
approaches allowed us to produce a narrative of engagement, including nuances for each of the four
3TG metal industries, detailing external forces and tactics used by the initiative, and describing how
downstream manufacturing firms identified and communicated with upstream metal producers.
The domain of conflict minerals provides a valuable and a rich source of data for applied research
on responsible sourcing. Activity in due diligence is particularly advanced in 3TG supply chains, as
compared to other metals and to other commodities. Data are available as far back as 2008 on supply
chains, standards, and downstream firms concerned about conflict minerals.
The three main due diligence programs, which cross-recognize each other’s listings, operate for
the benefit of downstream metal users: (1) the Responsible Minerals Initiative, which is described
below; (2) the Responsible Jewellery Council, which has more than on thousand member companies
from miners to manufacturers to retailers; and, (3) the London Bullion Market Association, whose
members includes over one-hundred miners, refiners and other actors in the global market for precious
metals. Smaller regional programs on conflict-free gold are operated at the Dubai Multi Commodities
Center and the Shanghai Gold Exchange.
131
Resources 2019, 8, 26
Table 1. Population and due diligence status of known tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold (3TG) smelters
and refineries (as of late 2017).
Tantalum Tin Tungsten Gold1 TOTAL
Known facilities, worldwide 44 83 46 150 323
Facilities in China 18 17 28 24 87
Facilities participating in due diligence
programs
44 78 44 114 280
Percent participating 100% 94% 96% 76% 87%
Facilities conformant to due diligence
standards
39 73 40 101 253
Percent conformant 89% 88% 87% 67% 78%
1 For gold the population is limited to industrial size gold refiners.
The 323 suppliers that are considered in the current study constitute the population of 3TG
smelters and refiners (as of late 2017) known to the three main due diligence programs. Notably, the
significant majority of suppliers are conformant to due diligence standards (Figure 2). For tantalum,
tin, and tungsten, more than 80% of suppliers are participating in due diligence programs. For gold
the number is lower, with about 75% conformant. For gold, it should be noted that this value is the
fraction of known of industrial gold refiners (i.e., those producing greater than about 1 tonne per year);
however, many hundreds of small and very small (e.g., less than one kilogram per year) refineries
are known, but are assumed not to supply industrial manufacturing networks. Note also, for all four
metal industries, there is an observable variation in the population, as firms go out of business or new
firms emerge. There is also the possibility that the programs have not identified and confirmed all
operating facilities, most notably black-market operators.
 
Figure 2. The fraction of global smelters and refiners conformant to international due diligence
standards. Includes suppliers listed by the Responsible Minerals Initiative, the Responsible Jewellery
Council, and the London Bullion Market Association (N = 323 facilities at end of 2017).
The Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative was founded in 2008 by members of two industry
associations, the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative,
largely involving multinational brand name electronics firms [49]. The roots of the effort go back to
2007 when a working group was struck to respond to claims made by civil society groups [50]. By 2017,
when the name was changed to the Responsible Minerals Initiative, the business initiative had over
350 members from companies and associations from ten industries (including electronics, automotive,
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retail, aerospace, apparel, telecommunications, and jewellery). The initiative aims to support company
raw material sourcing decisions including regulatory compliance and responsible sourcing from
conflict-affected and high-risk areas. The manufacturers and brand-name firms at the downstream
end of the metals supply chain paying for membership in the initiative, and they are supported with
tools to achieve and information to report on responsible sourcing. This relies on companies at the
upstream end of the supply chain: metal smelters and refiners who are encouraged to “participate”
in the Responsible Minerals Assurance Process (formally the Conflict-Free Sourcing Program) by
implementing due diligence management systems based on the OECD guidance [9]. The program
developed due diligence standards for each the four metal industries. Participating companies pay
the costs of implementing their own due diligence systems and usually pay for assurance audits.
The Responsible Minerals Initiative provides training materials and guidance, manages third-party
stakeholders, and maintains a list on their website of smelters and refiners who are conformant to each
due diligence standard [49].
Central to the current study was the Responsible Minerals Initiative smelter engagement team,
composed of individuals from about fifty member firms who performed outreach to metal smelter and
refinery companies. The team was created in 2013 but its efforts became more earnest in 2014 and 2015
after the U.S. Dodd–Frank Act rule reporting requirements came into effect.
3.1. Descriptive Data on Smelters and Refiners
The first stage of the research design involved investigating the pattern of smelter and refiner
participation into the program. The master smelter database, provided by the Responsible Minerals
Initiative, describes approximately 3000 entities, names, and brands that are associated with 3TG
suppliers. Over the years, the Responsible Minerals Initiative determined more than 2000 of these
names not to be actual smelters or refiners. As of late 2017, about 400 names remained under
investigation but they were of low likelihood to be eligible smelters or refiners. The remaining
323 facilities constituted the population of known and confirmed smelters and refiners and, of these,
87% participated in a due diligence program and, as of late 2017, 78% had achieved conformance (see
Table 1).
Information was consolidated and formatted into timelines for each of the four metal industries.
Documents from the program included training materials, the smelter database, templates used for
emails and letters, program performance metrics, and summary reports. (In a parallel study, our
research group assessed business characteristics for 212 of these facilities, including firm size, location,
and management system experience [14].) Key information on the 323 facilities included dates that
smelters and refiners started participating in the program and outreach efforts that were made by
member firms on behalf of the program to engage with suppliers and encourage them to participate
in the program. Central to the analysis was the status of each facility: the date of commitment to
participate, audit date, and date of conformance. Timelines were annotated with dates of external
events (like regulation) and activities internal to the initiative (like creation of the smelter engagement
team). The four timeline figures were used as a reference to support interviews with conflict mineral
managers in downstream manufacturing firms.
3.2. Interviews with Downstream Firms
Semi-structured interviews with conflict mineral managers in downstream firms sought to expose
how manufacturers engaged with, and persuaded upstream metal companies to participate in, due
diligence programs. Interviewees were recruited through a combination of convenience sampling
and purposive sampling. Based on the recommendation of the Responsible Minerals Initiative
manager, twelve candidates were invited to participate in the study, with six interviews accepting and
interviewed between January and March 2018. Interviewees were current or previous members of
the supplier engagement team and experts in conflict minerals. These individuals typically had 10–15
years’ work experience in supply-chain or corporate social responsibility functions in multinational
133
Resources 2019, 8, 26
electronics firms. Interviewees were drawn from a cross-section of Responsible Minerals Initiative
member companies, and they had experience working in different regions and different 3TG industries.
The theoretical basis used in designing the interviews was from Sauer and Seuring, who provide
a framework for supply chain management of mineral supply chains [37], which was selected given its
roots in sustainable supply chain management scholarship [26]. Their categories include government
interventions, strategic orientation, supply chain continuity, collaboration, risk management, and
proactive management. The timelines from the descriptive data analysis were provided to interviewees
ahead of time as a starting basis for interview discussions. Interview questions helped to contextualize
the timeline analysis, and they were designed to expose nuances and challenges of lower-tier
supplier engagement (Appendix A). Interviews were 30–60 minutes over the telephone, which were
then transcribed and imported into QSR NVivo, a data analysis software. Following Miles and
Huberman [51], first-order concepts were identified using open coding, which were then grouped into
second-order themes through axial coding. We then discussed emergent concepts and the connections
between them in relation to the extant literature, specifically Sauer and Seuring’s framework, with
new concepts being created where necessary.
A number of measures were taken to address concerns regarding the validity and reliability of
data and results. Construct validity was enforced by using a preexisting research framework. Our
dyadic approach linked data on upstream sellers of raw materials to independent data collected
from downstream buyers in the supply chain. Internal validity was supported by selecting key
informants with first-hand knowledge of the engagement processes. External validity was enforced
given inclusion of the whole population of suppliers across the four parallel case industries. Reliability
was assured given the sequential roles of the researchers in undertaking the research, as well as
extensive discussions related to emergent concepts, which were discussed between researchers until
consensus was reached. Furthermore, the use of a mixed method design allowed for the comparison
of qualitative and quantitative data [52] from both the interviews and the timeline analysis, revealed a
convergence of results. Fuller information on the methods, including more data on the timelines for all
four metal industries, is provided in the master’s thesis completed by one of the authors [53].
4. Results
The industry timelines (Figures 3–6) provide graphical summaries of supplier engagement for the
four metal industries, showing patterns initial participation, growth in participation, and abatement of
new participation. In the case of tantalum, the program achieved 100% smelter participation (allowing
for some ebb and flow as companies do change management or ownership). For tin and tungsten
industries, the total participation exceeded 80% by 2016 and continued to climb gradually; whereas,
for gold the total participation seemed to have plateaued around 70% in 2015 (see Figure 2). Based on
these results and supplemented with information from the interviews (identified as P1–P6), a narrative
was formed on smelter and refinery participation in due diligence programs.
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Figure 3. Timeline of tantalum industry metal producers joining due diligence program, to 100% of
known facilities engaged.
 
Figure 4. Timeline of tin smelters and refiners joining the due diligence program, to about 95% of
known facilities engaged.
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Figure 5. Timeline of tungsten smelters and refineries joining the due diligence program, to 96% of
facilities engaged.
 
Figure 6. Timeline of gold refiners joining Responsible Minerals Initiative, Responsible Jewellery
Council and London Bullion Market Association due diligence programs, to about 70% of large gold
facilities engaged.
About 2007, manufacturers realized they would need to understand sources of 3TG raw materials
in their supply chains. Some of the larger electronics firms began sending enquiries to their suppliers,
in hopes that their requests would penetrate through multiple tiers. Several issues became apparent:
• tracing specific chains of metals all the way back to mines was largely infeasible (as discussed
above, for physical and business reasons, see for example [34]);
• identification of mineral processors was confusing because there was blurring of roles and names
of mines, smelters, refiners, alloy makers, metal casters, fabricators, traders, and brands; and,
• end-product manufacturers in electronics share from many of the same 3TG metal suppliers.
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Based on this, it was logical that downstream firms collaborate to better understand their
lower-tier suppliers and to manage responsible sourcing. The Responsible Minerals Initiative was
created and supplier engagement began. Early consultant analysis [34,54] suggested that refiners
and “smelters were the pinch point in the supply chain” [P4]. They purchase mineral concentrates
from mines or through traders, convert them to refined metals and metal chemicals, which then are
sold to downstream manufacturers of parts and components. Smelters and refiners also purchase
post-industrial and post-consumer sources that are recycled in the same facilities as process primary
feedstocks. Smelters and refiners thus constitute a finite group of identifiable facilities (see Table 1),
mostly large-scale capital intensive metallurgical operations. “The smelters, the refiners, that we work
with are pretty [deep in] our supply chain, so they are not our immediate next supplier, they are maybe
8 or 9 down the supply chain“ [P3].
Engagement of smelters and refiners was part of a three-stage process: (1) identification of
potential facilities, (2) validation of alleged facilities to determine the legitimacy of smelters or refiners
at the chokepoint, and (3) outreach to encourage facility participation in the due diligence program.
1. Identification
To identify metal smelters and refineries, the Responsible Minerals Initiative developed a
standardized supplier survey for members in 2011. The survey provided common definitions, standard
smelter and refinery names, and fields to characterize suppliers (location, capacity, ownership, etc.).
This process also relieved survey fatigue experienced by suppliers. With the creation of the smelter
engagement team in 2013, the program “started to be more tactical and strategic about engagement”
[P4]. Supplier identification efforts were coordinated: downstream firms shared and aggregated survey
results, then met to coordinate the identification of potential smelters and refiners. However, because
surveys needed to be relayed from individual member firms back up the chain to identify metal
processors, and then returned downstream via the same chain, interviewees noted that there were
poor return rates (in the order of 1%). It was “tricky because we are so far removed from the smelter
itself and even our direct suppliers are removed from the smelter itself so that can be challenging
twisting through the supply chain” [P6]. Curiously, this approach meant that manufacturers identified
their 3TG suppliers without actually knowing how their supply chains were connected. Supplier
surveys were anonymized at each tier of the supply chain to preserve business confidentiality between
competitive suppliers and prevent line-of-sight visibility to smelters and refiners. Survey results were
additionally anonymized by the program, who managed the consolidated database.
2. Validation
Validation was necessary after suppliers were identified. Numerous product brand names,
marketing and distribution companies, differences in ownership and location, and confusion about
what actually constitutes a metallurgical processor complicated the process of identification and
qualification. The smelter engagement team clarify which smelters and refineries were targeted
(e.g., a facility needed to have the technical ability to process primary mineral concentrates) and
performed additional enquiries through industry associations to confirm processors. Nonetheless,
with enquiries aggregated among downstream firms and repeated annually, the efforts began to “build
supply chain visibility” [P6]. Over the years, the collaborative effort developed a reliable database of
qualified smelters and refiners for each of the four metals, which is updated regularly and provided to
Responsible Minerals Initiative members.
3. Outreach
Priority for outreach was to facilities that were identified most frequently in member supplier
surveys. “Smelters . . . that weren’t participating, would get letters, and lots of letters, and finally if
you start to get enough letters from all these big brand name companies, I think that helped drive
some of the participation. And so if you look at both tungsten and tin, you see that bump in 2013 about
the time SET got started” [P3]. “After we conduct the survey we find smelter contact information and
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directly go talk to them, and . . . engage with the smelters. So we either try to email them, try to call
them, and then meet them in person. We find that’s the most effective way to get them engaged and
this can be done by going directly to the smelter facilities” [P6].
Efforts were coordinated to encourage constructive communication and to avoid overloading
prospective participants. Depending on the type of company and the region involved, a plan for each
supplier was developed. This included coordinated emails, letter writing, and social media, each urging
the smelter to participate in the program. Messages could be escalated depending on the responses
or commitments received (or not received) from the supplier. Importantly, a single-point-of-contact
person was designated for each facility, to mitigate overloading a particular supplier with requests or
mixed messages, and to provide a friendly liaison who could encourage program participation. “[W]e
found that sometimes when too many companies are trying to reach the smelter or communicating
with the smelter it can cause confusion and they eventually stop responding . . . it was probably better
to assign one member company person to engage with the smelter” [P6].
Escalating their efforts of coordinated persuasion, manufacturers began to visit suppliers in-person
at smelter facilities around the world. Depending on the culture and language and the nature of firms
involved, the team would work with translators and a member of the engagement team might do
a site visit. Other tactics included attending metal industry conferences and working with industry
associations. This action conveyed the gravity and urgency of the conflict mineral problem, and
was very effective: “So in terms of how smelters become active I think the most important thing is
being very engaged and having not only your company brand but establish, but trying to establish
a face-to-face relationship with the smelters” [P6]. “Thus downstream firms overcame barriers of
distance, “breaching language, breaching communication or going to those places physically” [P6].
Somewhat surprisingly, top-tier manufacturers were visiting upstream companies who were not
their own suppliers. For example, one target group was tin smelters in Indonesia, many of which
are small in size. At the extreme, this meant a representative from a U.S. multinational electronics
corporation travelled to the island of Belitung, Indonesia to knock on the door of a family-owned,
20-employee tin smelter. Another effort focused on tungsten facilities in China, many of which are
located in Ganzhou, China. Gold refiners in Korea were another target group, which include numerous
small operations doing recycling from manufacturing industries in that country.
According to a survey by the Responsible Minerals Initiative covering about one-third of the audits
done from 2015–2018, metal suppliers expressed that they participated in the program because of their
own company policy (85%), because of customer requests (80%) and because of requests from end-use
manufacturers (50%). The last point aligns well with data in the timelines (see Figures 3–6) showing
that new participation of suppliers grew by 35%, 85%, 90%, and 80%, respectively for tantalum, tin,
tungsten, and gold, following the creation of the supplier engagement team in 2013.
The program offered supplier development resources and also provided financial assistance
to suppliers. Education and training were delivered in at least eight different languages, including
online, seminars at conferences, and workshops for targeted groups, like tin producers in southern
China. A fund was created, financed by individual member firms, and used to offset the costs of a
supplier’s first audit, significantly reduced the financial barrier to smaller facilities to participate in the
due diligence program. More than half of the conformant facilities benefited from the fund, which
distributed approximately $2 million up to 2018: “you combine that with the face-to-face interaction
and the hand holding of getting them ready for the audit then they’re more likely to be successful”
[P6]. Interviewees and program managers expressed general satisfaction in the performance of the
program in reaching suppliers over ten years of operation.
4.1. Tantalum
Smelters and refiners in the tantalum industry were quick adopters of due diligence systems for
responsible sourcing (Figure 3), as the majority of producers achieved conformance to the program in
the first two years. Several factors were involved: electronic capacitors account for a high proportion
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of tantalum use, the DRC is a major region of metal supply, capacitor firms are closely aligned with
the electronics industry, many midstream and downstream firms are U.S.-based and were therefore
immediately subject to the Dodd–Frank Act rule, most electronics corporations already had strong
corporate social responsibility commitments, and the upstream tantalum industry association rallied
successfully around the issue.
As apparent in Figure 3, the supplier engagement team did not contribute significantly to
engagement in the tantalum industry. Unlike the other three metal industries, “the electronics industry
had the leverage and the purchasing power to influence [and] . . . apply the pressure that we could”
[P4]. After a couple of the leading capacitor manufacturers joined the program, and with the support
of brand-name computer firms that faced reputational risks there was rapid acceptance in the industry
for responsible sourcing standards written by the downstream initiative. “The tantalum industry was
very a vicious industry without much collaboration. But when this came out, and this is where we saw
a lot of collaboration occurring” [P4].
Of interest for tantalum, one interviewee referred to more advanced responsible sourcing efforts
that were built off the collaborative responsible sourcing initiative. A “closed-pipe” system was
described that directly connects a specific mine in DRC, where conflict was not a problem, to a
conformant smelter, for example in China, to a capacitor manufacturer in the U.S., to a top-tier
manufacturer of electronics. Thus material was securely and assuredly moved from extraction
to end-product.
4.2. Tin
The tin industry, conversely, was not motivated by the Dodd–Frank Act (Figure 4) and the
role of the engagement team was significant. Indifference to the U.S. conflict minerals rule was
understandable, given that the vast majority of tin processors are outside the U.S. (e.g., Indonesia,
China, Peru, Bolivia) and the bulk of tin ore is sourced regionally, far away from the problems of
Central Africa. Although several large producers did participate early, there was “slowness given the
number of tin smelters that exist . . . [and] a lot of pushback from Indonesian tin smelters [and] a lot of
pushback from [industry associations]” [P4].
The smelter engagement team played an important role in engagement tin smelters and refiners
in due diligence programs. “What happened was these smelters started receiving letters . . . asking
them what they know about responsible sourcing, have they done anything in the past” [P3]. However,
it took more significant efforts to achieve commitments from tin industry actors. “[T]in smelters
started getting active when we as member companies started visiting smelters for the program . . . I
think the [engagement] team played a major role, face-to-face contact” [P3]. Regional outreach efforts
resulted in participation by blocks of companies starting in 2012, including major refiners in Thailand,
Malaysia, Peru and Bolivia. Indonesia and China were high-focus areas. “[We] recognized that its
very very important, especially in Indonesia culturally to have that face to face relationship [and]
stay in touch with the smelter” [P6]. Participation of small companies in Indonesia was particularly
advanced in 2015 after the government-run Indonesia Commodity & Derivatives Exchange (ICDX)
made compliance to the tin due diligence standard a requirement for tin export. In China, the world’s
largest tin refining nation, the program engaged with larger state-owned firms and with government
representatives, who provided an initial door for acceptance in that country. The program continued
to work on the participation and the conformance of tin smelters and refiners in China as late as 2018.
4.3. Tungsten
Tungsten smelters and refiners took longer than the other metal industries to become active in
due diligence efforts (Figure 5). Although a small number of U.S. and European tungsten producers
participated early-on, there was generally low interest: “Tungsten was really late to the table and such
a small amount of tungsten actually came out of the region, they just didn’t really want to engage”
[P4]. Program members constituted a relatively small portion of the tungsten market. “The electronics
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industry just did not have a lot of leverage over tungsten” [P4]. Moreover, given that a tiny fraction
of tungsten is sourced from Central Africa (less than 2%), the lack of interest by tungsten producers
was understandable.
A significant breakthrough occurred in 2013. The engagement team became more active.
Numerous site visits were made by program representatives to tungsten facilities, many in China.
Knowledge was gained both by the downstream manufacturers and by companies in the metal
industry; interviewees spoke of trust-building to address concerns with “business confidential
information [and] lack of awareness” [P5]. Concurrently, a new tungsten industry association was
formed to facilitate responsible sourcing (the Tungsten Industry-Conflict Minerals Council). At the end
of 2013, an agreement was struck between tungsten council and the Responsible Minerals Initiative.
Tungsten producers who are members of the council are provided funding by the downstream program
for facility audits and they are given a three-year (instead of one-year) audit cycle, and the tungsten
due diligence standard provides streamlined procedures for the tungsten industry.
Notably, after the new agreement came into effect, competitive pressures in the tungsten industry
appeared to motivate other tungsten producers, even those who were not council members, to
participate in the due diligence program. Given that approximately 80% of tungsten production
takes place in China, interviewees observed that the program was particularly successful in gaining
traction in that country—far from the U.S. Dodd–Frank Act and European pressures.
4.4. Gold
Although the gold timeline (Figure 6) looks similar to the other 3TG materials, the gold industry
operates unlike other markets. As observed by one interviewee: “gold is a completely different animal”
[P6]. Gold behaves more like currency than a metal. It is mined wherever possible, all around the
world, and all but the smallest country has a gold refinery, often associated with the national mint. The
value per mass is high, thus “it’s really hard to track and the quantities are much smaller for bigger
profit” [P6]. Gold is readily recycled, resulting in significant mixing of old and new sources. Because
of its value “it’s also used as currency, its used to wash money” [P4]. And, as several interviews
noted, “they’re not paying the taxes on it, so miners actually get more per gram of gold through illegal
channels than they do through legal channels” [P4].
With respect to encouraging participation in the Responsible Minerals Initiative due diligence
program, “gold smelters and refiners were the most challenging to engage, and where [supplier
engagement] tactics were the least successful” [P1]. “Gold is one of the hardest ones, because we don’t
really have that much gold in the electronics industry, so it’s hard for us: we don’t really have any
leverage to convince them” [P6]. For example, it was especially difficulty in convincing refiners who
source gold from mines in China to “join an American program that determines whether they source
from Africa” [P2].
To make gains on responsible sourcing, the Responsible Minerals Initiative relied on programs that
were developed by two other industry associations, the Responsible Jewellery Council and the London
Bullion Market Association. Although a significant volume of tantalum and tin go to electronics, about
90% of gold goes to non-industrial uses, such as in jewellery and bullion (including coins, gold bars,
and ingots). To achieve greater reach relevant to all gold end-uses, the three associations agreed to
cross-recognize their due diligence standards. The London Bullion Market Association is particularly
relevant, as it includes more than one-hundred large gold refiners that, since 2014, must each maintain a
responsible gold certificate that supports due diligence with respect to risks, including conflict, human
rights abuses, terrorist financing practices, and money laundering [55]. This certification requirement
led to a clear uptick in conformant facilities, starting in 2014 (see Figure 6). These partnerships allowed
for electronics firms to overcome their inability to apply market pressure onto gold refiners.
Responsible sourcing remains an on-going challenge in the gold industry. From a transparency
perspective interviewees noted that the commodity exchanges represent an important barrier. For
example: “Within China, the Shanghai Gold Exchange, the gold would go in and go out, there was no
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tracking of who got what gold. . . . if you tried to chase the gold supply chain, it was always stopped at
the exchange, and so you really didn’t know who your refiners were” [P4]. Non-conformant facilities
are known to be all over the world (Mexico, Middle East, China, India, etc.) and they are often in
regions where there is little or no market incentive to participate in due diligence programs.
5. Discussion
This study explored how global manufacturing firms engaged with suppliers in mineral supply
chains to enable responsible sourcing. The research responds to Carter, Rogers, and Choi, who asked
how organizations might “manage physical supply chains that reside beyond the visible horizon” [8]
(p. 94). Evidence revealed how top-tier firms in electronics and other sectors overcame barriers of
geographic distance, physiological distance, and cultural distance in identifying and engaging with
3TG suppliers. General strategies for sustainable supply chain management, like communication,
education, and development, and compliance approaches are relevant to all suppliers [28], but for
suppliers over the visible horizon [8] management needs to include engagement steps, including
identification, validation, and outreach.
The concept and value of a supply chain chokepoint at smelters and refiners [13] has been
confirmed. The chokepoint is where there is a concentration of firms in the upstream supply chain
where sustainable management practices can influence lower-tier suppliers. This observation supports
theory on diamond-shaped supply chains [36] and specifically confirms what Seuring and Sauer refer
to as “upstream focal firms” [5,37], who control the integrity of mineral feedstocks entering mineral
supply chains.
A novel contribution of this study is what we call the “deep supplier”. A deep supplier is defined
as a lower-tier supplier—beyond the visible horizon of top-tier firms—whose position at a supply chain
focal point affords them leverage over their suppliers. In the context of 3TG metals, the management
and purchasing actions of deep suppliers was shown to have a significant effect on the sustainability
of the mining practices and hence contribute to overall supply chain sustainability. We believe this
concept could have application beyond the 3TG metals, to other industries whose structure also reveals
lower-tier supply chain focal points.
Surprisingly, lack of supply chain transparency does not present an impossible barrier for
multinational manufacturers to manage deep suppliers. We observed top-tier firms “jumping the
chain” to engage with deep suppliers, who are beyond their visible horizon and who may—or may
not—be physical suppliers to all top-tier firms. The did this collaboratively, working through the
standards program, a business-led initiative. Although individual manufacturers could conceivably
invest greater resources to discover more about their mineral supply chains, it was both effective and
sufficient for top-tier firms working together to jump-the-chain to manage deep suppliers.
5.1. Contribution to Theory
This study contributes empirical evidence to theory on sustainable supply chain management
in multi-tier supply chains. Figure 7 depicts a conceptual framework of engagement with deep
suppliers. Whereas, the theoretical work of Tachizawa and Wong [3] suggests four management
practices by which top-tier firms engage with lower-tier suppliers (direct, indirect, “work with third
party” and “don’t bother”), we have identified a potential intermediate practice, to “work with second
party”, which more accurately describes the role of companies working in business-led efforts, like
the Responsible Minerals Initiative. The members of the initiative were highly active in parts of
the operation of the initiative, including efforts to engage suppliers. “Work with a second party”
captures the practice of jumping-the-chain, whereby a top-tier firm works with the initiative and in
collaboration with competitors to achieve engagement. This differs slightly with Sauer and Seuring [35],
who describe a mechanism of cascaded multi-tier sustainable supply chain management that links
between downstream and upstream parts of mineral supply chains, in that, in our conception, the role
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of the second party is pivotal. Results are supportive of Hofmann, Schleper, and Blome, who describe
due diligence in multi-tier supply chains [6].
Figure 7. Types of supplier engagement.
Our results contribute empirically to the limited body of research on engaging lower-tier suppliers
in sustainability management. Gong, Jia, Brown, and Koh suggest a number of supply chain learning
stages [31], which were apparent in our study, including top-tier firms working in breadth with
partners and working in depth to learn more about lower-tiers. By sending requests to their immediate
suppliers as a means of indirect engagement, manufacturers learned the identity of deep suppliers.
Thus, even with limited knowledge of lower-tiers, by partnering and collaborating focal companies
were able to apply a direct approach to manage deep suppliers. Additionally, although well observed
in the direct management of first-tier suppliers [29,56,57], we add to the understanding of how focal
companies work directly with lower-tier suppliers and with strategic partners to establish governance
mechanisms to manage distant suppliers [30,31]. Beyond standards and compliance, “contributive”
strategies [57] include training, financial incentives, and other assistance intended to develop supplier
risk management capacity. Interviewees identified more “pro-active” strategies [57] undertaken by
manufacturers for supply chain sustainability and risk mitigation, for example “closed-pipe” material
supply networks (see Figure 7) provide dedicated conflict-free sources of tantalum to end-users who
are highly dependent on this critical material [5,58].
Results also confirm contingency variables that Tachizawa and Wong suggest affect supply chain
relationships in multi-tier supply chains [3]: each of the four metals is “critical” to electronics and other
high-tech products and manufacturing; top-tier manufacturers are “dependent” on the concentration
of smelters and refiners at the chokepoint; there is significant “stakeholder pressure” and reputational
risk for top-tier firms; “industry dynamism” of smelters and refiners is low, as these facilities tend to be
technically complex, capital intensive, and permanent; there is a significant physiological, geographic,
and cultural “distance” from mostly-Western top-tier firms to many smelters and refiners in developing
countries; and, top-tier firms have limited in their familiarity and industry “knowledge” of smelting
and refining at deep suppliers. To mitigate this last variable and to engage deep suppliers, the
Responsible Minerals Initiative relied significantly on metal industry associations and other upstream
parties for metal industry expertise.
The study indicates how top-tier firms exercise power in multi-tier supply chains and
how lower-tier suppliers responded to pressures of sustainable practices. Results support prior
considerations on how the power of multinational firms is focused to influence lower-tier suppliers [3,6].
The extent to which downstream buyers influence upstream producers differs according to leverage
available. In the case of tantalum, given that electronics applications account for the majority of
use, top-tier firms used their economic power to leverage metal producers to implement responsible
sourcing. For tin and tungsten, where market leverage was lower, power was exerted more softly
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through non-economic persuasion of deep suppliers. Coordinated letter-writing and site visits from
“big brand name companies” helped to overcome supply chain distance and improve industry
knowledge. To reach and motivate gold industry actors, even more indirect efforts were needed,
primarily via partnering with third parties in the gold bullion and jewellery industries that had more
direct power to influence gold refiners.
There is varying understanding of supply chain transparency. Hofmann, Schleper, and Blome
describe four practices that increase transparency along supply chains [6]: certification of firms,
chain-of-custody along the value chain, traceability of materials, and due diligence of firms. Using
their terminology, full transparency in the supply chain would include clear line-of-sight upstream,
and this would require chain-of-custody traceability of raw materials backwards from end-users to
source. However, in this study, top-tier firms described a more limited transparency that provides
identification of deep suppliers but without line-of-sight traceability through the supply chain. To
encourage due diligence management at deep suppliers, manufacturers gathered information to
identify smelters and refiners, but they did not have enough knowledge on the operating structure of
those supply chains to their supply chains link-by-link. Thus, in practice, firms are prioritizing due
diligence over traceability. This finding is consistent with Kim and Davis who showed that very few
corporations filing under the Dodd–Frank Act rule claim to know whether their products are “DRC
conflict-free” [32]. Knowing one’s suppliers by name is not sufficient to know the source of materials
entering one’s specific products.
Traceability appears to be more complex and costlier than due diligence alone. Materials that were
produced by lower-tier suppliers can be tracked forward through multiple tiers in the supply chain to
downstream manufacturers, but firms need separate instruments and more developed systems to trace
materials backwards, for example, to confirm suppliers in the chain, or to know the upstream sources of
food that is subject to a health recall [39]. For minerals traceability, Apple, a large electronics firm, began
tracing its supply chains of tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold in 2010. This involved looking upstream
from manufacturing back to smelters. However, it was not until the end of 2016 that Apple could claim
that all its known 3TG suppliers were participating due diligence programs [10]. Traceability requires
significant information and more sophisticated systems. Further research is necessary to tease apart
and better understanding the nuances of responsible sourcing concepts, including transparency, due
diligence, tracking, traceability, and chain-of-custody.
5.2. Implications for Practice
Responsible sourcing has emerged as an expectation of producers and users of metals and
minerals. Transparency can improve confidence on sources of materials, which may improve security
of supply, by knowing more about both physical flows and business information on actors in global
markets. Without knowing one’s suppliers, there is concern that things will be out of compliance to
regulations or fail in quality but, more broadly, it limits sustainable supply chain management and
the mitigation of environmental impacts and social problems that may be present in distant global
supply chains. Results here have suggested that simply by being known to downstream customers
(and therefore visible to other stakeholders), there is pressure on deep suppliers to improve practices.
This study provides insights that may support responsible sourcing and supply chain management
for a larger set of important materials. Two of the four conflict minerals (tantalum and tungsten)
are commonly characterized as critical raw materials [7,19] that are paramount in low-carbon and
other technologies yet also present geopolitical supply-risks. The Responsible Cobalt Initiative due
diligence standard targets an important critical metal that also presents responsibility concerns. The
London Metal Exchange expects responsible sourcing standards to be in place for the major base
metals [11]. The exchange specifies physical standards and it is the main global price-setting platform
for aluminum, copper, zinc, nickel, lead, tin, molybdenum, and cobalt.
Moreover, the goals of responsible sourcing are expanding. Initial concerns were on conflict
(and focused on the DRC), but the OECD guidance broadens consideration to “conflict-affected
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and high-risk areas”, which cover a variety of human rights, conflict, and governance concerns [9].
The cobalt standard aims to improve responsible sourcing that includes labor conditions, like the
prevention of forced labor and better health and safety [59]. Other programs hit on additional aspects of
sustainable development, notably in its responsibility standard the Aluminium Stewardship Initiative
refers extensively to environmental objectives and to the rights of indigenous peoples [60].
Several study informants made note of the success of supplier engagement and due diligence
implementation in China. Reasons for this success were several, and they may inform other efforts
in responsible sourcing, like those for sustainable wood and fisheries that have been less successful
in China (see [5]). First, given that China is important not just to upstream processing of metals (see
Table 1), but also to midstream manufacturing and downstream assembly of electronics, member firms
could exercise market leverage (particularly of tantalum and tin suppliers). Second, was the ability to
bridge cultural distance by member companies with significant local presence. Third, firms invested
significant individual and collaborative resources, including repeated site visits and connections
to partner organizations such as Chinese industry groups and government agencies. It appears
that Chinese authorities accepted the value of responsible sourcing and, perhaps more importantly,
accepted the value of third-party assurance of responsible sourcing. The success carried to cobalt
supply chain responsibility, which started operation in 2018 as a collaboration of the Responsible
Cobalt Initiative, the Responsible Minerals Initiative and the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals,
Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters [59]—which is important given that China is a major
cobalt processor and a maker of electric vehicle batteries.
The current research has elucidated strategies and mechanisms that top-tier firms use to identify
suppliers of material resources and encourage lower-tier suppliers to implement due diligence
systems. Top-tier firms are collaborating and “jumping the chain” in order to engage deep suppliers.
Results have shown the considerable efforts that top-tier firms have made to discover the identity
of companies who are suppliers of 3TG metals: coordinated outreach, face-to-face visits, and direct
financial support. Compare this to raw material criticality assessments, which generally use data at
the national scale [19,20]. Few researchers have paid attention to managing real supply chains at the
firm-level [20–23] at the firm-level resolution shown here for 3TG sources.
Whereas, technical avenues to the critical materials problem, like geological exploration, efficient
mining and metallurgy, and materials substitution, are widely touted [7,19], management strategies
for mineral governance are less discussed. Firms need to manage risks in mineral supply chains,
regardless of whether risks are associated with supply disruption, with conflict or with environmental
hazards. One approach is simply to change the sources of raw materials, to shift sourcing away from
high risk countries and companies. However, to do this, firms need to know where materials are
actually sourced, and this is difficult due to complex long supply chains, multiple processing tiers,
independent traders, and long transportation distances. Another difficulty for minor metals, which is a
key contribution to the criticality of raw materials, is that there are often a limited number of producers
or production concentrated within a region. For example, most tungsten, which is classified as both a
critical raw material and a conflict mineral, is mined and processed in one region in China.
In managing risks in their supply chains, top-tier firms have begun to develop systems and
risk management approaches, and they participate in audit and certification processes. By better
understanding their suppliers, manufacturing firms can “identify and manage critical suppliers” [8]
and improve their ability to mitigate sources of supply disruption while maintaining ethical and
sustainable sources of raw materials [24]. If a top-tier firm has better knowledge of lower-tier suppliers,
it can better assess risks and implement strategies to manage risks.
More broadly, we discern a “responsible sourcing regime” for global governance of minerals and
metals supply chains. Businesses are undertaking efforts in responsible sourcing that is guided by
high-level norms and policy, which is executed through private-sector governance of minerals and
raw materials [19,24,25]. Three levels are apparent: (1) principles and broad objectives like those in the
OECD guidance on due diligence; (2) standards and requirements defined by industry-led programs,
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but also in government regulations like the U.S. and Europe conflict mineral rules; and, (3) company
management systems. Firms need to select which responsible sourcing standards they should follow
depending on their needs and capacities, and given the particulars of each industry and their position
in the supply chain (upstream, midstream, downstream). Consequently, companies at all stages in
the supply chain, and across a growing diversity of resource industries, are implementing responsible
sourcing policies, procedures, management processes, and reporting systems.
6. Conclusions
Top-tier manufacturing firms collaboratively manage suppliers of critical metals to increase supply
chain transparency and implement due diligence to reduce negative social impacts. We used data on
real firms to look at both ends of the mineral supply chain. Upstream, we analysed a population of 323
“deep suppliers”—our term for lower-tier metal producers who are critically positioned to mitigate the
conflict mineral problem. Downstream, we conducted interviews with six conflict mineral managers
in multinational manufacturers who are end-users of tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold.
Results showed both expected and novel tactics used to reach suppliers and manage risks
in mineral supply. Manufacturers work collaboratively through industry associations to identify,
validate, and engage lower-tier suppliers—targeting deep suppliers and persuading them to conform
to responsible sourcing standards. Surprisingly, we found that manufacturers do not need line-of-sight
visibility to lower-tier suppliers in order to do sustainable supply chain management; rather, global
manufacturing firms “jump the chain” to engage directly with deep suppliers at the supply chain
chokepoint. This work has contributed empirical evidence to understanding multi-tier supply chains,
showing how power is exercised by top-tier firms to manage deep suppliers and to reach suppliers
both directly and indirectly, and has helped to understand mechanisms for supply chain transparency.
Due diligence has emerged as an approach that is expected of companies, both upstream and
downstream, involved in mineral supply chains where there is a risk of conflict, human rights,
governance, or other concerns. For tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold, the majority of smelters and
refineries have implemented due diligence management systems. Responsible sourcing programs like
the Responsible Minerals Initiative, the Responsible Jewellery Council, and the London Bullion Market
Association have engaged hundreds of companies around the world.
The major limitations of this study are associated with the framing of the research and potential
bias in data. The timelines that were developed relied on information provided by one industry
association and cross-checked against industry and public information. We did not consult with
suppliers or with other due diligence programs that may have differing perceptions of engagement
practices. There was a potential selection-bias associated with interviewees. These persons may have
skewed positive perspectives regarding their own efforts and programs.
Responsible sourcing, particularly of minerals and metals, is new and consequently numerous
avenues for future research are available. Manufacturers have shone a light on deep suppliers,
encouraging improvements in social aspects of companies and communities in which they operate.
Theoretical work is recommended on the responsible sourcing regime for global governance of minerals
and metals supply chains. Specifically:
• Further investigation might consider environmental conditions or management performance of
lower-tier suppliers who have no previous experience in corporate social responsibility. What
have due diligence management systems done to change deep suppliers?
• There is currently significant company implementation of the five-step process defined in the
OECD guidelines. Consequently, future researchers should look for new data and public reports
by various companies positioned at points along the supply chain.
• As data become available on due diligence efforts in other industries, and with different objectives,
new research questions and comparisons can be considered for conflict minerals, critical raw
material, and base metals.
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• On a more theoretical level, concepts like transparency, responsible sourcing, and due diligence
have just started to gain research interest [6]. These concepts and their practical implementation
need additional clarification in future research.
• The impacts of governance initiatives related to mineral and metals are poorly studied, partially
because they are relatively young but also given a lack of data and methods [25]. Practical research
is possible based on longitudinal data that are available since the Dodd–Frank Act was passed in
2010 on firms and industries, and at national and global scales.
Lastly, it should be emphasized that responsible sourcing and due diligence practices of companies
cannot be easily correlated to tangible outcomes regarding mitigation of violence, improved human
rights, or governance progress. Continued research, including field work in the DRC and other regions,
is necessary to assess real circumstances and guide improvements in mining areas and communities.
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Appendix A
Interview questions:
1. Can you share the story of how this metal/regional group of smelters or refiners became active
participants in the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative?
2. What were external factors that enabled these smelters to participate?
3. What were external factors that impeded these smelters to participate?
4. What deep supplier engagement tactics did your team try that worked? Why?
5. What did you try that did not work? Why?
6. Do you have any comments or insights regarding the timeline graphs?
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Abstract: The concept of a “circular economy”, in which material in society is regarded as “a transient
phase in anthropogenic resource utilization”, is a growing topic for discussion. The primary
motivations for supporting a circular economy include a reduction of environmental impacts and
conservation of natural resources. Australia is a vivid example of a country whose large metal
extraction capacity is not balanced as it has neither an extensive product manufacturing capability
nor a large domestic market. Consequently, Australia must rely on the global resource network
to achieve circularity and carbon neutrality. This work illustrates this situation with quantitative
material flow cycles for Australian aluminum, nickel, copper, zinc, and stainless steel, and comments
on the implications of the results for Australia and for circular economy prospects more generally.
Keywords: copper; aluminum; zinc; nickel; stainless steel; sustainable resources
Highlights
• Australia’s metal extraction rates are not balanced by the domestic use of those metals;
• Most domestic metal use in Australia is enabled by imports;
• Australia is far from being a circular economy for metals;
• The circular economy can only be realized at the global level.
1. Introduction
The concept of a “circular economy”, in which material in society is regarded as a transient phase
in anthropogenic resource utilization, was first formally proposed in 1990 [1] and has come to be
regarded in some countries and regions as a politically attractive alternative to the traditional “linear
economy” [2–4]. Despite the fact that such a process is, strictly speaking, a violation of the Second
Law of Thermodynamics [5], a strong approach to a circular economy may be regarded as a significant
improvement over present day practices [6]. The systems perspective of the circular economy implies a
preference for repair, reuse, remanufacture, and recycling as strategies to maintain products in service.
If this is not possible, the preference is to recycle the product efficiently, rather than dump it as refuse.
Which “economy” does one have in mind when speaking of the circular economy? In fact,
is the word economy that is appropriate in this context, given that in a modern economic system
each transaction must make sense economically [7,8]? The circular economy approach thus far is
clearly focused on materials, and the implication is that it is appropriate to consider it on a regional
scale [4,6]—this is probably because Europe is the geographical location of those who have been active
in pursuing the concept. It has been observed that it is economically impractical to imagine that a
circular economy system could exist within arbitrary geographical borders [9,10] due to globalized
systems of production and consumption. Such a system would require each constituency (country,
region, etc.) to maintain a complete sequence of industrial capacity for the processing of a full spectrum
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of materials through every stage of their life cycles [11]. No country or region anywhere in the world
meets or could meet that criterion, which requires suitable domestic resources throughout the periodic
table, a full manufacturing capability across all aspects of modern technology, and a comprehensive
recovery, refurbishment, reuse, and recycling program.
If one grants that the circular economy concept is appealing but challenging, how can a more
structured assessment of its potential be achieved? As with many discussions, quantitative information
is a useful guide to a more informed perspective, notably for minerals and metals where supply is
often concentrated but demand is fragmented and difficult to track. In this regard, national-level
life cycles of five materials (four metals and one alloy) are herein presented for Australia, a country
with extensive and intensive mining activity, but one that utilizes resources at a very modest level
by comparison [12]. This work complements related research in which the criticality of the metals
is evaluated [13] and scenarios of feasible future supply and demand of the metals are explored
(forthcoming). First, we summarize comments on the circular society potential for each of the cycles
and on the environmental implications of the country profile. Then, we explore Australia’s options for
achieving or approaching a circular society for those materials and reflect on the political and societal
aspects of those options. Finally, we outline comments on what these results have to say about the
potential for global realization of the circular economy concept.
2. Methodology
A generic diagram for the material life cycle of a metal is shown in Figure 1. The virgin metal
enters the cycle at the lower left, moves from one life cycle stage to the next around the circle, ends the
life cycle at the bottom right, and, if circularity is to be achieved, returns to the center of the circle and
subsequently reenters the cycle to undergo a subsequent use.
Several circled numbers representing metal flows were added to the Figure 1 generic cycle in order
to discuss the potential for country-level circularity. Flow 1 represents the flow of metal concentrate,
which results from a comminution process that crushes metal-containing ore and performs a rough
separation of minerals from gangue by froth flotation (concentrate is the form of a mine’s output
most often imported or exported). Flow 2 represents the flow of impure metal, from which the anions
present in the minerals have been largely extracted in the smelting process, followed by refining the
metal to purity, fabricating semi-products (sheets, rod, etc.), and product manufacturing. Flow 3 is the
outflow of the target metal in domestically manufactured products. This can be added to or subtracted
from flow 4, the amount of the target metal in imported or exported products. Flows 3 and 4 combine
to provide the magnitude of flow 5, the amount of the target metal flowing into domestic use. Flow 6
is the domestic recycled flow fed back into the domestic material flow cycle; as Birat [14] notes, it is an
extremely challenging step for many metals. However, for a system to completely satisfy circularity
for a target metal, flow 6 must be equal to flow 5.
Material flow cycles for selected metals in Australia are constructed upon data generated for
this project or as part of more comprehensive projects published previously. The goal for each of
the five materials was to generate and/or evaluate sufficient data to construct a cycle on the model
of Figure 1 for 2010, the reference year for data consistency across the targeted materials. Doing so
required extensive acquisition and vetting of information across the entire metal life cycle from mining
to product use to obsolescence to reuse. In the cases of aluminum, copper, nickel, and stainless steel,
the analyses were carried out specifically for this project. For zinc, a recently published study provided
a 2010 Australian cycle as part of a global zinc assessment [15]. For all metals other than zinc, details of
data sources related to Australia and the ways in which material flows were characterized are provided
in the Supplementary Information (Tables S1–S5).
The elemental information generated by means of material flow analysis (MFA) constituted the
basis for computing the environmental implications associated with a metal value chain. The mining
industry is very energy-intensive and, as such, is one of the largest industrial sectors contributing
to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions [16]. Using gross energy requirements as a proxy for
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environmental impacts [17], in particular for energy-related GHG emissions, we computed first-order
estimates of energy requirements per life cycle stage and for the share of the energy embodied in trade
in Australia compared to metal production and consumption. Overall, our model determined the
embodied energy in mining, beneficiation, smelting, and refining, prorated for primary and secondary
metal inputs. For the fabrication and manufacturing stages, global averages for cradle-to-gate data
were used, assuming that the energy required for further processing is negligible compared to that of
earlier life cycle stages. Life cycle inventory (LCI) databases and literature were used in combination,
as described in the Supplementary Information.
Figure 1. The generic life cycle of a metal at the country level. The dots between the life cycle stages
represent international markets through which resources can be imported or exported. In a “circular
economy” model, most or all metal would move around the right side of the diagram and through
the scrap market back into reuse, while the extraction of virgin resources would be diminished or
eliminated. Mi—mining, S—smelting, R—refining, F—fabrication, Mfg—manufacturing, U—use,
W—waste management. The circled numbers refer to the discussion in the text.
3. Results
As a first example of our results, Figure 2a presents the Australian material flow cycle for
aluminum in 2010. Australia is one of the world’s major producers of bauxite and alumina; in 2010,
22,100 Gg Al were extracted in the country from virgin ores. Of that amount, about 2200 Gg were
net-exported after mining, 8600 Gg after refining, and 1700 Gg as unwrought aluminum forms. Less
than 5% of aluminum originally mined in 2010 entered fabrication for the production of semi-finished
goods through extrusion, rolling, foundry casting, and other fabrication processes. A total of 600 Gg
of semi-finished goods were then processed into finished goods and, with the additional import of
about 300 Gg, entered the use phase. Due to its relatively long in-use lifetime, aluminum embedded
in principal end-use sectors such as building and construction and transportation accumulates as
in-use stock (400 Gg in 2010). The largest amount of aluminum scrap generated annually derives from
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packaging and containers. Of the total amount of aluminum scrap (500 Gg), only a minor fraction was
domestically processed for recycling, with about 200 Gg of aluminum scrap being exported mainly
to China, and more than 200 Gg were disposed of in landfill. Aluminum scrap input to secondary
smelting is estimated at about 100 Gg. Even with perfect recycling of secondary sources, achieving a
circular economy for aluminum in Australia is inhibited by increasing metal demand and the time
delay in scrap generation.
The Australian cycle for copper appears in Figure 2b. About 1000 Gg of copper was extracted and
processed from Australian mines in 2010. Primary copper production amounted to 870 Gg, of which
more than half was exported. Smelters processed 380 Gg of copper, as well as about 50 Gg of copper
from secondary (recycled) sources. Total unrefined copper production was 410 Gg; this amount plus
the addition of 40 Gg from net-import of copper anodes resulted in a total copper cathode production
of about 450 Gg. More than 60% of the refined copper was exported, and the remaining fraction was
processed to create semi-finished goods such as wires and rods, strips, sheets, castings, and tubes.
Net-input of new scrap to fabrication was estimated at 10 Gg. Apparent consumption of wrought
copper forms amounted to 120 Gg; this flow was processed through manufacturing processes and
supplemented with 170 Gg Cu imported in finished goods. Major application sectors included building
and construction, infrastructure, machinery and equipment, transportation, and consumer durables.
Total copper entering use amounted to 290 Gg. The copper net addition to in-use stock was estimated
at 190 Gg, which represents around two thirds of the total flow entering use. At end-of-life, 100 Gg
of copper was discarded. Subtracting 40 Gg of copper in exported obsolete products, 60 Gg were
processed through the national waste management system. Of that amount, about 20 Gg of copper
were not recovered and lost from the cycle.
In Figure 2c we show the Australian nickel cycle. This cycle is quite similar to that of copper
in Figure 2b, but shows even less manufacturing activity. In 2010, Australia extracted 210 Gg Ni
domestically, of which 170 Gg went into the smelting process. About 60 Gg Ni were exported, while
100 Gg underwent domestic refining and then were almost entirely exported. What nickel is used in
the economy is largely contained in products made outside Australia and imported. However, the
level of nickel imports is small, and recycling is rather efficient. About 20 Gg Ni entered the use phase,
10 Gg net-accumulated in the anthropogenic reserve, while 10 Gg Ni were generated at end-of-life.
The Australian cycle for zinc appears in Figure 2d [15]. Australia is one of the world’s major
zinc mining countries, extracting more than 2000 Gg (thousand metric tons) of zinc in 2010. Of that
amount, some 1680 Gg were exported immediately after mining and another 310 Gg were exported
after smelting. Australian fabrication and manufacturing processes employed less than 10% of that
originally mined, and transferred most of that material into use. Because products remain in use
for extended periods, discards from use do not balance the input flow, i.e., zinc stock contained in
products grows over time. It is clear that even with perfect recycling (which is not occurring now),
Australia cannot come close to achieving a circular economy for zinc if it must achieve that goal within
its own borders.
The Australian stainless steel cycle for 2010 is given in Figure 2e. This cycle is not for a single
metal but for an alloy, one with the approximate composition of 15Cr-9Ni. Australia is a producer of
each of these alloy metals, but not of stainless steel itself. However, the country imports stainless steel
at the manufacturing stage (100 Gg), and the products of that life stage provide most of the stainless
steel for Australian use. Virtually all stainless steel scrap is exported, but need not be, because there
is the potential for an Australian circular economy of stainless steel given the approximate balance
between flows of stainless steel into and out of use.
153
Resources 2019, 8, 32
Figure 2. The Australian cycle of aluminum (a, this work), copper (b, this work), nickel (c, this work),
zinc (d, [15]), and stainless steel 15Cr-9Ni (e, this work). The units are Gigagrams (thousand metric tons)
of metallic equivalent per year. The year of reference is 2010. Flows may not add up due to rounding.
In Figure 3, the embodied energy in trade allocated to the targeted materials production is
reported. Overall, greater embodied energy results in exports than imports for aluminum (90% and
15%, respectively), copper (96%, 43%), nickel (103%, 16%), and zinc (90%, 6%). In absolute terms,
the cumulative results for the five materials follow those for aluminum, which is a main driver of
energy embodied in trade for Australia due to the primary role of Australia in the global value chain
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of this metal and the relatively high energy requirements per unit of virgin aluminum processed.
This trend becomes more evident if the embodied energy is compared to consumption (i.e., flow into
use) rather than production (Figure 4). In this case, the energy embodied in exports of nickel and
zinc is up to 8 times greater than that attributable to the amount of material consumed in Australia.
For aluminum and copper, the energy embodied in exports is between 2 and 4 times that associated
with the flow into use. For stainless steel 15Cr-9Ni, the entire flow into use in Australia is imported,
with only a relatively small fraction of this alloy (5%) being exported in finished goods.
Figure 3. Energy embodied in trade as a fraction of metal production in Australia (%). N/A—Not applicable.
Figure 4. Energy embodied in trade as a fraction of metal consumption in Australia (%).
4. Discussion
Figure 2 makes it apparent that Australia is far from being a circular economy so far as metals
and alloys are concerned. However, Lane [7] pointed out that the appropriate geographical scale for a
circular economy is open to discussion. Within its national boundaries, Australia is active in the first
stages of most metal life cycles, has a modest manufacturing capability, and possesses the potential for
recovery and reuse at the end of product life [18]. That product life could be enhanced by designing
for more efficient maintenance [19], refurbishment [20], remanufacture [21–23], and reuse, as well as
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cascading uses as an alternative to discard and improved separation [24]. Such actions would not help
to circularize the Australian metals cycles, but would result in lowering the metal flow in imports to
the use stage.
Australia has the potential for circular economy partnerships with countries around the world [25].
As pointed out above, however, each step of the process must make economic sense if it is to happen.
Ultimately, increasing material circularity is one of the possible ways to improve the sustainability of
resource use and to achieve the desired goal of extending the longevity of resources [26].
An innovative idea put forth by Giurco et al. [24] is that the rapid development of additive
manufacturing may make it feasible for product manufacturing to be increasingly local—additive
manufacturing could make it more efficient to produce new parts or products locally rather than
to import them. The steps leading to additive manufacturing would be important to consider
in this regard. To manufacture new products from discarded ones, the products would need to
be disassembled in detail, the metal melted at perhaps 1000–1600 ◦C (depending on the metal),
and the molten metal formed into powder by water or gas atomization [27] to enable additive
manufacturing. This would add a step to the material’s reuse process, and thus would need to
make technological, energetic, and economic sense, but it might move some of Australia’s metal cycles
closer to circularization from a national perspective.
From the perspective of this paper, it is also of interest to ask “What is the prime motivating reason
for supporting a more circular economy?” Among the possible answers to this question are (1) it will
be economically beneficial, (2) it will minimize environmental impacts such as energy requirements
and carbon emissions, and (3) it will conserve resources, especially scarce resources. Our discussion
herein does not speak to the first of these, but it does address the last two. From that standpoint,
an increasingly circular economy does indeed speak to resource conservation, but only if the scale of
circularity is sufficiently broad.
The minimization of environmental impacts, supply risk, and vulnerability to supply restriction
are features related to the global challenge of mitigating resource scarcity and are commonly covered
in material criticality assessments [28]. The dynamic nature of criticality and its variance in space and
among materials is influenced by geological, geopolitical, economic, social, technical, and regulatory
factors [13]. For instance, Australia holds large deposits of major metals, but the global metal
production network distributes material over a multi-tiered supply chain. While outsourcing and
globalization may increase resilience to supply deficits, a diffuse and interlinked supply chain limits
transparency and accountability, makes cascade-effects challenging to predict, and ultimately prevents
the country from approaching or achieving material circularity [29].
This relationship and interdependence between organizations and the natural environment is
a main source of complexity in the implementation of the circular economy [30]. Global awareness
about the importance of integrating sustainability issues beyond the first-tier levels in supply chain
management is increasing [31], but dispersed supply chains like those of minerals and metals are
difficult to track within components and manufactured products originating from diverse sources [32].
As the metal cycles have demonstrated, Australia is a very significant supplier of primary
resources to the rest of the world. This feature determines a shift between the location of metal
production and that of use, which shapes national environmental profiles and may influence the
perception of economic costs associated with global climate policy [33]. A considerable variation in
energy requirements based on consumption (i.e., flow into use) rather than production introduces
a geographical dimension in the environmental pressure of resource cycles and may reduce the
net environmental benefits of recycling, ultimately undermining the potential to achieve carbon
neutral economies.
At the national level, recovering an obsolete product containing, for instance, stainless steel
(iron, chromium, and sometimes nickel and molybdenum) conserves the metals and/or alloys only
if appropriate domestic processing technology exists. If it does not, the discarded material must be
exported to an appropriate country or region where the technology resides, an action that might
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compromise both the environmental and economic aspects of resource recovery. The international
trade of secondary materials and their recycling in countries with different CO2-eq emissions per unit
of electrical energy generated and different process efficiencies compared to those of primary producer
countries may cause leakages in carbon accounting [33]. This is not to say that a circular economy
goal is undesirable, but rather that it must be carefully analyzed in all aspects to make sure that its
intentions can in fact be realized. Further refinement of the role of institutions and international trade
in the circular economy concept is hence needed to solve the dichotomy between global efforts of
policies, legislation, and society against individual company efforts of profitability, competitiveness,
and manufacturing capacity [28].
5. Conclusions
In this work, the Australia anthropogenic cycles of five materials (four metals and one alloy)
were analyzed and utilized to provide novel insights into the circular society potential for each of
the cycles and carbon neutral prospects in Australia. Considering the role of Australia in the early
stages of metal supply chains, the elemental information provided in this work will contribute to
an understanding of the modern metabolism of the targeted resources as well as inform criticality
assessments and scenario analyses. Absolute amounts of resources in metallic equivalents per life
cycle stage were combined with related life cycle inventory per unit of mass of resource to estimate
the gross energy requirements allocated to production, trade, and consumption for Australia. While
the material flow approach can be used to highlight the magnitude of carbon emissions embodied
in international trade, production-based emissions inventories may be preferable for demonstrating
implications to global climate policy. More integrative research in this direction can build upon the
framework demonstrated herein.
To summarize, the results in this work have demonstrated that a circular materials economy
is difficult to impossible to achieve at the level of a single country. Australia has been used as an
example, but no country anywhere has a complete collection of the technologies that would be needed
in order to achieve circularity. It is apparent that a circular economy must be conceived at the global
level, and must be cognizant of the losses that are inevitable at every life stage. In addition, the
material handling and ocean transport needed for circularity need to be weighed against the potential
environmental impacts of such activities. The circular economy concept remains a promising goal, but
one that should not be slavishly followed to the detriment of other environmental goals.
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